

National Model United Nations

Week A

March 17 – March 21, 2013



Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations

Documentation

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Committee Staff

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Agenda

1. Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts
2. Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations
3. Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements

Resolutions adopted by the committee

Document Code	Topic	Vote (Y/ N/ Abstention/ Non-Voting)
C34/1/L.1	Peace Bonds	72/2/21/42
C34/1/L.2	Gender perspective	85/5/6/42
C34/1/L.3	Rule of Law	84/4/6/42
C34/1/L.4	Finance	89/1/6/42
C34/1/L.5	Standby Peacekeeping Team	84/3/9/42
C34/1/L.6	DKPO	78/3/16/42
C34/1/L.7	Standardized Training	76/9/11/42
C34/1/L.8	Sovereignty	33/47/16/42
C34/1/L.9	Civilian Capacity	85/2/9/42
C34/1/1	Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts (compiled report segments)	N/A

Summary Report

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations assembled for the first time on Sunday evening to discuss, review, and report on crucial issues within the field of peacekeeping operations, namely the following topics:

- 1.Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts
- 2.Cooperation and Capacity Building within Regional Arrangements
- 3.Strengthening the Protection Mandates of Peacekeeping Operations

The delegates of the Special Committee immediately began negotiations regarding the order of the topics to set priorities. After the first suspension, four varying motions to set the order of the agenda were brought forward and voted upon. The third suggestion was approved by the body and the agenda was set in the order of 1 - 3 - 2. In the following hour, delegates stated their opinions and exchanged views on the first topic, Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts. After several speeches and another informal caucus, the body suspended the session until the next day at 2:30 pm.

On Monday's session the delegates began forming groups to work on draft report segments. Remarks were made by speakers who expressed their ideas of reforms that would strengthen stabilization efforts in post-conflict areas in speeches and during informal caucusing. Proposed reforms included establishing joint training operations between regional partners, gender reforms that would encourage increased female participation in peacekeeping forces, finance reform, and the creation of standby forces. By the end of the evening, five draft report segments had been worked on.

During Tuesday morning's session, work on the draft report segments continued. Delegates caucused and proceeded to work diligently on their drafts during the following sessions, with speeches focusing on the key sub-topics being discussed, including financial reform, gender equality in the peacekeeping process, the establishment of standby forces, and an infrastructure project. Even after several hours of tiring negotiating and revising, spirits remained high and by the end of the day, a total of ten draft report segments were under discussion. On Tuesday evening, delegates continued to further negotiated and cooperated on the content of the future report.

Wednesday's session began with the presentation of the various segments that had been officially introduced. Between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, several papers had been merged. The first draft report segments were accepted by the dais during the late hours of the morning session. A motion to close the speaker's list was introduced and approved by the body. Throughout the afternoon, further improved working papers were submitted. The body saw nine draft report segments in total.

Of the nine draft report segments considered for voting, eight segments were accepted. Three segments were amended, with four amendments in total. The division of the question was introduced for segment number 2 in order to separate clause 9 and 10; however, only one delegate voted in favor of this motion. Lastly, delegates voted to adjourn the meeting for the year. The Special Committee's final

report proposed innovative, comprehensive reforms with the promise to revolutionize the role of peacekeeping operations in post-conflict stabilization.

Code: C34/1/1

Committee: Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Subject: Reforming Peacekeeping to Strengthen Post-Conflict Stabilization Efforts

1 **I. Introduction**

3 **A. PEACE BONDS**

5 1. While approved resources for 1 July 2012-30 June 2013 are at 7.33 billion USD
6 [A/C.5/66/18], current outstanding contributions to UN peacekeeping operations as of January
7 31, 2013 amount to 3.34 billion USD. Over 30 percent of all funding required for the
8 peacekeeping operations' budget is still outstanding. Inadequate funding gives rise to major
9 security issues. The UN has an important responsibility to deliver on promised funding and troop
10 levels. When the UN over-promises and under-delivers, higher civilian and military fatalities
11 result.

13 2. In 2012, the Special Committee released in its annual report (A/66/19) a summary of the
14 financial status and shortfalls of peacekeeping operations, which highlighted outstanding
15 payments to donor countries as far back as 2002 (A/C.5/66/18). Current troop-contributing
16 countries shoulder a substantial financial burden. The current funding system is unsustainable
17 and could jeopardize future peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization efforts.

19 3. The sale and trade of bonds to help in global development are not new concepts; in 1962, the
20 UN General Assembly approved a three-point financial plan which included the issuing of UN
21 bonds. This designated to the UN Secretary-General the authority to issue bonds. It also
22 specifically recommended that the Secretary-General work in conjunction with the Advisory
23 Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, enabling the two to issue bonds as
24 deemed appropriate. This precedent could be applied to peacekeeping operations that are
25 continually under-funded or that lack funding when initially mandated by the Security Council.

27 4. In the past, the UN has experienced a lack of funding for major initiatives, such as the
28 "Decade of Development" or the era of decolonization efforts throughout the world. To address
29 the conflict in the Congo, General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) authorized the Secretary-
30 General to issue bonds to finance a peacekeeping operation to resolve this conflict. At the time,
31 this peacekeeping operation was the most costly in UN history. Most likely, due to limiting the
32 bond sales to the American domestic market alone and to the UN fixing the overall interest rate
33 as opposed to the market controlling the rate, the endeavor failed and left the project short of
34 funds, as is the case with many of today's peacekeeping operations.

36 5. Other departments within the UN, such as the Financing for Development Office of the
37 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), have more recently developed systems of
38 trading and issuing bonds based off of a Member State's GDP. While this has been effective in
39 developing markets for the purpose of bolstering GDP and growth, this project has not yet been
40 tailored to security or peacekeeping issues and remains only a program of the Department of
41 Economic and Social Affairs.

43 **B. INCENTIVES FOR MEMBER-STATES TO MEET QUOTAS**

44
45 6. Approximately 31 percent of the donations Member States have pledged have not been
46 received, indicating the absence of an incentive among UN Member States to fulfil their
47 financial obligations. There is currently no system to deter Member States from failing to meet
48 their predetermined quotas.

49
50 **C. NON-FINANCIAL PRODUCT INVESTMENT MECHANISMS**

51
52 7. Through non-financial product investment mechanisms, Member States can foster local
53 ownership and the promotion of employment and development in post-conflict areas. Using local
54 physical and human resources in conjunction with expertise for reconstruction can strengthen
55 these states. In 2008, for instance, in the case of Lebanon, Qatar used a participant banking
56 system and non-financial product investment mechanisms to reach a peace agreement between
57 Hezbollah and the Lebanese government (Doha Agreement). The promise to provide foreign
58 capital and investment in order to rebuild infrastructure contributed to the conclusion of the Doha
59 Agreement, and is thus an outstanding example of how even the possibility of foreign investment
60 can positively contribute to achieving peace and post-conflict stabilization.

61
62 **D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS**
63 **FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION**

64
65 8. Women provide a unique and comprehensive perspective when it comes to dealing with post-
66 conflict stabilization (PCS). These insights are crucial in regards to the effects of armed conflict
67 on women and children, and the process of sustainable peace after the peacekeeping mission has
68 ended. Currently, over 235 officers have been specially trained in Women and Children
69 Protective operations, and sent to over 15 counties in Liberia. These Protection Units are
70 invaluable to communities affected by sexual and gender-based violence, and gives them a
71 secure place to report crime and danger, especially considering, Security Council Resolution
72 1820 (2008) which affirms that sexual violence against women and girls is an official war
73 strategy and crime against humanity, giving victims a base for claiming justice. The
74 Peacebuilding Fund has issued a 5 million USD gender promotion initiative to support women in
75 peacebuilding. Additionally, the UN has a minimum of 15 percent of financing promised to post-
76 conflict gender equality and women's empowerment. The UN is also working to further increase
77 that percent.

78
79 9. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on "Women and peace and security" calls for "equal
80 participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and
81 security." In 2009, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) set a goal ratio of 20%
82 female peacekeepers in police units by 2014 however as of December 2012, women represented
83 2% of all military peacekeeping personnel. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in his 2010 report
84 on women in peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466), connects the inclusion of more women in
85 peacekeeping operations to the protection and empowerment of women and post-conflict
86 stabilization. The all-female Indian police force, deployed as part of the UN Mission in Liberia
87 (UNMIL), empowered Liberian women through programs such as self-defense classes as well as
88 promotion of hygiene and sanitation. With aid from the UN, the Liberia National Police has

89 increased its female representation, increasing the percentage of the police force that is female to
90 17% as of September 2012. As discussed in the 2012 UN Women report entitled “Addressing
91 Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice”, the
92 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS)
93 have developed mission-wide strategies and pre-deployment training procedures focused on
94 protecting women from sexual violence. The Secretariat’s Senior Advisory Group on Troop
95 Reimbursement Rates and Related Issues has made efforts to ensure that Member States are
96 reimbursed for the provision of troops, police, and resources to peacekeeping operations, as most
97 recently discussed by the General Assembly in 2002.

98
99 10. The importance of gender consideration in peacekeeping operations has been accepted by the
100 international community in the past decade. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on
101 Women, Peace and Security served as a guideline for the actions that had to be taken in order to
102 include gender consideration in peacekeeping operations. Following the recommendations a
103 growing amount of countries have highlighted the importance of Security Council Resolution
104 1325 (2000) by creating and applying national action plans for implementation. These programs
105 have underlined the need for a better integration of gender perspectives "into all projects,
106 operations, policy making and legislation regarding peace, security and development issues" as
107 stated in the aforementioned document. The challenge of sexual and gender based violence has
108 also been further included in the training of the military, police and civilian personnel.

109
110 **E. INVOLVEMENT, THE RULE OF LAW, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND**
111 **NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH**
112

113 11. Since the start of UN peacekeeping operations in 1948, the process of peacekeeping has
114 evolved hand in hand with the specific needs of post-conflict states. Peacekeeping was originally
115 limited to observational tasks for maintaining ceasefires in post-conflict situations and stabilizing
116 situations on the ground. However, over the years the concept of peacekeeping has expanded to
117 complex and multidimensional operations. Peace cannot be achieved without stable, legitimate,
118 and transparent institutions of governance along with adherence to the rule of law. This
119 multidimensional approach to peacekeeping was recently affirmed by Security Council
120 resolution 2086, specifying especially in article 8 the wide variety of peacebuilding tasks UN
121 Peacekeeping missions can and should take on.

122
123 12. The Policy Evaluation and Training Division currently lacks sufficient resources and
124 capacities to effectively manage, research, and strategize on behalf of peacekeeping operations in
125 the face of a growing need of peacekeeping forces globally.

126
127 13. The end of the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was initiated in 2000
128 by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Poland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, illustrated the issues
129 such as: a lack of adequate resources, incoherent logistical frameworks, conflicting political
130 support, and breakdowns in the lines of communication, that this standing force had to face.
131 SHIRBRIG revealed the limits of cooperation between national disparate systems and the
132 necessity of appropriate resources, more efficient lines of communication, and the need for
133 coherent strategy between stakeholders. Given the expanding nature of peacekeeping, the same

134 problems in which undermined the success of SHIRBRIG put current peacekeeping operating
135 structures at as much risk to be undermined in the same manner.

136
137 14. Currently, over 120 Member States contribute military and police personnel that carry out the
138 mandates of a particular peacekeeping mission. However, problems have resulted from cultural
139 factors either within a post-conflict state or between peacekeeping forces themselves.

140
141 15. Member States have demonstrated a desire to take on larger roles in supporting peace within
142 their own regions. In 2013, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
143 assisted with stabilization efforts in the Republic of Mali. Similarly, the UN Stabilisation
144 Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has benefitted greatly from Latin American involvement.

145
146 16. International normative values and declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human
147 Rights provide recognized standards of good governance accepted by large parts of the
148 international community. Moreover, prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
149 sanctioned by the UN such as Amnesty International have proven to be vital assets in both
150 reporting and reforming legal, political, and judicial structures.

151
152 17. A particular problem continues to arise in which governance branches in post-conflict states
153 are viewed as illegitimate and lacking in transparency, as stated by the Security Council in
154 Resolution 2086. Under this circumstance, the rule of law deteriorates, and the resultant rise in
155 crime, violence, and conflict threatens the stability in post-conflict nations.

156
157 18. Ensuring both the military and police can adequately uphold the rule of law and maintain a
158 legitimate monopoly over violence is vital in stabilization efforts once conflict has subsided.
159 Efforts to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) following the War in Afghanistan demonstrate
160 both the hope and the struggles associated with SSR. Nevertheless, as the Security Council
161 iterates in resolution 2086, ensuring a sovereign state can maintain its own security is of the
162 utmost importance in continuing efforts for stabilization in post-conflict nations. However, in
163 accordance with sovereignty and the UN Charter, SSR should adhere to the voluntary conditions
164 the Special Committee previously suggested in its 2009 report to the General Assembly
165 (A/62/19).

166
167 19. The illicit trade and black markets for armaments and security equipment are a growing
168 problem. SSR endeavors must be cautious to ensure any armament trade or transfer adheres to
169 UN resolutions, such as General Assembly resolution 62/47, and international law, such as the
170 *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT) currently in negotiation.

171
172 20. The *Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations 2000* (A/55/305), or commonly known
173 as the Brahimi Report, stated national and regional security is greatly enhanced when economic
174 conditions are sufficient for providing necessary goods, services, and necessities required to
175 sustain the well-being of post-conflict actors as noted in General Assembly resolution A/62/19.
176 The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on UN
177 peace operations (A/55/502) reiterates this belief.

178

179 21. Currently, the World Bank’s International Development Association’s Trust Fund for East
180 Timor is assisting in providing capital to facilitate reconstructive efforts that lend towards
181 stabilization and human security efforts. The World Bank’s efforts have emphasized and helped
182 create stakeholder partnerships to ensure transparency, accountability, prosperity, stabilization to
183 East Timor. These efforts are largely mitigating the many contributing factors to a re-escalation
184 in conflict and violence.

185
186 22. UN bodies, arms-length organizations, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and
187 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a continuing positive effect on reducing the
188 extraneous causes of conflict and contributing towards peaceful post-conflict stabilization efforts
189 as found within General Assembly resolution 56/201 and *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting*
190 *a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*.

191 192 **F. FINANCIAL ISSUES**

193
194 23. The financing of peacekeeping operations is a collective responsibility of all Member States
195 of the UN, and should be carried out in full observance of the general principles and cost-sharing
196 guidelines established in General Assembly resolutions 1874 (S-IV) and 28/3101.

197
198 24. In his speech during the 62nd Annual DPI/NGO Conference, Secretary-General Ban Ki-
199 Moon addressed the challenges in the current financing of peacekeeping, claiming that “the
200 world is over-armed and peace is under-funded”. The budget for UN peacekeeping operations for
201 the fiscal year of 1 July 2012-30 June 2013 is approximately 7.33 billion dollars, as stated in
202 A/C.5/66/18. This is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures, which have
203 risen to 1,738 billion dollars according to 2011 estimates.

204
205 25. The transition from conflict-phase peacekeeping activities to a post-conflict stabilization
206 stage poses special challenges concerning financing as different funding mechanisms apply
207 under a crisis management framework versus under traditional programmatic UN work.
208 Currently, a number of actors who operate in post-conflict settings are not acknowledged under
209 or bound by peacekeeping guidelines, namely Special Political Missions and the donor
210 community.

211
212 26. Proliferation of field-based Special Political Missions, which have transcended their original
213 reporting and monitoring mandates to take on multidimensional tasks, are increasingly becoming
214 a significant financing concern. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with
215 administrative and budgetary matters, has expressed concern over the proposed 567 million
216 dollars needed for continuing expansion of these missions. The budget for special political
217 missions has risen by 1,256 percent in the last decade. The Report of the Secretary General to the
218 Fifth Committee (A/66/340) acknowledged that by 2000, the average core sets of mandated tasks
219 for Special Political Missions was 4, and included traditional roles such as political process
220 facilitation, peace agreement implementation, coordination with the UN country team, and
221 mobilization of international assistance in connection to elections. Only one decade later, half of
222 the 14 existing Special Political Missions had grown to include mandates containing 12 to 24
223 tasks.

224

225 27. This expansion is only expected to continue, bringing about a concomitant increase in the
226 demand for resources. Although there are currently 31 deployed special political missions with
227 33 proposed for 2013 and most of them discharge traditional, more limited mandates, the subset
228 of 15 field-based missions entrusted with multidimensional mandates utilize 94 percent of all
229 resources destined for Special Political Missions. This discrepancy in cost, added to the potential
230 redundancy of duties vis-à-vis peacekeeping forces deployed in the transition and handover
231 phase, has invited questions about their classification as political missions.
232

233 28. Funding for the Special Political Missions is currently set up under the perennial programme
234 budget process, namely from regular budget appropriations. This alternative has been singled out
235 as problematic through debates and addressed fruitlessly by the Secretary-General in A/66/340.
236

237 29. Firstly, these missions do not follow the programmatic budget cycle, as they can be set up at
238 any time of the year, and thereby present a challenge to a budgeting process founded upon
239 predictability.
240

241 30. Secondly, although field-based Special Political Missions are largely indistinguishable from
242 peacekeeping operations, financing them through the regular budget ignores both the special
243 responsibility of the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the area of peace and
244 security, and the fundamental difference in capacity between the developed and developing
245 nations enshrined in A/RES/1874 and A/RES/28/3101.
246

247 31. Thirdly, given the recurrent shortfalls in the regular budget, it is common practice to fund
248 Special Political Missions through closed accounts of Peacekeeping Operations, instead of
249 allocating those funds to cover overdue reimbursements to Troop- and Police-Contributing
250 Countries (TCC/PCC).
251

252 32. Fourthly, although the DPKO is singularly tasked with providing support and backstopping
253 to Special Political Missions, the budgetary distinction between Peacekeeping and the Special
254 Political Missions that follow and/or overlap in deployment leads to efficiency losses: staff
255 whose posts are funded through a specific Peacekeeping support account cannot lend assistance
256 to Special Political Missions, so that the DPKO must make available other staff whose posts will
257 be funded through the programmatic budget. This disconnect places a serious burden on the
258 DPKO and drains existing capacity.
259

260 33. The development of general principles for the financing of UN peacekeeping operations
261 under General Assembly resolution 67/224 was not followed up with prompt and effective
262 implementation. Current financing methods for peacekeeping operations will remain ineffective
263 unless additional changes are made in the preexisting finance framework for peacekeeping
264 operations. As established in General Assembly resolution 64/249, regular UN budget
265 procedures are not sufficient to meet expenditures arising from such operations.
266

267 34. The Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning (ST/SGB/2000/8), particularly
268 rules 104.7(a) and 105.4(a) which calls for budgetary allocations to clearly contribute to program
269 objectives, constitute a framework for the formulation of feasible peacekeeping strategies.
270 Peacekeeping plans should be thoroughly formulated and defined in order to avoid situations

271 where underfinanced missions continue to operate without accomplishing their specified
272 mandate. Responsible implementation of peacekeeping strategies will allow for a more
273 comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the auspices of the UN.
274

275 **G. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STANDBY PEACE BUILDING TEAMS AND** 276 **INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY**

277
278 35. Military and police presence alone does not always prevent the reoccurrence of crisis in a
279 post-conflict zone. The present categorization of peacekeeping personnel into civilian, military,
280 and police overlooks the need to address the crucial role infrastructure plays in post-conflict
281 stabilization.
282

283 36. As determined by EuropeAid, an organization concerned with the design of development
284 policies in the European Union (EU), the four key pillars of infrastructure development are
285 energy, transportation, communication, and sanitation and water supply.
286

287 37. Peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Sudan and Liberia have shown,
288 that UN experts are not always familiar with regional cultural, traditional, religious, or political
289 affairs during post-conflict situations. The Brahimi Report outlined that under the current system
290 in the UN, there is currently no way to identify, recruit, and efficiently deploy qualified civilian
291 specialists in substantive and support functions in peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report
292 also outlines the number of vacancies present in field and administrative positions, as the field
293 operations are operating at only 50 percent efficiency, while administrative positions are
294 operating at 40 percent efficiency. This is due to the rate of recruitment and the rate of departure
295 by mission personnel.
296

297 38. Security Council Resolution 2086 is committed to strengthening the UN's fundamental role
298 through a multidimensional approach. It emphasizes the connection between making, building
299 and identifies peace as essential to effectively approach post-conflict situations.
300

301 39. The state of emergency that arises from post-conflict situations requires an immediate
302 response. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was created in 2000 and
303 subsequently decommissioned in 2009 due to a decision-making process that proved to be
304 unreliable because of conflicting political support. Presently, the UN lacks a standby
305 peacekeeping force.
306

307 **H. STRUCTURAL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES WITHIN DPKO AND DFS**

308
309 40. The decade since the publishing of the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
310 Operations (the Brahimi Report) has seen a substantial increase in the level of peacekeeping
311 operations being undertaken, as well as increases to aggregate UN peacekeeping force numbers
312 and the UN budget for peacekeeping operations. In the last ten years alone, the number of
313 military/police deployed on DPKO operations increase from 36,948 to 93,368 in January 2013.
314 The reforms put in place by the report therefore have not kept up with the current mission
315 demands on the DPKO and Department of Field Services. Both departments are operating
316 passed the level that was envisioned during their individual formation.

317
318 41. Furthermore, the necessary expedited nature and *ad hoc* process of mandate creation and
319 mission phase development, done before the necessary resources are fully sought out, has led to
320 the inability of both the DPKO and DFS to fulfill mandated tasks. This is particularly true in the
321 post-conflict stabilization phase, whereby too often the ability of both departments is hindered by
322 lack of critical capabilities. Moreover, the lack of asset-management due to overstretched DPKO
323 and DFS leads to reduced efficiency of resources and increase losses. The Security Council, in
324 resolutions 1327 and 1353, reiterates the aforementioned as well as increased systematic
325 consultation needed between the Security Council and UN peacekeeping entities for enhanced
326 dialogue and reduction of highlighted critical capacity deficiencies.

327
328 **I. STRUCTURE OF RESOURCES CONTRIBUTION**

329
330 42. At the heart of the UN Charter is its duty to propagate peace. The DPKO is the central UN
331 organ for preparing and coordinating peacekeeping operations. It is further assisted by the
332 Departments for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Political Affairs (DPA). The Special
333 Committee recognizes their key roles. But in many points there is still a lack in systematic and
334 efficient execution.

335
336 43. The Special Committee recognizes that the transition to a post-conflict stabilization phase of
337 peacekeeping mandates should be effective and prompt, as the initial stage of any mandate is the
338 time with the greatest risk to relapse into conflict. Moreover, the continued contribution of
339 adequate resources for mandate completion during the entirety of post-conflict stabilization is
340 crucial.

341
342 44. The Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), as an effort to create the UN's own
343 rapid deployment force, was launched under Danish patronage in 2000. Unfortunately it was
344 discontinued in 2009. Next to the shortage of member state commitments, it is problematic to
345 entertain a standby force, as it is financially exhausting. Additionally, an institutionalized army at
346 the UN-level raises problems regarding national sovereignty and can therefore be questioned in
347 terms of legitimacy. Further, the transfer of knowledge and information on Member States
348 commitments weakened SHIRBRIGs effectiveness.

349
350 45. Troop contribution is an expensive effort that deserves the highest appreciation, as it is a
351 necessary pillar for UN peacekeeping's ability to function. Often, there is a shortage or
352 misallocation of resources when UN peacekeeping operations are mandated. Furthermore,
353 situations exist where countries have a comparative advantage in their resources, either in
354 funding or the capability to supply troops. However, too often resources are not allocated
355 efficiently because of asymmetries of information.

356
357 46. The present and prior increasing of the capability of UN efforts through regional
358 arrangements has been of great value to post conflict stabilization. Hereby the UN offices to the
359 African Union and the European Union are of great value in terms of cooperation and
360 information exchange.

361

362 **J. STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN A MULTINATIONAL**
363 **NETWORK**

364
365 47. There has been a lack of standardization and multinational cooperation of peacekeeping
366 training, which lead to misunderstandings and a suboptimal allocation of funds and resources.
367

368 **K. TRAINING ON HIGH-TECH USAGE**

369
370 48. Peacekeeping relies on the collection and unbiased reporting of information. The use of
371 updated and latest technologies enhances the monitoring technologies at checkpoint, port of
372 entry and international line of control and in disarmament activities. This enhances the prospect
373 of success to implement a peace agreement.
374

375 49. Global positioning systems have been utilized successfully by militaries and other UN
376 missions such as the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan to aid
377 military operations, the Carlog system used by the DPKO in vehicle location information, and
378 UN Protection Force to track aid and supply convoys. Global Positioning Force has become a
379 standard for the operations of the modern world.
380

381 50. The use of technology especially in post conflict areas for the protection of civilians,
382 monitoring of imported shipments such as humanitarian supplies or collected weapons, can be
383 extremely beneficial.
384

385 51. The integration of monitoring technologies into peacekeeping operations improves the
386 security, effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping by protecting personnel, extending the
387 peacekeepers capabilities, providing objective and verifiable information, and saving resources.
388 It is recognized that modern technologies are a vital part of a successful public sector. It is
389 proven that computers and software aid in facilitating communication on a local level. However
390 as post-conflict areas are in the process of creating stability and order, they are not always
391 provided with the adequate means to do so.
392

393 52. The use of aerial vehicles have been incorporated into surveillance from the moment the
394 camera was invented by applying this once revolutionary technology into hot air balloons and
395 kites. However, the most recent advances in technology on aerial surveillance is extraordinary
396 and could be better integrated into peacekeeping missions.
397

398 53. Internet offers new ways to allow for the unrestricted transfer of needed information in order
399 to assist in the operations of UN peacekeepers in post conflict areas, by increasing the
400 accessibility of vital data and information as well as allowing for the easy communication across
401 difficult terrain.
402

403 **L. STRENGTHENING LOCAL SECURITY FORCES**

404
405 54. It is most important for security forces to be accepted among the people they are working
406 with. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations feels that in the current stage the

407 acceptance of local security forces is not sufficient in order to guarantee long-lasting successful
408 stabilization.

409
410 55. Communicational lines between local authorities, regional actors and UN responsibility
411 holders have been sub standard. . The past has shown that a lack of communication between the
412 parties leads to loss of efficiency and transparency.

413
414 **M. TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARDS TO MEDIATION AND CULTURAL**
415 **SENSITIVITY**

416
417 56. Mediation has been a key tool in stabilizing post-conflict areas such as South Africa,
418 Lesotho, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. There is no specific type of
419 mediation that is used during the stabilization process. However, mediators are always third
420 party, non-biased participators who can conduct a fair mediation. This allows for all parties
421 involved to feel non-threatened and the stabilization process to be neutral and impartial.

422
423 57. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as reported in the 2011 *Policy and Practice Brief* by The
424 African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, mediation was used as a tool for
425 conflict resolution and dispute settlement between the Tutsis and Hutus. More specifically,
426 Rwanda used *Abunzi Mediation*, which consisted of local Rwandan mediators, who were chosen
427 based on their good character and morals. Rwanda then passed the Organic Law in 2006 to fully
428 recognize the Abunzis as mediators. This mediation process also allowed for the idea of
429 decentralizing power, participation in community, and consensus-based decision making. The
430 Abunzi mediation proved to be a successful dispute settlement mechanism, and allowed
431 stabilization.

432
433 58. The UN Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II), as reported by the Defense Science Board
434 Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics in 2009, proved to be unsuccessful partly
435 because peacekeeping troops were not trained to be culturally sensitive. The Somali people could
436 not identify with the peacekeeping troops, which led to more violence and conflict within the
437 region.

438
439 **N. CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION IN PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS**

440
441 59. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305, Brahimi
442 Report) discussed the importance of the extent to which local authorities are willing and able to
443 take difficult but necessary political and social decisions and to participate in the establishment
444 of processes and mechanisms to manage internal disputes, and pre-empt violence or the re-
445 emergence of conflict in the context of peacekeeping operations in post-conflict scenarios.
446 Affirming that cooperation is critical in determining the success of a peace operation, the
447 Brahimi Report supported political and social changes that create a secure environment that is
448 self-sustaining.

449
450 60. The best practices highlighted by Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) aimed at post-
451 conflict peacebuilding have not yet been implemented to their full capacity. The role of women

452 in the peacebuilding process has improved but is still lacking and could, as the resolution attests,
453 contribute to civilian participation in post-conflict stabilization.

454

455 61. In reporting to the General Assembly on 24 February 2006 on the maintenance of
456 peacekeeping operations (A/60/696), the Secretary-General highlighted the importance of
457 integration for a wider peacebuilding effort by emphasizing the need for predictable frameworks
458 for cooperation with regional organizations and national governments, common peacekeeping
459 standards and modalities for cooperation and transition, and joint training exercises.

460

461 **O. ACCORDANCE OF LAW INCORPORATING CIVILIAN NEED**

462

463 62. In 2009, the New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping
464 highlighted the fact that UN peacekeeping has in over 60 years of experience and with 63
465 missions accumulated an extensive expertise to help establish rule of law and security
466 institutions. However, at times, peacekeeping missions have failed due to the fact that the
467 strategies implemented were poorly adapted to creating the conditions and structures for a
468 sustainable peace, with peacekeepers departing, perhaps too early, only to return.

469

470 63. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was implemented in 2001 after the
471 political violence during the era of the Shining Path. The TRC was largely implemented by
472 civilian initiative and, as a result, incorporated civilian interests and investment in the
473 reconciliation process. The TRC was critical in the rebuilding of national identity and in post-
474 conflict national healing.

475

476 64. Initiatives in Cameroon have demonstrated how cooperation and increased participation of
477 regional authorities, national authorities, and civilians in peacebuilding can advance post-conflict
478 stabilization efforts. Such initiatives have included the project for Institutional Capacity
479 Enhancement of the International Security Forces Training School (EIFORCES) in 2011, as well
480 as the Seminar on the Role for Civilians in Peace-building and Peace Support Operations.

481

482 65. In the Special Report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region
483 (S/2013/119), the Secretary-General stressed that the lack of progress towards building well-
484 trained and well-equipped security forces constitutes a major threat to the stability of the
485 Democratic Republic of the Congo, as it comprises one of the critical pillars to strengthening
486 state authority and achieving stability, in addition to other national actions, such as governance
487 and structural reforms, and the maintenance of the rule of law, human rights and
488 democratization.

489

490 66. Civilians are consistently a group that suffers greatest during times of conflict; yet, they have
491 the quietest voice in the rebuilding process. In one of the most recent peacekeeping missions, the
492 UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the civil society had the greatest number of casualties.
493 Though various civil committees were given some voice in the rebuilding process, the
494 continuation of that voice throughout not only the initial but the ongoing stages of the
495 peacebuilding process is critical.

496

497 67. The Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities program (RECAMP) is a
498 successful model for UN peacekeeping agents to transition power to the sovereign nations in an
499 orderly and self-sufficient process. New schools generated by this program were produced in a
500 uniform way to increase efficiency, but implemented with regionally appropriate considerations.
501

502 **II. Mandate**

503
504 68. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was established in 1965 through
505 General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) and was originally tasked to undertake a
506 comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects in
507 order to facilitate consultations on peacekeeping within the General Assembly.
508

509 69. In 1996, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/136, which decided that the Special
510 Committee, in accordance with its mandate, should continue its efforts for a comprehensive
511 review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, and should review
512 the implementation of its previous proposals and consider new proposals so as to enhance the
513 capacity of the UN to fulfil its responsibilities in this field.
514

515 **III. Conclusions and Recommendations**

516 **A. PEACE BONDS**

517
518
519 70. UN peacekeeping operations consistently lack funding, as stated previously 3.4 billion USD
520 is outstanding for this year's annual budget. In order to supplement resources that may be lacking
521 at the time of a mandated peacekeeping operation; the Special Committee recommends, in
522 addition to all prior recommendations made by the Committee, the increased participation of
523 global citizens and the private sector in the funding strategy of the UN through the sale and trade
524 of Peacekeeping bonds.
525

526 71. In order to allow increased funding for UN peacekeeping operations, the Special Committee
527 recommends that the Secretary-General issue UN peace bonds in accordance with the annex to
528 General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI). The Committee further recommends the Secretary
529 General work in tandem with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
530 Questions. The Special Committee reminds the General Assembly Fifth Committee of their
531 responsibility for budgetary aspects of peacekeeping operations and the Secretary General of the
532 authority to issue and monitor bonds as granted by the 1961 annex to *Resolution 1739* for the
533 conflict in the Congo. However, today's program differs in that the peace bonds would be
534 diversified bonds or multiple mission bonds, sold on all international markets, and the rates
535 would be subject to market demand and supply as opposed to the UN autonomously establishing
536 the rate. The new peace bonds would be accessible at an individual, corporate, and country level,
537 thus increasing demand and access to the peace bonds, helping to make the project sustainable in
538 the long run.
539

540 72. For countries still embroiled in conflict, the funding received from bonds sold would
541 supplement normal UN funding for peacekeeping operations. This additional funding would
542 enable more rapid troop deployment, higher levels of technology for operations, and spread the

543 burden of cost for the mission more evenly among Member States, private citizens, and other
544 global entities.

545
546 73. Post-conflict, the bond issuing governments would be able to invest the received funds in
547 construction, agriculture, real estate, and other industries related to long-term infrastructure and
548 economic growth. A key to long-term political stability is a strong domestic economy. Prior to
549 infrastructure investment as the conflict is still the primary concern, the bonds would be used to
550 fund the initial UN peacekeeping response.

551
552 74. There are three investment options available, a hedged bond, country specific bond, and
553 corporate bond. The hedge bond is a traditional bond package, the country specific bond focuses
554 on one conflict area for investment, and the corporate bond allows for increased funding
555 specifically for a recipient's private sector. The three investment packages would mature after a
556 15-year term. The initial funding from the loan issues would enable countries to fund
557 peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict infrastructure projects. Each country specific bond
558 issuer would be strongly recommended to add additional incentives to attract businesses to their
559 lands post-conflict.

560
561 75. In order to secure the long-term bond market, the UN would insure the bonds up to 50%;
562 this would still be less expensive than the current UN system of fully financing all peacekeeping
563 operations. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations reminds the General Assembly
564 of *Resolution 1739 (XVI)* Annex, particularly paragraph six, which further highlights historical
565 precedence for UN bond issue. Demand for UN issued bonds would be higher than in the 1960's,
566 because of the increased levels of convergence in our world markets and global economy; which
567 makes this a profitable long-term investment for both parties.

568 569 **B. INCENTIVES FOR MEMBER-STATES TO MEET QUOTAS**

570
571 76. Because funding is always crucial for peacekeeping operations, including those that engage
572 in post-conflict stabilization efforts, the Special Committee encourages the establishment of a
573 point system in which Member States who have met their donation quotas receive a 10%
574 increase to their application for administrative and managerial appointments. Thus allowing skill,
575 experience, and background to play the biggest role, but add an additional incentive for Member
576 States to follow through on their financial commitments. Donation quotas can be met in a variety
577 or combination of ways, including, but not limited to financial donations, troop recruitment,
578 technological donations, and research. The comparative advantage of the Member States should
579 be considered when donations are received and peacekeeping quotas are met. This multi-
580 dimensional approach to supporting peacekeeping operations offers incentives to countries to
581 provide peacekeeping operations with the full quantity of funds promised by UN Member
582 States.

583 584 **C. NON-FINANCIAL PRODUCT INVESTMENT MECHANISMS**

585
586 77. The Special Committee underlines the importance of promptly identifying infrastructure
587 projects for reconstruction in post-conflict areas. The Special Committee suggests that
588 peacekeeping personnel prioritize the identification of projects suitable for investment from both

589 the public and private sectors from the conflict region and from abroad. Sharing risks and
590 burdens of reconstruction between the loan bank and the investor with the means of a participant
591 banking system guarantee both short-term and long-term development and reconstruction as it
592 has proven a very successful tool in reconstruction, particularly in the Arab region.

593
594 **D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS**
595 **FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POST-CONFLICT**
596

597 78. The Special Committee recommends that an organ such as the Security Council include a
598 local female perspective on the current socio-political situation in post-conflict areas because of
599 their difference in perspective compared to men in the same region. Institutions such as
600 governments, police forces, and the military within post-conflict zones (PCZs) should increase
601 the number of females in their respective bodies to further PCS efforts and ensure sustainable
602 peace following the conclusion of UN missions.

603
604 79. The Special Committee recommends the full implementation of Security Council Resolution
605 1820 (2008) and subsequent resolutions as part of a broader framework for strengthening and
606 developing the implementation of zero-tolerance laws in regards to punishing sexual assault
607 offenders. The prosecution of all sexual offenders will aid in the stabilization of post-conflict
608 regions by establishing the authority of the rule of law.

609
610 80. The Special Committee proposes the creation of educational campaigns based on women's
611 role in societies in post-conflict situations to convey the importance of women's rights and
612 capabilities at even greater level. In making this recommendation, the Special Committee
613 reaffirms the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and the Universal
614 Declaration of Human Rights, meeting the Millennium Development Goal 3 of supporting
615 gender equality and women's empowerment.

616
617 81. The Special Committee proposes that the local regional post-conflict stabilization forces are
618 further informed and counseled about the significance and effects of sexual violence and
619 exploitation of women and young girls after the UN mission has expired.

620
621 a. Peacekeepers ought to provide more aid in the form of counseling, psychological, and
622 trauma services to victims of sexual violence. These services should include
623 counseling and psychological services to enable victims of sexual violence to develop
624 the tools necessary to deal with these instances. These services will provide rape
625 victims with rehabilitation and coping mechanisms, thereby help stabilize post-
626 conflict zones.

627
628 b. In addition, women peacekeepers should take on the role of educators and mentors for
629 young women and girls in order to inform them on the topic of sexual exploitation,
630 sexual discrimination and other forms of sexual based violence and provide guidance
631 to aid in PCS and perpetual peace.

632
633 82. Furthermore, women should be encouraged to share and utilize their experience for in
634 peacebuilding initiatives as mediators and activists. Social forums could provide an all-

635 encompassing group of women from the local community with a safe space to discuss gender-
636 sensitive issues. The forums would seek to include local female leaders, activist organizations,
637 and NGO's speaking and connecting with local women. Furthermore, the forums could promote
638 collective efforts for public outreach campaigns disseminating gender-sensitive information to
639 local entities. The forum would also provide more aid in the form of counseling, psychological,
640 and trauma services to victims of sexual violence to women become healthier more contributing
641 members of the community. The local forum would be facilitated by women peacekeepers and
642 staff trained in women sensitive issues in order to negate any intervention from unwanted forces.
643 Building effective partnerships with civil society and mobilizing financial and political support is
644 a crucial step for these initiatives to be successful.

645
646 83. The Special Committee supports the promotion of women into influential and/or leadership
647 roles. The Special Committee advocates the establishment of a baseline in gender equity in
648 partnership with the Declaration of Human Rights, but strongly encourages nation-states to take
649 proactive measures to fully integrate women into influential and/or leadership roles in the public
650 and private sectors. This Committee recommends that all Member States abide by these
651 standards, with consideration of cultural customs, national priorities, and international norms and
652 policies.

653
654 84. The Special Committee recognizes that women peacekeepers, police, and advisors play a
655 crucial role in the stabilization of a post-conflict society, as a female perspective helps combat
656 gender-based sexual violence, implement rights for women and girls, and empower women. New
657 efforts must be introduced in order to increase the percentage of women peacekeepers.
658 Therefore, the Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly revisit its
659 reimbursement rate policy for troop and police contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs), and that
660 they implement a policy which provides these countries greater reimbursements for the provision
661 of women peacekeepers within the current reimbursement process. This would incentivize
662 Member States to contribute more women troops and police, thereby meeting the call made by
663 the Security Council in Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) for increased women
664 participation in peacekeeping and reaching the DPKO's goal of women representing 20% of all
665 peacekeepers.

666
667 85. In addition, the Special Committee suggests that troop-contributing countries actively
668 promote women as UN peacekeepers whether as military, police or civilian personnel, possibly
669 through informational material about UN peacekeeping aimed to appeal to women. Additionally,
670 select experienced female peacekeepers can present their own experiences and serve as contact
671 personnel and role models for potential female peacekeepers.

672
673 86. The Special Committee recognizes the value that all-women police units bring to post-
674 conflict stabilization efforts. We therefore propose the creation of more special all-women police
675 units in peacekeeping operations, similar to the one which served in UNMIL, in order to better
676 address the needs of women victims of sexual and/or domestic violence, and to better protect
677 women from such violence.

678
679 87. The Special Committee recommends that the DPKO, DFS, and individual Member States
680 integrate peacekeeping strategies specific to protecting women against sexual violence and other

681 forms of violence in post-conflict situations, including, but not limited to, armed patrols and
682 escorts, joint protection teams, quick impact projects, cordon-and-search operations, and other
683 techniques suggested in the 2012 UN Women report on addressing conflict-related sexual
684 violence.

685
686 88. The Special Committee does not believe that the original deadline for the Security Council's
687 goal for attaining a ratio of 20 percent female peacekeepers, set by the DPKO for completion by
688 2014, is realistic, and suggests an extension of the deadline to 2019.

689
690 89. The Special Committee emphasizes with appreciation the fact that with the implementation
691 of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, improvements have
692 been made to the training of uniformed capacities to include a gender perspective. In order to
693 obtain better results, the special committee calls upon the general assembly to take action by
694 encouraging member states to evaluate the current status of their national and regional training
695 program on the matter of gender sensitive issues, such as sexual and gender based violence. To
696 ensure that these evaluations become actions of change, the special committee recommends that
697 these evaluations should be followed by the implementations of specific action plans.

698
699 90. The Special Committee continues to appreciate the fact that efforts have been made to
700 include a gender perspective in the training of civilian staff. The Special Committee recommends
701 that the General Assembly call upon Member States to adopt standardized policies regarding the
702 role of women in civilian staff training in order to enhance the implementation of a gender
703 perspective.

704
705 **E. INVOLVEMENT, THE RULE OF LAW, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, AND**
706 **NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH**

707
708 91. The Special Committee reaffirms the importance of upholding the spirit and mandates of the
709 UN Charter in all peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee therefore advises the General
710 Assembly to uphold Articles 1 and 2 in the course of ensuring human security for all within post-
711 conflict zones.

712
713 92. The Special Committee recognizes the Security Council's primary responsibility of
714 maintaining international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the UN Charter. The
715 legitimate deployment of peacekeeping forces results only from the directive and guidance of the
716 Security Council pursuant from Article 42 of the UN Charter.

717
718 93. The Special Committee promotes the mission of the Policy Evaluation and Training Division
719 and its two sections: Policy and Best Practices Service (PBPS) and the Integrated Training
720 Service (ITS). These institutions require the resources and ability to gather pertinent information
721 for policy formation to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in operations throughout missions at
722 all levels.

723
724 94. The Special Committee suggests an overview of the Department of Field Support (DFS) to
725 ensure that sufficient resources are available for the DFS to carry out its mandate. Moreover, this
726 mandate ought to include an evaluation of particular missions, their costs, core issues the mission

727 is to resolve, and the possible integration and collaboration with relevant parties to resolve found
728 problems so to maximize the success of the mission.

729

730 95. In order to ensure effective mandates, a common culture of civic involvement between
731 peacekeepers and their chain of command should be developed with involved Member States.
732 Clear mandates, open communication and understanding of both regional cultural factors and
733 those between peacekeepers will further contribute to ensuring that peacekeepers and civilians
734 are protected in the highest regard.

735

736 96. The Special Committee encourages regional organizations such as but not limited to the
737 European Union, NATO, ECOWAS, and the African Union to share their experiences and best
738 practices in regards to regional standby forces and rapid deployment forces in order to
739 supplement the effort of the PBPS in deployment policy and strategy.

740

741 97. The Special Committee recognizes that reestablishing the rule of law, effective law
742 enforcement, and judicial capacities are of the utmost important foundations in reconstructing
743 stability within post-conflict nations and regions. Moreover, the transparency of and congruence
744 with human and civil rights of the aforementioned foundations is vital in maintaining peace and
745 order within post-conflict nations and regions.

746

747 98. The Special Committee suggests to the General Assembly that impartial and proven
748 nongovernmental organizations, peacekeeping field leaders, and the Security Council actively
749 communicate and collaborate to review the transparency and effectiveness of a post-conflict
750 state's legal and political institutions responsible for ensuring and enforcing the rule of law.

751

752 99. The Special Committee suggests that all relevant actors, in conjunction with leading experts
753 in relevant fields, develop programmes of action that will promote the highest capacity for
754 maintaining the rule of law, judicial effectiveness and transparency, and legitimate enforcement.

755

756 100. The Special Committee further suggests all relevant parties make strong efforts to ensure
757 enforcement, adjudication, and legislative institutions act in harmony towards common goals and
758 interests of the post-conflict state, and moreover endeavor to maintain peace and order through
759 their unified goals and interests.

760

761 101. The enforcement, legislation, and adjudication of law within a post-conflict nation ought to
762 reflect the normative values found within human rights agreements. The Special Committee
763 emphasizes that capacity building for human rights with respect to the rule of law within post-
764 conflict nations ought to be included within peacekeeping mandates. This is a necessary function
765 of stabilizing post-conflict areas to ensure that governing branches of the post-conflict nation
766 retain legitimacy in their actions.

767

768 102. The Special Committee recommends that peacekeeping mandates continue to include the
769 assistance for electoral processes in relevant states, and the continuation of promoting of
770 democratic values in conjunction with UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) activities.

771

772 103. In accordance with creating the necessary foundations for the rule of law, the Special
773 Committee stresses the importance of SSR. In essence, to not only maintain peace but to
774 facilitate it, Member States must retain a legitimate monopoly over violence so the rule of law is
775 maintained within their borders. The Special Committee therefore would like to particularly
776 stress the establishment of security sector capacity building to ensure effectiveness and
777 efficiency. Furthermore, SSR should incorporate mandates including the protection of human
778 rights so as to ensure the proper maintenance of human security, as well as legitimacy of security
779 actors within post-conflict nations and regions.

780
781 104. The Special Committee recommends three aspects SSR reforms ought to reflect: forming a
782 unified spirit and coherent strategy within a national security force; ensuring security forces are
783 adequately equipped and trained to maintain the peace; and clear and coherent security structures
784 are sustained within a post-conflict nation or region.

785
786 105. The Special Committee recommends that Member States assist in providing security
787 equipment to legitimized post-conflict Member States in accordance with international law for
788 trade of armaments and military equipment.

789
790 106. The Special Committee recommends that Member States, NGOs, and the Security Council
791 assist a post-conflict nation in developing strong and effective security sector structures upon
792 request of the host state. This process can be facilitated either through direct consultations,
793 bilateral or multilateral relations, or through the adherence to commonly accepted normative
794 values currently followed by Member States in this regard. Many various functional and
795 effective security sector models are currently in existence. A thorough research and
796 developmental program should be undertaken before SSR begins to gain insight into the
797 requirements of the host country. Replication of an existing security system model that best fits
798 the particularities of a host nation would be the most effective, efficient, and direct method in
799 assuring SSR is successful.

800
801 107. The Special Committee further suggests the implementation of methods, including
802 facilitation of consultations, dialogues, and negotiations between parties; assisting in integrating
803 post-conflict nations into economic unions, and assisting in meeting requirements for agreements
804 and loans. This would greatly further cooperation and collaboration between post-conflict
805 nations and international organizations (IOs), such as the World Bank, the International
806 Monetary Fund (IMF), or other arrangements, to assist in allocating capital and expertise or
807 facilitating trade arrangements to assist in economic restructuring and reconstruction.

808
809 108. The Special Committee furthermore advises that the General Assembly review the
810 structures and processes by which economic stabilization and peacekeeping coincide so to make
811 this as effective and efficient as possible. A general review of individual cases ought to take
812 place before investment and economic restructuring is undertaken so that investment, aid, and
813 efforts are not hindered by unforeseen inefficiencies and ineffectiveness.

814
815 109. The PBC presents great capacity for the facilitating and integration of processes by which
816 various UN organs, NGOs, Member States, and other relevant actors can actively participate in
817 peacebuilding within post-conflict nations and regions. The Special Committee therefore

818 suggests the General Assembly review the financial aspects, logistical aspects, and structural
819 aspects of the PBC in order to ensure the expert advice found within this organization can be
820 fully utilized for nation building. Moreover, the integration of relevant bodies would assist in
821 adding to the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in its current struggles in
822 the peacebuilding process.

823

824 **F. FINANCIAL ISSUES**

825

826 110. The Special Committee reaffirms General Assembly resolution 55/231 on results-based
827 budgeting for peacekeeping operations, and emphasizes that it should encompass not only the
828 sole costs of the in-conflict deployment, but also the foreseeable costs of peace-building efforts.
829 This approach will bolster the likelihood of success and sustainability of the post-conflict
830 stabilization efforts.

831

832 111. The Special Committee recommends the implementation of a budgetary framework that
833 takes into consideration the different timeframes of the commitment to peace and addresses both
834 the immediate security concerns, as well as the long-term development needs. These two
835 dimensions are inextricably linked, and there should be a robust and smooth transition through
836 the stages of conflict management beginning with conflict emergence and culminating in post-
837 conflict peacebuilding. Such a transition will not obtain unless bureaucratic and funding
838 structures are reformed to reduce redundancy and to provide greater accountability and
839 transparency. The necessary performance improvement will necessarily require a long-term
840 vision for the incorporation of and/or the cooperation with relevant actors, which operate in post-
841 conflict settings.

842

843 112. The Special Committee urges the consolidation of strategies that address immediate security
844 and political stability concerns on the ground, both on doctrinal and financial terms. In this
845 context, there is a need for a comprehensive review of the mandate of Special Political Missions
846 by this Committee, in fulfillment of our responsibility for the comprehensive review of the whole
847 question of peacekeeping.

848

849 113. The Special Committee recognizes the need for operational flexibility in response to
850 severely unstable deployment environments, but also stresses the imperative to enhance doctrinal
851 coherence, accountability, transparency, and consistent performance through the development of
852 a standing framework. Such a framework should include a provision for funding of Special
853 Political Missions through the Peacekeeping Fund. This arrangement would properly allocate the
854 financial burden for such a critical component of the UN peace and security architecture, and not
855 through the diversion of closed peacekeeping account resources intended for reimbursement to
856 Troop and Police Contributing Countries.

857

858 114. The Special Committee recommends that all regional arrangements and individual Member
859 States, especially those with emerging economies, wield an increased role in post-conflict
860 reconstruction efforts. To accomplish this, the Committee endorses the designation of a
861 percentage of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for peace-building purposes to promote
862 closer and deeper cooperation with national and regional stakeholders. The Committee
863 recommends the funding of security and development activities through the ODA/aid budgets, in

864 accordance with the guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
865 Organization for Economic Development (OECD). Funding priorities should include:

- 866
- 867 a. management of security expenditures;
- 868
- 869 b. civil society initiatives in the security sector;
- 870
- 871 c. protection and reintegration of child soldiers through legislation;
- 872
- 873 d. security system reform;
- 874
- 875 e. peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution developed by civilians;
- 876
- 877 f. control and prevention of proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- 878
- 879 g. nuclear energy in peaceful capacities; and
- 880
- 881 h. reimbursement of net bilateral costs of UN peace operations.
- 882

883 115. The Special Committee, in accordance with the DAC criteria for ODA eligibility,
884 encourages institutions involved in this process to preclude funding of the following activities:

- 885
- 886 a. enforcement aspects of peacekeeping, such as mine clearance;
- 887
- 888 b. supply and financing of military equipment or services;
- 889
- 890 c. counterinsurgency or anti-terrorism training for paramilitary functions;
- 891
- 892 d. military applications of nuclear energy; and
- 893
- 894 e. anti-terrorism activities.
- 895

896 116. The Special Committee urges the exclusion of items mentioned in the previous paragraph to
897 emphasize that under the proposed framework, ODA is not the recommended funding channel
898 for UN-related activities that concern security objectives exclusively. Additionally, our aim is to
899 ensure that recently stabilized and emerging nations are able to retain high levels of sovereignty
900 in observance of the cornerstone principles of the UN.

901

902 117. The Special Committee recommends involvement of all relevant stakeholders to guarantee
903 that peacebuilding be governed by a consistent framework and implemented with a clear timeline
904 in order to promote national ownership and greater cooperation among the UN, host countries
905 and regional partners.

906

907 118. The Special Committee reaffirms the importance of a cost-effective investment in stability
908 and a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping. It further encourages regional and sub-

909 regional organizations to continue opening spaces for multilateral institutions, as well as public
910 and private efforts developed in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
911 (DPKO).

912

913 **G. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STANDBY PEACE BUILDING TEAMS AND** 914 **INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY**

915

916 119. The Special Committee recommends that regional organizations establish standby
917 peacebuilding teams to educate civilians, military, and police in post-conflict zones.

918

919 120. The Special Committee recalls articles 52 and 54 set on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and
920 stresses the need for cooperation between the UN and regional partners.

921

922 121. The Special Committee also suggests that the UN take into consideration the different
923 aspects in order to ensure the continuous operational readiness and mobility of the peacebuilding
924 teams.

925

926 122. The Special Committee underlines the paramount importance of protecting civilians and
927 securing the legal framework in order to avoid the reoccurrence of conflict. The protection of
928 civilians must continue to be the international community's highest call of duty and essential
929 mandate. To achieve this end the establishment of an open dialogue between all parties involved
930 in the conflict zone is recommendable. This must extend not only to governmental organizations
931 but local population through a grassroots effort.

932

933 123. In the light of the recent Security Council Resolution 2086 stressing the need for a
934 multidimensional approach to peacekeeping, it is necessary to have expert teams responding to
935 the specific fields of difficulties in installing a stable peace situation in the aftermath of a
936 conflict. The Special Committee considers that a more autonomous recruitment will increase the
937 efficiency of the post conflict stabilization efforts. To this end, the Special Committee
938 recommends that a standardized recruitment of civilians experts should be conducted by a UN
939 specific body such as the DPKO, which formulates a comprehensive staffing strategy.

940

941 124. The Special Committee emphasizes the need for post-conflict nations to become self-
942 sustaining and responsive towards urgent crisis situations. To this end, peacekeeping operations
943 must prioritize the achievement of conditions to help countries through the transition from
944 conflict to peace and development.

945

946 125. The Special Committee seeks to incorporate infrastructure into the peacebuilding process.
947 Currently the peace and security forces are comprised of military, police, and civilian personnel,
948 but infrastructure has not yet been addressed in these areas. In this, a new standard will be set for
949 the peacebuilding process. The suggested four components of the new infrastructure initiative are
950 transportation, communication, energy, and sanitation and water supply. This renewed focus on
951 infrastructure provides an opportunity for civilian education essential to economic growth and
952 recovery, and the promotion of self-sustainment at the grass root level.

953

954 126. The Special Committee acknowledges a need to give more control to the regional
955 organizations for peacekeeping initiatives. Regional organizations can supply an imperative
956 understanding of culture and customs that a global organization simply cannot. Furthermore, full
957 transparency and intensified communication between the operational personnel, the troops, local
958 and national authorities, local experts, as well as the public, are recommended. An open dialogue
959 between these parties will help the mission to be successful. Direct contact with the local
960 population facilitates the legitimization of the operation as well as the ability of the personnel
961 and troops to respect local needs and interests. To further enhance the effectiveness in this
962 matter, personnel and troops should consist of local civilians and soldiers from the host country.

963
964 127. The Special Committee urges the General Assembly to assign the Senior Advisory
965 Committee to the oversight of the regional bodies with respect to financial and humanitarian
966 aspects, in addition to ensuring transparency. Simultaneously ensuring accountability and
967 sovereignty for the regional bodies is critical to the successful implementation of the
968 peacebuilding teams. Unlike SHIRBRIG, the peacebuilding teams would operate at the regional
969 level, thus avoiding prior mistakes. If a regional organization does not have the capacity to
970 develop a full team, then the regional organizations that have that capacity to do so would act as
971 a voluntary pool for those that do not. As well, if a particular team is less equipped than others,
972 either financially or otherwise, it is recommended that a donation process be put in place to
973 ensure said team is adequately equipped for their mission.

974
975 **H. STRUCTURAL AND ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES WITHIN DPKO AND DFS**
976

977 128. The Special Committee recognizes a near dire situation that the Department of
978 Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) face in the capacity
979 of carrying out their mandates. The Special Committee therefore advises the General Assembly
980 to undertake a general overview of these departments in two aspects. Firstly, that both the
981 general structures and infrastructure these departments have at their disposal is sufficient in
982 carrying out their mandates. Secondly, that the overview addresses the concerns in regards to the
983 lack of resources, particularly in terms of staffing and personnel, is sufficient in effectively
984 carrying out mandates. These offices are indispensable in ensuring a mission's success, especially
985 within the evolving nature of peacekeeping. In essence, strain within these departments will
986 directly translate into ineffective and incomplete missions that risk conflict relapse and
987 destabilization in post-conflict states. If peacekeeping is to continue expanding in both the
988 amount of missions and breadth of mandates, the underlying bureaucratic organizations that
989 organize peacekeeping must reflect this evolving nature as well.

990
991 129. The Special Committee advises the need for increased accountability standards for
992 individual entities involved in the UN peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee also
993 advises increased accountability for participants in post-conflict stabilization efforts through the
994 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question (ACABQ) as well as the
995 development of a new accountability and transparency mechanism for inter-agency involvement
996 between the DPKO, DFS, peacekeeping missions and other related bodies. To ensure the
997 continued involvement and contributions of Member States in UN peacekeeping, proper
998 financial and asset-management is essential.

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I. STRUCTURE OF RESOURCES CONTRIBUTION

130. The Special Committee supports any and all cooperation efforts by the DPKO, Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and Political Affairs (DPA) with the national government while preparing. This can be especially implemented by, but not limited to the invitation of country representatives of states in a post-conflict stage to the responsible integrated operational teams (IOTs) of the DPKO and throughout the entire process of peacekeeping efforts. The goal being to accelerate the abilities and capacities of the national government in the long term to independently secure a peaceful state and the rule of law in its country.

131. The Special Committee recognizes the need to cooperate closely with the national government and regional arrangements in order to coordinate a need-based adaptation of post-conflict stabilization efforts on a case-by-case basis.

132. A national government is the ultimate expert on the situation of the conflict in its country and the cultural circumstances and can therefore be an enriching parameter in ensuring transition from conflict. Representatives from national governments and national governments serving as experts to the circumstances on the field can greatly enhance preparation work while still remaining in a timely effective time frame.

133. The Special Committee suggests enhancing the information management of peacekeeping resources in order to augment the rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces, for example through an increased emphasis on pre-deployment resource data gathering information on the extent and content of contribution capacities, countries are willing to provide to a given situation that requires the establishment or enlargement of peacekeeping operations. Member States would voluntarily outline resources they have available for specific peace keeping operations. By sharing information on available resources it will speed deployment timelines, increase efficiency, and overcome asymmetries of information. Countries should not be unduly strained by contributing resources to missions in which they have a scarcity.

134. Information management should be located in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and, if necessary, is to be treated discreetly. Having a coherent and well-structured document management system in place from the very start will also aid the consistent and cumulative build-up of knowledge and “organizational memory” for a continuing and ongoing lessons learned process.

135. This database gives an overview of the possible resources which can be regressed by the DPKO in their preparation for planning peacekeeping operations after having been mandated by the Security Council. The information in this database is given voluntarily and has the overall intention to support preparation efforts carried out by the DPKO.

J. STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING FACILITIES IN A MULTINATIONAL NETWORK

1045 136. The Special Committee notes a current lack of standardization and multinational
1046 cooperation of peacekeeping training. Improvement is necessary in the areas of training center
1047 networking on a multinational level, information sharing, and training modules, including but not
1048 limited to sanitation, sexual violence, cultural sensitivity and mediation, in mission training, as
1049 well as the use of special technology.

1050
1051 137. The Special Committee welcomes recent efforts to address standardization of training
1052 modules and equipment by implementing the 12-scenario based training exercises, prepared by
1053 the Secretariat, including a module on conflict related sexual violence.

1054
1055 138. The Special Committee recommends to all Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC
1056 and PCC) to implement domestic peacekeeping training programs modeled after the
1057 International Association of Peacekeeping Centers. Further it promotes best practice sharing
1058 between well-established peacekeeping training centers and newly established ones. Further the
1059 Committee emphasizes the need for more training facilities especially for police units and
1060 civilian personnel, such as but not limited to, the Center for Excellence in Police Stability Units.

1061
1062 139. The Special Committee urges troop and police contributing countries to hold more joint
1063 training efforts also before the mission to create common standards in training, and especially in
1064 logistical support for missions. A network structure of peacekeeping centers in countries among
1065 regional organizations, as well as world wide, should serve as a basis by creating joint capacities.

1066
1067 140. The Special Committee recommends Member States to better orient their training modules
1068 to inform peacekeepers on the cultural differences to the region, that they are being send to by
1069 utilizing experts who are preferably from the region in question and by incorporating testimony
1070 from past peacekeepers and other UN official from the region in question into the training
1071 process. The Special Committee is convinced that this effort will be reflected thoroughly by the
1072 strategic framework of UN peacekeeping training that addresses the language, religion and
1073 tradition, gender roles, and history of the area that they are being deployed to in order to
1074 maintain the integrity of the nation and its people.

1075
1076 141. The Special Committee recommends that the training module that concerns sanitation and
1077 hygiene, which peacekeepers undergo, is reformed and intensified in order to better educate
1078 peacekeepers and mitigate the risk of the transmission of communicable diseases.

1079 **K. TRAINING ON HIGH-TECH USAGE**

1081
1082 142. The Special Committee promotes cooperative monitoring principles to enhance core
1083 peacekeeping functions. Further the Committee is of the opinion that monitoring technologies
1084 improve a mission ability to observe, access, report and respond to events demonstrating the
1085 credibility and impartiality of UN peacekeeping and bolstering local acceptance of the mission.
1086 Strengthening the effectiveness of operations, monitoring technologies also enhance the safety of
1087 UN personnel and civilians. The usage of High-technology equipment of UN peacekeeping
1088 missions allows monitoring larger territories while reducing the costs of peacekeeping
1089 operations.

1090

1091 143. The Special Committee recommends the full implementation of Global Positioning Systems
1092 for all operating peacekeepers, including those in post conflict environments, in order to better
1093 implement their mandate the fullest extent by providing safety for peacekeepers, civilian
1094 populations, and commerce.

1095
1096 144. The Special Committee further recommends, especially for mission regarding post conflict
1097 stabilization in areas that require additional security, the implementation of other forms of
1098 technology such as but not limited to alarmed fences, personal entry identifiers, metal/chemical
1099 detectors, and portable x-ray machines in concert with additional border security.

1100
1101 145. The Special Committee suggests implementing various forms of ground based sensors in
1102 order to help peacekeepers monitor border areas that, under normal conditions, personnel only
1103 visits during infrequent patrols.

1104
1105 146. The Special Committee notes that sensors mounted in aircrafts and unmanned aerial
1106 vehicles should supplement the ground monitoring in areas such as post-conflict regions with
1107 extremely large, inaccessible or dangerous objects.

1108
1109 147. The Special Committee recommends the escalation in the use of aerial imagery such as
1110 visual photography, infrared, radar imagery, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. These
1111 would be used to improve the quality of aerial monitoring at night even through cloud or
1112 vegetation. Additionally, thermal images on an aerial platform can help to detect and identify
1113 groups of people.

1114
1115 148. The Special Committee finds that it is necessary for general dissemination information to
1116 connect fiber optic cables and increase Internet capabilities inside of post conflict zones.

1117
1118 149. The Special Committee urges peacekeepers to consider the adoption of adhesive barcodes,
1119 particle/reflective tags, and secure Internet websites. This should be done when safe, practical,
1120 and readily available in order to fully catalog the inventory records of weapons storage sites.

1121
1122 150. The Special Committee urges countries that are more technically developed to share their
1123 knowledge, concerning high-tech as well as basic technology and to consider training capacities
1124 when applicable. This should be in conjunction with efforts to improve international cooperation
1125 by a multinational network of Peacekeeping Centers.

1126
1127 151. The Special Committee suggests that in conjunction with the World Trade Organization, as
1128 program should be established aimed to eliminate import and export tariffs, and import quotas
1129 specifically targeted towards technology associated with stabilizing areas of post-conflict
1130 focusing on technology associated with security. This would include but is not limited to: GPS,
1131 metal detectors, x-ray imagery, radar, radios, etc. This would essentially lower the price of any
1132 countries associated within the zone. Lower prices would not only propagate the proposed
1133 technology, but would also make it more accessible through creating a larger market for
1134 technology associated with this free trade zone.

1135
1136 **L. STRENGTHENING LOCAL SECURITY FORCES**

1137
1138 152. The Special Committee expects future reviews to reflect the reality of regional diversity and
1139 takes into account the complexity of current peacekeeping operations. In order to ensure progress
1140 in peacekeeping operations, the Special Committee is also convinced that comprehensive
1141 evaluation, including pragmatic benchmarks, of the work of peacekeeping personnel is
1142 completed. Seeing strengthening local security forces as a promising approach towards the goal
1143 of creating international communicational lines and cooperation among Member States. This is
1144 to be understood as a long-term measure. The strengthening of the communicational lines
1145 between local forces, regional actors and their capacities and the UN is crucial for the success
1146 and adaptability of peacekeeping missions. The Special Committee stresses the importance of
1147 maintaining peace and security as the primary responsibility, thereby recommending that there
1148 always is an intact communication between all parties involved.

1149
1150 153. The Special Committee affirms that during the process of strengthening local and national
1151 ownership of peacekeeping operations regional particularities have to be kept in mind. The
1152 establishment of Lesson Learned Unit has been proven to be a successful tool in reviewing and
1153 assessing best practices.

1154
1155 154. Therefore, the Special Committee recommends the following to be taken under
1156 consideration by the UN:

- 1157
1158 a. Improving the cooperation between UN peacekeeping forces and advisors with
1159 local authorities and civil society by establishing a more efficient communication,
1160 including increasing transparency concerning chain of command and responsibility
1161 of carrying out a mission.
1162
1163 b. Increasing transparency and efficiency of communication between local authorities
1164 and responsibility holders at UN through establishing more regular contacts and
1165 enhancing formal reporting of information.
1166
1167 c. Strengthening local security forces through improving already existing networks of
1168 training and education, standardizing regional arrangements' capacities and
1169 intensifying international military, police and civilian peacekeeping exercises, at
1170 the same time cooperating closely with local leaders and the community.
1171
1172 d. Taking measures to expand these facilities for training and education of police and
1173 military forces of the regarding regions in cooperation with non-governmental
1174 organizations, creating incentives for possible supporters.

1175
1176 **M. TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARDS TO MEDIATION AND CULTURAL**
1177 **SENSITIVITY**

1178
1179 155. The Special Committee emphasizes the importance of the inclusion of mediation skills into
1180 training and stresses paragraph 11 of the Brahimi Report, underlining the importance of
1181 mediation in peacemaking and reiterates S/PRST/2010/1 stating the Security Council's
1182 commitment to mediation to settle conflicts peacefully, therefore encouraging further

1183 cooperation of Member States on this topic. The Special Committee underlines paragraph 13 of
1184 the UN Secretary-General's reports A/65/680 (2011) and clauses No. 5 and No. 48 of A/67/632
1185 (2012), appreciating the efforts of several states in the mediation process in Darfur. The outcome
1186 document of this process – the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) – is a proof of
1187 mediation and reconciliation being integral to achieve peace, security and post-conflict
1188 stabilization, methods that should thus be more emphasized in peacekeeping efforts. Besides, the
1189 Special Committee stresses S/RES/2063 (2012) recognizing the DDPD and its implementation to
1190 be the basis for lasting peace and security in Darfur, which can be seen as a model for resolving
1191 other conflict situations. Additionally, the Special Committee highlights operative clause 2 and
1192 clause 8, lit. (c) of S/RES/2086 (2013) stressing the importance of peacekeeping to enhance post-
1193 conflict peacekeeping, that can be accomplished by improving mediation skills.

1194
1195 156. The Special Committee also asserts that mediation is a successful tool in the stabilization
1196 process of post-conflict regions, and it affirms that mediation should be utilized more frequently
1197 in all post-conflict areas to create cohesion among all parties involved.

1198
1199 157. The Special Committee strongly recommends to the UN and its Member States to support
1200 mediation programs for post-conflict regions and collaborate further on this issue in order to
1201 open communication lines and enhance understanding.

1202
1203 158. The Special Committee suggests to the General Assembly to incorporate more mediation
1204 and dispute settlement mechanisms in peacekeeping operations. Mediation efforts have proven to
1205 support diplomatic discussions and reconciliation, for example in the Doha Document for Peace
1206 in Darfur (DDPD).

1207
1208 159. Leading officials as well as peacekeeping troops and advisors deployed should thus be
1209 trained more profoundly in mediation and conflict resolution. To that end, the Special Committee
1210 recommends the establishment of training programs for the aforementioned troops to be taught in
1211 basic skills to settle small disputes between conflicting parties and to supervise ceasefires,
1212 thereby allowing peacekeeping troops to be seen as advisors and enhancing personal safety.

1213
1214 a. The Special Committee encourages UN Member States that have gained
1215 experience in mediation in conflict and post-conflict situations to share
1216 information, expertise and best practices on these issues with other UN Member
1217 States. To that end, useful means of communication and information-sharing
1218 should be established among UN Member States.

1219
1220 b. As a further measure for troop mediation capacity on an ad hoc basis in case of
1221 urgent need, principle guidelines of mediation should be resumed and immediately
1222 accessible at any time in areas, where peacekeeping troops are deployed in order to
1223 prevent reemerging conflicts.

1224
1225 160. The Special Committee understands cultural sensitivity for UN peacekeeping operations as
1226 one of the most crucial aspects during the phases of political reforming, security sector reform
1227 and economic recovery. The Special Committee highly suggests bringing forward a
1228 comprehensive plan that adapted to the local environment for each mission and following

1229 through the detail to achieve greater efficiency . The issue of cultural sensitivity has not been
1230 comprehensively addressed as needed. Optimal outcomes are contingent on acceptance of the
1231 peacekeepers by the peoples. The Special Committee is concerned that peacekeeping forces are
1232 not being trained to be culturally sensitive in many post-conflict regions, which in turn impedes
1233 the stabilization process. As a cause can be seen the current ad hoc structure that newly formed
1234 peacekeeping operations have at this stage.

1235

1236 161. To better address the need of post-conflict region, the Special Committee encourages a
1237 higher proportion of civilian specialists, police and local voluntary members among the
1238 peacekeeping personnel especially during post-conflict stabilization operations.

1239

1240 162. The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to inform the troop-contributing countries
1241 (TCC) as well as other resource- contributing Member States of any changes to the training of
1242 peacekeepers, thereby standardizing the training process as well as keeping all peacekeepers up-
1243 to-date on any changes in information that would assist them in their tasks.

1244

1245 **N. CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION IN PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS**

1246

1247 163. The Special Committee reinforces the importance of inward development in the
1248 stabilization of post-conflict territories. The Committee underscores the need for the education
1249 and skill-building of national civilians in the country involved to implement self-sustainment and
1250 eventually providing a national contribution to peace-building efforts within UN peacekeeping
1251 missions to divide responsibility more evenly between UN forces, regional arrangements and the
1252 nations themselves. Such measures not only allow a faster transition away from reliance on
1253 international aid, but also provide a method for nations to retain sovereignty throughout the
1254 peacekeeping process.

1255

1256 164. The Special Committee suggests the implementation of educational programs for national
1257 civilians. Such programs would ideally go hand in hand with peacekeeping missions to prepare
1258 the nation for the departure of UN forces and ease transition from international assistance to
1259 national independence. UN experts should focus on reducing direct financial and operative
1260 support and opening the path for national civilians to facilitate the nation-rebuilding process.
1261 Educational programs should concentrate on skill-building and should be regionally and
1262 culturally appropriate.

1263

1264 165. Educational programs in peace building should be seen as a collaborative effort between
1265 national civilians and regional, governmental and peacekeeping forces to build practical skills
1266 necessary for economic stabilization and subsistence. Within this skill-building, the Special
1267 Committee recommends a specific focus on the inclusion of women and youth to further
1268 strengthen peace-building efforts.

1269

1270 166. Educational programs may also foster regional and local cooperation through skill-based
1271 education that promotes capacity building. Such cooperation improves communal sentiment,
1272 which is critical to post-conflict nation-building and the reformation of national identity.

1273

1274 167. Various states with highly selective civilian personnel systems are informed by their past
1275 experiences in peacekeeping and as a result are among the most organized and efficient of
1276 peacekeepers. The Special Committee recommends the sharing of best practices between
1277 countries with differing expertise. In the case of post-conflict peacekeeping, the Special
1278 Committee encourages collaboration between nations with civilian personnel expertise and those
1279 without.

1280
1281 168. The Special Committee additionally recommends the implementation of concentrated
1282 information and documentation centers that are nationally run in conjunction with regional
1283 experts to improve the access of information to the population. The centers would be responsible
1284 for informing the people on previous conflicts and post conflict strategies through multi-media,
1285 documentaries and interactive measures. These centers would contribute to the growing
1286 awareness of the causes of conflict and how to handle similar situations in the future.

1287
1288 **O. ACCORDANCE OF LAW INCORPORATING CIVILIAN NEED**
1289

1290 169. The Special Committee suggests the promotion of the adherence to the law with the
1291 development of standardized procedures to safeguard citizens in post-conflict. To achieve this, it
1292 is necessary to establish provisional judicial structures, implement concrete measures to ensure
1293 transparency and judicial independence, and maintain an appropriate ratio of the number police
1294 and law enforcement personnel to the number of citizens, according to international standards.
1295 The involvement of preventive personnel to investigate international and local crimes is critical
1296 to upholding the rule of law as is the incorporation of former participants of war into the peace
1297 building process, ensuring that post-conflict strife does not reoccur.

1298
1299 170. Reform processes in the areas of democracy and the rule of law foster close collaboration
1300 between citizens and their national government, with the aim of guaranteeing equitable
1301 participation of the entire population in the development process, especially for women.

1302
1303 171. The Special Committee emphasizes the need for special protection of former participants of
1304 war by monitoring their vulnerable state. A victim-of-post-conflict disability program to
1305 reintegrate the victims of the conflict with physical and mental injuries through the cooperation
1306 of the peacekeeping operation and the national government should be developed. Inclusion of
1307 former war-participants in the peace-building process is critical to ensuring their reintegration
1308 and participation within society. Furthermore, the Special Committee recommends the inclusion
1309 of experts dealing with such struggles within the peacekeeping operations personnel.