



NMUN • NY

COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS  
BACKGROUND GUIDE 2012

Written By: Théo Thieffry, Harald Eisenhauer, Karin Friedrich, Jordan Drevdahl



NMUN • NY [nmun.org](http://nmun.org)

## CONTACT THE NMUN

Please consult the FAQ section of [nmun.org](http://nmun.org) for answers to your questions. If you do not find a satisfactory answer you may also contact the individuals below for personal assistance. They may answer your question(s) or refer you to the best source for an answer.

NMUN Director-General (Sheraton)  
Amanda M. D'Amico | [dirgen.ny@nmun.org](mailto:dirgen.ny@nmun.org)

NMUN Director-General (Marriott)  
Nicholas E. Warino | [dirgen.ny@nmun.org](mailto:dirgen.ny@nmun.org)

NMUN Office  
[info@nmun.org](mailto:info@nmun.org)  
T: +1. 612.353.5649 | F: +1.651.305.0093

NMUN Secretary-General  
Andrew N. Ludlow | [secgen.ny@nmun.org](mailto:secgen.ny@nmun.org)

### NMUN•NY 2012 Important Dates

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:** To make hotel reservations, you must use the forms at [nmun.org](http://nmun.org) and include a \$1,000 deposit. Discount rates are available until the room block is full or one month before the conference – whichever comes first. **PLEASE BOOK EARLY!**

31 January 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confirm Attendance &amp; Delegate Count. (Count may be changed up to 1 March)</li> <li>• Make Transportation Arrangements - DON'T FORGET! (We recommend confirming hotel accommodations prior to booking flights.)</li> </ul>
15 February 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committee Updates Posted to <a href="http://www.nmun.org">www.nmun.org</a></li> </ul>
1 March 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hotel Registration with FULL PRE-PAYMENT Due to Hotel - Register Early! Group Rates on hotel rooms are available on a first come, first served basis until sold out. Group rates, if still available, may not be honored after that date. See hotel reservation form for date final payment is due.</li> <li>• Any Changes to Delegate Numbers Must be Confirmed to: <a href="mailto:outreach@nmun.org">outreach@nmun.org</a></li> <li>• Preferred deadline for submission of Chair / Rapp applications to Committee Chairs</li> <li>• All Conference Fees Due to NMUN for confirmed delegates. (\$125 per delegate if paid by 1 March; \$150 per delegate if received after 1 March. Fee is not refundable after this deadline.</li> <li>• Two Copies of Each Position Paper Due via E-mail (See Delegate Preparation Guide for instructions).</li> </ul>
NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2012	<p>1 - 5 April – Sheraton New York 3 - 7 April - New York Marriott Marquis</p> <p>The 2013 National Model UN Conference 17 - 21 March &amp; 24 - 28 March (both at Sheraton; Sun-Thurs)</p>

## POSITION PAPER INSTRUCTIONS

**Two copies of each position paper should be sent via e-mail by 1 MARCH 2012**

### 1. TO COMMITTEE STAFF

A file of the position paper (.doc or .pdf) for each assigned committee should be sent to the committee e-mail address listed below. Mail papers by 1 March to the e-mail address listed for your particular venue. These e-mail addresses will be active when background guides are available. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt. Please put committee and assignment in the subject line (Example: GAPLEN\_Greece).

### 2. TO DIRECTOR-GENERAL

- Each delegation should send one set of all position papers for each assignment to the e-mail designated for their venue: positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org or positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org.

This set (held by each Director-General) will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments.

*Note:* This e-mail should only be used as a repository for position papers.

- The head delegate or faculty member sending this message should cc: him/herself as confirmation of receipt. (Free programs like Adobe Acrobat or WinZip may need to be used to compress files if they are not plain text.)

- Because of the potential volume of e-mail, only one e-mail from the Head Delegate or Faculty Advisor containing all attached position papers will be accepted.

Please put committee, assignment and delegation name in the subject line (Example: Cuba\_U\_of\_ABC). If you have any questions, please contact the Director-General at dirgen@nmun.org.

nmun.org  
for more information

### COMMITTEE

### EMAIL - SHERATON

General Assembly First Committee .....	ga1st.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee .....	ga2nd.sheraton@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.sheraton@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.sheraton@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary .....	ecosoc.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women .....	csw.sheraton@nmun.org
Commission on Narcotic Drugs.....	cnd.sheraton@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia .....	escwa.sheraton@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.sheraton@nmun.org
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) .....	csustd.sheraton@nmun.org
Food and Agriculture Organization.....	fao.sheraton@nmun.org
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization .....	unesco.sheraton@nmun.org
African Union.....	au.sheraton@nmun.org
Organization of American States .....	oas.sheraton@nmun.org
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation .....	oic.sheraton@nmun.org
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation .....	apec.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council A.....	sca.sheraton@nmun.org
Security Council B.....	scb.sheraton@nmun.org
International Criminal Court .....	icc.sheraton@nmun.org
Peacebuilding Commission.....	pbcs.sheraton@nmun.org
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty .....	att.sheraton@nmun.org

### COMMITTEE

### EMAIL - MARRIOTT

General Assembly First Committee .....	ga1st.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Second Committee .....	ga2nd.marriott@nmun.org
General Assembly Third Committee.....	ga3rd.marriott@nmun.org
Human Rights Council.....	hrc.marriott@nmun.org
ECOSOC Plenary .....	ecosoc.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on the Status of Women .....	csw.marriott@nmun.org
Commission on Narcotic Drugs.....	cnd.marriott@nmun.org
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia .....	escwa.marriott@nmun.org
United Nations Children's Fund.....	unicef.marriott@nmun.org
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) .....	csustd.marriott@nmun.org
Food and Agriculture Organization.....	fao.marriott@nmun.org
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization .....	unesco.marriott@nmun.org
African Union.....	au.marriott@nmun.org
Organization of American States .....	oas.marriott@nmun.org
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation .....	oic.marriott@nmun.org
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation .....	apec.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council A .....	sca.marriott@nmun.org
Security Council B.....	scb.marriott@nmun.org
International Criminal Court .....	icc.marriott@nmun.org
Peacebuilding Commission.....	pbcs.marriott@nmun.org
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty .....	att.sheraton@nmun.org

### OTHER USEFUL CONTACTS

Entire Set of Delegation Position Papers .....	positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org
(send only to e-mail for your assigned venue).....	positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org
Secretary-General .....	secgen.ny@nmun.org
Director(s)-General .....	dirgen.ny@nmun.org
NMUN Office .....	info@nmun.org

# THE 2012 NATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

1 – 5 April (Sheraton) & 3 – 7 April (Marriott) • [www.nmun.org](http://www.nmun.org)

Andrew N. Ludlow  
Secretary-General

Amanda M. D'Amico &  
Nicholas Warino  
Directors-General

Miriam Mueller  
Chief of Staff

Rachel Johnson &  
Thera Watson  
Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Deena M. Kucko &  
Holger Baer  
Assistant Secretaries-General

Roger Tseng &  
Alex Adriano  
Under-Secretaries-General  
General Assembly

Kristina Mader &  
Vera Todorova  
Under-Secretaries-General  
Economic and Social Council

Cyril Philip &  
Daniel Leyva  
Under Secretaries-General  
Specialized Agencies

Lucas Carreras &  
Katharina Weinert  
Under-Secretaries-General  
Inter-Governmental Organizations

Sameer Kanal &  
Hannah Birkenkoetter  
Under-Secretaries-General  
Peace & Security

Laura O'Connor &  
Martin Schaefer  
Under-Secretaries-General  
Conference Services

## BOARD of DIRECTORS

Prof. Richard Reitano  
President

Prof. Donna Schlagheck  
Vice-President

Prof. Chaldeans Mensah  
Treasurer

Prof. Kevin Grisham  
Secretary

Jennifer Contreras

Prof. Eric Cox.

H. Stephen Holloway, Esq.  
The Hon. Joseph H. Melrose, Jr.

Prof. Raúl Molina

Prof. Richard Murgo

Adam X. Storm, Esq.

Prof. Karen Young

Prof. Markéta Židková

Members Ex-Officio

Michael Eaton  
Executive Director

Prof. Shelton L. Williams

Dear Delegates,

We are very pleased to welcome you to the 2012 National Model United Nations (NMUN), and we hope you share our excitement and enthusiasm for the conference. You are now about to be part of an active group of people who will come together in April 2012 for a week of hard work and passionate debate.

The Directors and Assistant Directors for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) are already fully committed to making this an extraordinary experience for you. Your Director at the Marriott venue will be Harald Eisenhauer, and Jordan Drevdahl as your Assistant Director. Harald is currently in an M.A. program in Political Science at the University of Munich, with a focus on Economics, American History, and European Union Studies. Jordan holds a Bachelors' Degree in English with a minor in Women's Studies from the University of California, Riverside. She has done research on political impacts of gender, and how women are affected by war.

At the Sheraton venue, Théo Thieffry will be your Director, and Karin Friedrich your Assistant Director. Théo has a B.A. in Politics and International Relations from the University of Kent, United Kingdom, and is currently doing an M.Sc. in financial analysis at Sciences Po Lille, France. Karin has a B.A. in Crises and Conflict management from Umea University in Sweden, and is currently in a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies at European Peace University in Austria. We are honored to serve as your committee staff and look forward to working with you.

The topics for the CND this year are as follows:

1. Responding to the Challenge of Narco-Traffic and Organized Crime in West Africa
2. Drug trafficking and its Role in Fueling Conflict in Central and South America
3. Exploring the Effects of Decriminalization Strategies within International Drug Policy

The CND is one of the main committees of the UN for the issues of drugs and drug policy. As it is a sensitive topic, it creates room for a healthy and fascinating debate for delegates at NMUN. Some of the issues can be complex, and it is therefore important that all delegates prepare the conference as best as they can. We have put together this guide that will serve as a starting point for researching the policies of the countries you will represent. The better you prepare the conference, the better your experience will be once in New York.

We are all looking forward to meeting you at the conference in April 2012 for a week of debate. There is no doubt that the tasks of the CND will be challenging, but together we will produce hard and valuable work that will make the conference unforgettable for all of us. If you have any questions or concerns, do not hesitate to contact us through the committee email assigned for your venue or the Under-Secretaries-General for the Department of the Economic and Social Council, Kristina Mader and Vera Todorova.

Sincerely,

*Marriott Venue*  
Harald Eisenhauer  
Director

Jordan Drevdahl  
Assistant Director

[cnd.marriott@nmun.org](mailto:cnd.marriott@nmun.org)

*Sheraton Venue*  
Théo Thieffry  
Director

Karin Friedrich  
Assistant Director

[cnd.sheraton@nmun.org](mailto:cnd.sheraton@nmun.org)



## Message from the Directors-General Regarding Position Papers for the 2012 NMUN Conference

At the 2012 NMUN New York Conference, each delegation submits one position paper for each committee to which it is assigned. Delegates should be aware that their role in each committee affects the way a position paper should be written. While most delegates will serve as representatives of Member States, some may also serve as observers, NGOs, or judicial experts. To understand these differences, please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide.

Position papers should provide a concise review of each delegation's policy regarding the topic areas under discussion and should establish precise policies and recommendations about the topics before the committee. International and regional conventions, treaties, declarations, resolutions, and programs of action of relevance to the policy of your State should be identified and addressed. Making recommendations for action by your committee should also be considered. Position papers also serve as a blueprint for individual delegates to remember their country's position throughout the course of the Conference. NGO position papers should be constructed in the same fashion as position papers of countries. Each topic should be addressed briefly in a succinct policy statement representing the relevant views of your assigned NGO. You should also include recommendations for action to be taken by your committee. It will be judged using the same criteria as all country position papers, and is held to the same standard of timeliness.

Please be forewarned, delegates must turn in entirely original material. *The NMUN Conference will not tolerate the occurrence of plagiarism.* In this regard, the NMUN Secretariat would like to take this opportunity to remind delegates that although United Nations documentation is considered within the public domain, the Conference does not allow the verbatim re-creation of these documents. This plagiarism policy also extends to the written work of the Secretariat contained within the Committee Background Guides. Violation of this policy will be immediately reported to faculty advisors and it may result in dismissal from Conference participation. Delegates should report any incident of plagiarism to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Delegation's position papers can be awarded as recognition of outstanding pre-Conference preparation. In order to be considered for a Position Paper Award, however, delegations must have met the formal requirements listed below. Please refer to the sample paper on the following page for a visual example of what your work should look like at its completion. The following format specifications are **required** for all papers:

- All papers must be typed and formatted according to the example in the Background Guides
- Length must **not** exceed two single-spaced pages (one double-sided paper, if printed)
- Font must be Times New Roman sized between 10 pt. and 12 pt.
- Margins must be set at one inch for whole paper
- Country/NGO name, School name and committee name clearly labeled on the first page,
- The use of national symbols is highly discouraged
- Agenda topics clearly labeled in separate sections

To be considered timely for awards, please read and follow these directions:

1. **A file of the position paper** (.doc or .pdf format required) **for each assigned committee** should be sent to the committee email address listed in the Background Guide. These e-mail addresses will be active after November 15, 2011. Delegates should carbon copy (cc:) themselves as confirmation of receipt.
2. Each delegation should also send **one set of all position papers** to the e-mail designated for their venue: [positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.sheraton@nmun.org) or [positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org](mailto:positionpapers.marriott@nmun.org). This set will serve as a back-up copy in case individual committee directors cannot open attachments. These copies will also be made available in Home Government during the week of the NMUN Conference.

Each of the above listed tasks needs to be completed no later than **March 1, 2012 (GMT-5) for delegations attending the NMUN conference at either the Sheraton or the Marriott venue.**

**PLEASE TITLE EACH E-MAIL/DOCUMENT WITH THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE, ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION NAME (Example: AU\_Namibia\_University of Caprivi)**

*A matrix of received papers will be posted online for delegations to check prior to the Conference. If you need to make other arrangements for submission, please contact Amanda D'Amico, Director-General, Sheraton venue, or Nicholas Warino, Director-General, Marriott venue at [dirgen@nmun.org](mailto:dirgen@nmun.org). There is an option for delegations to submit physical copies via regular mail if needed.*

Once the formal requirements outlined above are met, Conference staff use the following criteria to evaluate Position Papers:

- Overall quality of writing, proper style, grammar, etc.
- Citation of relevant resolutions/documents
- General consistency with bloc/geopolitical constraints
- Consistency with the constraints of the United Nations
- Analysis of issues, rather than reiteration of the Committee Background Guide
- Outline of (official) policy aims within the committee's mandate

Each delegation can submit a copy of their position paper to the permanent mission of the country being represented, along with an explanation of the Conference. Those delegations representing NGOs do not have to send their position paper to their NGO headquarters, although it is encouraged. This will assist them in preparation for the mission briefing in New York.

Finally, please consider that over 2,000 papers will be handled and read by the Secretariat for the Conference. Your patience and cooperation in strictly adhering to the above guidelines will make this process more efficient and it is greatly appreciated. Should you have any questions please feel free to contact the Conference staff, though as we do not operate out of a central office or location, your consideration for time zone differences is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

*Sheraton Venue*  
Amanda D'Amico  
Director-General  
[damico@nmun.org](mailto:damico@nmun.org)

*Marriott Venue*  
Nicholas Warino  
Director-General  
[nick@nmun.org](mailto:nick@nmun.org)

**Delegation from  
The United Mexican States**

**Represented by  
(Name of College)**

### ***Position Paper for the General Assembly Plenary***

The issues before the General Assembly Plenary are: The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion; Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions; as well as The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The Mexican Delegation first would like to convey its gratitude being elected and pride to serve as vice-president of the current General Assembly Plenary session.

#### **I. The Use of Economic Sanctions for Political and Economic Compulsion**

The principles of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, have always been cornerstones of Mexican foreign policy. The legitimate right to interfere by the use of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, is laid down in Article 41 of the UN-charter and reserves the right to the Security Council.

Concerning the violation of this principle by the application of unilateral measures outside the framework of the United Nations, H.E. Ambassador to the United Nations Enrique Berruga Filloy underlined in 2005 that the Mexico strongly rejects “the application of unilateral laws and measures of economic blockade against any State, as well as the implementation of coercive measures without the authorization enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” That is the reason, why the United Mexican States supported – for the 14th consecutive time – Resolution (A/RES/60/12) of 2006 regarding the *Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba*.

In the 1990s, comprehensive economic sanctions found several applications with very mixed results, which made a critical reassessment indispensable. The United Mexican States fully supported and actively participated in the “Stockholm Process” that focused on increasing the effectiveness in the implementation of targeted sanctions. As sanctions and especially economic sanctions, pose a tool for action “between words and war” they must be regarded as a mean of last resort before war and fulfill highest requirements for their legitimate use. The United Mexican States and their partners of the “Group of Friends of the U.N. Reform” have already addressed and formulated recommendations for that take former criticism into account. Regarding the design of economic sanctions it is indispensable for the success to have the constant support by all member states and public opinion, which is to a large degree dependent the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. Sanctions must be tailor-made, designed to effectively target the government, while sparing to the largest degree possible the civil population. Sanction regimes must be constantly monitored and evaluated to enable the world-community to adjust their actions to the needs of the unforeseeably changing situation. Additionally, the United Mexican States propose to increase communication between the existing sanction committees and thus their effectiveness by convening regular meetings of the chairs of the sanction committees on questions of common interest. An example is the case of negative spill-over effects of economic sanctions on neighboring countries, in which affected countries additionally need to be enabled to voice their problems more effectively, as addressed in the resolution *Implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations related to assistance to third States affected by the application of sanctions* (A/RES/54/107). Non-state actors have in the last years tremendously grown in their political importance, especially with regard to the international fight against terrorism. Their position and the possibilities of the application of economic sanction on non-state actors is another topic that urgently needs to be considered.

#### **II. Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Conflict Regions**

As a founding member of the United Nations, Mexico is highly engaged in the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights all over the world, as laid down in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)* in 1948. Especially since the democratic transition of Mexico in 2000 it is one of the most urgent topics to stand for Democratization and Human Rights, and Mexico implements this vision on many different fronts.

In the Convoking Group of the intergovernmental Community of Democracies (GC), the United Mexican States uphold an approach that fosters international cooperation to promote democratic values and institution-building at the national and international level. To emphasize the strong interrelation between human rights and the building of democracy and to fortify democratic developments are further challenges Mexico deals with in this committee. A key-factor for the sustainable development of a post-conflict-region is to hold free and fair election and thus creating a democratic system. Being aware of the need of post-conflict countries for support in the preparation of democratic elections, the United Mexican States contribute since 2001 to the work of the International Institute for Democracy

and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an intergovernmental organization operating at international, regional and national level in partnership with a range of institutions. Mexico's foreign policy regarding human rights is substantially based on cooperation with international organizations. The Inter American Commission of Human Rights is one of the bodies, Mexico is participating, working on the promotion of Human Rights in the Americas. Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the regional judicial institution for the application and interpretation of the *American Convention of Human Rights*.

The objectives Mexico pursues are to improve human rights in the country through structural changes and to fortify the legal and institutional frame for the protection of human rights on the international level. Underlining the connection between democracy, development and Human Rights, stresses the importance of cooperation with and the role of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and the reform of the Human Rights Commission to a Human rights Council.

Having in mind the diversity of challenges in enforcing democracy and Human Rights, Mexico considers regional and national approaches vital for their endorsement, as Mexico exemplifies with its *National Program for Human Rights* or the *Plan Puebla Panama*. On the global level, Mexico is encouraged in working on a greater coordination and interoperability among the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as the development of common strategies and operational policies and the sharing of best practices in civilian crisis management should be encouraged, including clear frameworks for joint operations, when applicable.

### **III. The Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa**

The United Mexican States welcome the leadership role the African Union has taken regarding the security problems of the continent. Our delegation is furthermore convinced that The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can become the foundation for Africa's economic, social and democratic development as the basis for sustainable peace. Therefore it deserves the full support of the international community.

The development of the United Mexican States in the last two decades is characterized by the transition to a full democracy, the national and regional promotion of human rights and sustainable, economic growth. Mexico's development is characterized by free trade and its regional integration in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Having in mind that sustainable development is based not only on economic, but as well on social and environmental development, President Vicente Fox has made sustainable development a guiding principle in the Mexican Development Plan that includes sustainability targets for all major policy areas.

The United Nations Security Council has established not less than seven peace-keeping missions on the African continent, underlining the need for full support by the international community. In post-conflict situations, we regard national reconciliation as a precondition for a peaceful development, which is the reason why Mexico supported such committees, i.e. in the case of Sierra Leone. The United Mexican States are convinced that an other to enhance durable peace in Africa is the institutional reform of the United Nations. We therefore want to reaffirm our full support to both the establishment of the peace-building commission and the Human Rights Council. Both topics are highly interrelated and, having in mind that the breach of peace is most often linked with severest human rights' abuses, thus need to be seen as two sides of one problem and be approached in this understanding.

As most conflicts have their roots in conflicts about economic resources and development chances, human development and the eradication of poverty must be at the heart of a successful, preventive approach. Lifting people out of poverty must be seen as a precondition not only for peace, but for social development and environmental sustainability.

The United Mexican States want to express their esteem for the decision taken by the G-8 countries for a complete debt-relief for many African Highly-Indebted-Poor-Countries. Nevertheless, many commitments made by the international community that are crucial for Africa's sustainable development are unfulfilled. The developed countries agreed in the *Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development* (A/CONF.198/11) to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) "towards the target of 0,7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries and 0,15 to 0,20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least developed countries". Furthermore, the United Mexican States are disappointed by the result of the Hong Kong Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, which once more failed to meet the needs of those, to whom the round was devoted: developing countries and especially African countries, who today, more than ever, are cut off from global trade and prosperity by protectionism.

With regard to the African Peer Review Mechanism, the United Mexican States want to underline that good governance is an integral part of sustainable development. Therefore, we support all efforts by African countries to make the mechanism obligatory to increase transparency and accountability in all African countries.



## Committee History

### ***Introduction: Persistent global drug problems***

Illicit drugs production, trafficking, and consumption remain important problems for the international community. In many countries, people are suffering and dying from using illicit drugs, while at the same time trafficking is fuelling criminal activities worth several hundred billions of dollars. Yury Fedotov, the Director-General of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) confirms: “We are [...] witnessing more and more acts of violence, conflicts and terrorist activities stoked by drug trafficking and organized crime.”<sup>1</sup> Recent trends, presented in the 2011 World Drug Report, highlight the persistent need to tackle drug-related problems: Globally, 3.3% to 6.1% of the population aged 15-64 used illicit substances at least once in the year 2008.<sup>2</sup> The world’s largest illicit drug product remains cannabis, followed by cocaine, heroin, and Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).<sup>3</sup> While definite numbers are difficult to acquire, long-term trends of increased seizures suggest stable or rising production rates, as seizures of ATS tripled and seizures of other drug types nearly doubled between 1998 and 2009.<sup>4</sup> Especially the manufacture of ATS-type drugs has spread to over 60 United Nations (UN) Member States from all regions.<sup>5</sup> This offsets some positive trends, such as the 18% reduction of the global area under coca cultivation since 2007.<sup>6</sup> These trends underline the continued need for international cooperation on counternarcotic strategies at all levels.

### ***History of International Drug Control***

The origins of the international drug control system dates back to 1909 when the first international narcotics conference was held in Shanghai, China (where an unprecedented opium epidemic was rampant).<sup>7</sup> Advocating the regulation of opium manufacture, trade, and consumption, this conference established a forum for discourse over global drug control.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, the first International Opium Convention was adopted in 1912, which introduced global drug control as an element of international law and established in basic form the present international drug control regime.<sup>9</sup> The League of Nations, founded in 1920, incorporated these precursors in its drug control regime under the auspices of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs (OAC), which is regarded as a forerunner of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).<sup>10</sup> The League continued to work on the problem and oversaw the development of three major conventions in 1925, 1931, and 1936.<sup>11</sup> While these conventions aimed to improve international drug control (especially of opium), the effective functioning of the drug control regime was hindered by the lacking will to cooperate, most dramatically evident during World War II.<sup>12</sup>

### ***International Drug Control in the UN System***

Following the war, the newly founded UN incorporated and enhanced the drug control regime of its predecessor. In 1946, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was created by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in order to take on the work of its predecessor, the OAC. The mandate established that CND would assist ECOSOC in supervision of international drug conventions, assume the responsibilities of the OAC, advise ECOSOC in drug control as well as draft new or update existing legal instruments.<sup>13</sup> In effect, CND was designed to assume the role of the main policymaking body in the UN System dealing with drug control – alongside a variety of parallel international institutions.<sup>14</sup> The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs gave a more unified order to the international drug control regime and established the independent and quasi-judicial International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The INCB incorporated the functions of a number of precursor bodies and operates as a control and

---

<sup>1</sup> Fedotov, *Launch of the 2011 World Drug Report*, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> The most recent available data is from 2008. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Fedotov, *Launch of the 2011 World Drug Report*, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Bayer and Ghodse, *Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995*, 1999, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Bayer and Ghodse, *Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995*, 1999, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Bayer and Ghodse, *Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995*, 1999, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2009, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2009, pp. 57–58.

<sup>13</sup> Bayer and Ghodse, *Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995*, 1999, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 2007, 2011*, p. 1285.

regulatory body for monitoring implementation of international drug control conventions.<sup>15</sup> Thus an effective division of labor is enshrined with CND as policymaker and INCB as enforcer.<sup>16</sup> The 2002 established UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assumes and unifies the responsibilities of two predecessor bodies and operates as secretariat for both INCB and CND.<sup>17</sup> In addition, UNODC serves as the main UN agency to address a comprehensive response against trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, inter alia.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Institutional Setup of the CND***

Established in 1946 by ECOSOC with resolution E/RES/1946/9(I), the CND is mandated to assist ECOSOC in the supervision on international drug control conventions and to provide advice on narcotics-related policies.<sup>19</sup> According to ECOSOC resolution E/RES/1991/38, the commission also serves as the governing body of the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), which is now administered by UNODC.<sup>20</sup> The CND is further mandated to approve the budget of the UNDCP, which represents more than 90% of all UN-sponsored financial resources for drug control.<sup>21</sup>

The commission comprises 53 UN Member States, which are elected by ECOSOC for four-year terms.<sup>22</sup> Members are elected with regard to adequate representation of countries with important roles in production, trafficking, or consumption, while taking into account the traditional principle of equitable geographical distribution.<sup>23</sup> As a formal subsidiary body to ECOSOC, the CND meets once a year for a period not exceeding 8 days.<sup>24</sup> As a tradition, CND adopts unanimously reports on its annual session, which are brought forward to the attention of ECOSOC.

### ***Current topics and evaluation***

In 2003, an alarming article by Cindy Fazey, a former senior officer at UNDCP, was published in the renowned International Journal on Drug Policy, which scrutinized the hitherto record of the CND, alongside the international drug control regime. Fazey argued that the commission in its 55 years of history turned out to be “no forum for debate and change”.<sup>25</sup> Rather, policies are mostly decided by major donor Member States, which do not even have a united stance on drug control policies.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, general policies decided by CND only reflect the smallest common denominator, while specific projects and applications of the UN drug conventions were executed with varying attitudes and goals, depending on the donors in charge.<sup>27</sup> In addition, implementation reports are often found to be biased towards “reporting process, not necessarily progress.”<sup>28</sup> These contradictions negatively affected the proper functioning of UNDCP, which has since been incorporated in the UNODC.

These findings point to a key problem of the international drug control regime, which persists today:<sup>29</sup> Although it has reached a very high degree in “universalism, comprehensiveness, and institutional integrity,” differences in ideology complicate the effectiveness of international drug control.<sup>30</sup> While some Member States, especially European and South American countries, have recently introduced regulatory and liberalization-oriented policies, others, most notably the United States, Sweden, and Japan, rely on more traditional, prohibition-based strategies.<sup>31</sup> These different approaches have to be reconciled at CND sessions, often resulting in sub-optimal compromises. Therefore it is clear that constant efforts are still needed amongst the CND and Member States to strengthen the

---

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2009, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> Weiss and Daws, *The Oxford handbook on the United Nations*, 2008, p. 612.

<sup>18</sup> Weiss and Daws, *The Oxford handbook on the United Nations*, 2008, p. 612.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. (E/RES/1946/9(I)), 1946, February 16.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Terms of reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. (E/RES/1991/38), 1991, 21 June.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs as governing body*, 2011.

<sup>22</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 158.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Membership*, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 158.

<sup>25</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 155.

<sup>26</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 165-167.

<sup>27</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 162-164.

<sup>28</sup> Fazey, *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme*, 2003, p. 155.

<sup>29</sup> See also Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Buxton, *The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control Regime*, 2010, p. 90

<sup>31</sup> Buxton, *The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control Regime*, 2010, p. 90

existing drug control systems, incorporate new scientific insights into new strategies, and foster greater and more effective international collaboration.

## Annotated Bibliography

### Committee History

Bayer, I., & Ghodse, H. (1999). Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995. *Bulletin on Narcotics (Occasional Papers)*, LI(1-2), 1-17. Retrieved 2 September 2011 from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.1075&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=9>

*This bulletin provides background on origins and evolution of the international drug control regime. Its authors are renowned experts in the fields of pharmacy and medicine, at the time of publication stationed in Budapest and London, respectively. Readers will find historical information about institutional developments, important conventions, and key actors of the global drug control regime.*

Buxton, J. (2010 [2008]). The Historical Foundations of the Narcotic Drug Control Regime. In P. Keefer & N. Loayza (Eds.), *Innocent Bystanders. Developing Countries and the War on Drugs* (pp. 61-93). Washington DC: World Bank.

*This book chapter by Julia Buxton, based on her 2008 working paper, aptly summarizes the history of international drug control. Most major institutions and conventions are listed and described in detail. Presently, the author is senior research fellow at the University of Bradford. The rest of the book is worth studying as well, as it contains unbiased analyses of the consequences of criminalization, interdiction, and eradication policies for the developing world.*

Fazey, C. S. J. (2003). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: politics, policies and prospect for change. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 14(2), 155-169.

*This journal article provides independent insights into the functioning of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The author does not hesitate to point at shortcomings of the international drug control regime. Formerly, she worked for the United Nations Drug Control Programme, before becoming professor of International Drug Policy at the University of Liverpool in 1998.*

United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. (2011). *Report on the fifty-fourth session (2 December 2010 and 21-25 March 2011)*. Retrieved from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V11/819/03/PDF/V1181903.pdf>

*This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs during its 54<sup>th</sup> session in 2010-2011. In its report, the CND recommends draft resolutions to be adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council for the Council. Furthermore, the report informs about the organizational proceedings of the session.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *A Century of International Drug Control*. Retrieved 2 September 2011 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100\\_Years\\_of\\_Drug\\_Control.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf)

*This publication is a good starting point for research on the international drug control regime. Written for a general audience, it provides basic information on the evolution of international drug control up to 2009. Published by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which also serves as Secretariat of the CND.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report 2011*. Retrieved 2 September 2011 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2011\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf)

*The World Drug Report is the major international publication on problems related to global illicit drug production, trade, and consumption. It is compiled yearly by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, which is based in Vienna. Researchers and policymakers in the field of international drug control often refer to this publication.*

## I. Responding to the Challenge of Narco-Traffic and Organized Crime in West Africa

*"We can succeed if we reinforce our commitment to the basic principles of health and human rights [...]. [T]his will foster communities free of drug-related crime and violence, and individuals free of drug dependence who can contribute to our common future and a safer world for all."*<sup>32</sup>

### **Introduction**

Over the past 50 years, the West African region has experienced 44 successful military coups, 43 attempted coups, and seven civil wars.<sup>33</sup> During the late 1980s and 1990s many of the 15 countries in the region faced civil war, regime change, and militia brutality, which have all contributed to the extreme vulnerability and instability in the region.<sup>34</sup> The most consequential of these conflicts was the eleven-year civil war in Sierra Leone. The war's chief concern, like many in the region, was control over the country's natural resources.<sup>35</sup> The devastation caused by the Sierra Leone Civil War, and other similar wars in the region, have contributed to the region's high number of "failed states":

*During the last half century, as [West African] states have been incorporated into the international economy [after at least a decade of war], weak and poorly funded administrative institutions have emerged. Courts are corrupt, police are underpaid, armies tend to be under-funded and untrained, education systems tend to be bankrupt, basic health care is unavailable to most people, and elections are often fraudulent. [This] provides few incentives for leaders to establish popular legitimacy through reform or development."*<sup>36</sup>

The institutional corruption has also led to the weakening of state border protection, allowing international crime organizations, especially drug cartels, to penetrate the weakened States and establish connections and deals with local rebel, guerrilla, and militia groups. This has led to the smuggling and transport of illegal and black market products throughout the region and into Europe. The international community is now faced with the task of preventing these illegal and endangering actions from taking place transnationally while allowing each West African nation to develop freely and with sovereignty.

### **Context**

Due to destabilization and war in the region, organized crime has become paramount and with the presence of corrupt government, military, and police officials, has in some cases led to partial State dependence on narcotics trafficking. Large crime organizations have been known to produce profits that exceed the combined Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) of all the nations in the region.<sup>37</sup> Approximately a quarter of all the cocaine trafficked to Europe (a conservative estimate is about 40 metric tons per year) is funneled through the West African region; therefore, it has become extremely profitable for those involved, especially when they also deal in other smuggling operations or black market trade.<sup>38</sup> The profitability of these illegal operations is a major cause in keeping the region unstable and in a state of armed conflict. Many international relations experts and United Nations (UN) officials agree that the profits from smuggling operations have "financed armed conflicts in West Africa and the export of illegal drugs [through the region] has continued to finance insurgents and militias in all of Africa."<sup>39</sup>

Drug, especially cocaine trafficking in West Africa is one of the major contributors to the lack of stability and political turmoil in the region.<sup>40</sup> The financial incentives that the cartels, militias, and other organized crime groups offer to politicians has made it extremely difficult for a legitimate government to take power in the region. While

---

<sup>32</sup> Ban, *Message for International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> McGowan, *Coups and Conflict in West Africa 1955-2004: Theoretical Perspectives*, 2005, p. 17.

<sup>34</sup> The West African/Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) Member States are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

<sup>35</sup> Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, 2004, p. 111-113.

<sup>36</sup> Driscoll, *Social Conflict and Political Violence in Africa*, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>38</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report*, 2009.

<sup>39</sup> Levinson, *Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment*, 2002, p. 1521.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

countries like Gabon, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have established what seem to be stable, long lasting governments they are the exception in the region, where corruption reaches the highest levels of government. It is estimated that between the years of 2000-2008, Nigeria alone lost US\$130 billion in illegal or corrupt practices, including profits from smuggling and drug trafficking in addition to bribing officials and government personal.<sup>41</sup> The corruption in the Nigerian government seems far from over, their 2007 election was won fraudulently, and the coup-prone but oil-rich country worries many UN officials who fear uprisings and worsening conditions so long as “corruption, pollution, and poverty remain unaddressed by the government.”<sup>42</sup> Similar issues of corruption have penetrated most of the other nations in the region. In Guinea, the average income is less than US\$1 per day but even the lowest ranking government official, the Minister of Sports, makes nearly US\$15 million per year, much of which was meant for government programs and not his salary.<sup>43</sup> In recent years, there have been measures to prevent, fight, and counter corruption in the West African region. However, corrupt practices remain prominent in nearly all of the region’s Member States, allowing organized crime groups to flourish and partake in illegal business practices that are, at minimum, overlooked by government officials and law enforcement agents.

The weakness of West African borders has, in recent years, lead to an increase in terrorist activities in the region and due to the already flourishing drug trade and the cooperation of some West African governments, terrorist groups like al Qaeda and Hezbollah are able to use these countries as training areas and profitable smuggling ventures.<sup>44</sup> This problem has been increasing over the last decade and “al Qaeda has been detected working with the Colombian drug cartels to handle movement of the drugs from West African airports to North African ports.”<sup>45</sup> The involvement of terrorist groups has increased the profitability and efficiency of other crime organizations in the region because the terrorists offer their protection and assistance.<sup>46</sup> In exchange, terrorist groups are harbored and sheltered by established crime organization that already have agreements with local law enforcement.<sup>47</sup> The recent presence of terrorist organizations in the region has heightened the urgency of the drug trafficking and organized crime situation in West Africa because they have increased the man power of the groups and the level of violence connected with them.<sup>48</sup> Because these terrorist groups are focused on recruitment they “utilize political violence [...] and propaganda, the result of which has increased instability and chaos in countries within the region.”<sup>49</sup>

The combination of weak border security, organized crime, and corrupted politicians has led to extreme instability and strained relationships between West African Members States and developed nations who would be able to provide aid. Because much of the aid given between 1970 and 1990 was given to corrupt politicians and officials, West Africa’s “relationships with the donors have become strained [...] and many aid programs have been reduced or dissolved completely.”<sup>50</sup> West Africa’s problem of organized crime and narco-trafficking is now at a critical level and is affecting the international community as a whole.

### ***Social and Economic Consequences***

Many West African States are now on the verge of being classified as “Narco-States,” because their economies are extremely dependent on the illegal funds that cocaine and other illegal drug trafficking is bringing in to the country.<sup>51</sup> This dependence has led many West African States to be under the unofficial control of cartel and militia leaders, who bribe government officials to overlook their illegal activities, work under them, or to promote governmental practices that will benefit drug smugglers and crime organizations.<sup>52</sup> These corrupt practices have led to deep social and economic consequences for the average citizens of the region, who now often live in extreme poverty and in fear of not only the crime organizations but the government, police, and military who work with them as well.

---

<sup>41</sup> Global Financial Integrity, *Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2008*.

<sup>42</sup> CBSNews, *In Nigeria, Clinton Lambastes Corruption*, 2009.

<sup>43</sup> BBC News, *Guinea Calls Corruption Hearing*, 2009.

<sup>44</sup> Farah, *Fighting Terrorism in Africa*, 2004, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup> Strategy Page, *Al Qaeda in West Africa*, 2010.

<sup>46</sup> Strategy Page, *Al Qaeda in West Africa*, 2010.

<sup>47</sup> Farah, *Fighting Terrorism in Africa*, 2004, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Davis, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, 2007, p. 105.

<sup>49</sup> Davis, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, 2007, p. 4.

<sup>50</sup> Olaniyan, *Foreign Aid, Self Reliance, and Economic Development in West Africa*, 1996, p. 93.

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>52</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.



The wealth in the region is very unequally distributed. While corrupted officials, militiamen, and organized crime groups live lavishly, the average citizens of these countries live with little access to health care and other basic human rights.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, the physical health of the populations deteriorates. Malnutrition and disease are rampant and levels of drug addiction are high.<sup>54</sup> In the region the malnutrition rate averages as 14.3% of the population in each State but little is done to prevent or counter these adverse health problems.<sup>55</sup> Even international aid money is used to fuel smuggling operations or to pay the salaries of corrupt government officials.<sup>56</sup> Recently, crime organizations have been able to profit from the ill health of the region's citizens because they are now smuggling counterfeit medicine into the region from Asia.<sup>57</sup> The majority of counterfeit medications are diluted forms of legitimate medications, which ultimately leads to the creation of drug resistant strains of diseases.<sup>58</sup> Unfortunately "the crime of trafficking bogus medicine is not taken as seriously as other forms of smuggling" allowing it to become an extremely profitable and easy way to fund other smuggling operations.<sup>59</sup>

West African women and children live in threat of kidnapping and coercion that lead to forced prostitution, both in country and abroad. Because the majority of the cocaine and other drugs that are smuggled through West Africa are en route to Europe the organized crime groups use this as an opportunity to also traffic women and children into sex slavery in these countries.<sup>60</sup> This practice is especially prominent among Nigerian crime organizations which draw women from all over the region using female recruiters, who know how to manipulate uneducated women using both traditional and modern tactics to scare them into compliance.<sup>61</sup> The trafficked women are then used as drug mules and later prostitutes in Europe.<sup>62</sup> Orphaned children are especially at risk of being trafficked.<sup>63</sup> Many orphans live in State sponsored homes, but when the home directors are corrupted arrangements are made with organized crime groups and the children are sold to them.<sup>64</sup>

Girls are not the only West Africans at risk; boys are also kidnapped and forced to serve as soldiers and drug smugglers in the militias and other crime organizations. In order to increase their effectiveness as violent soldiers, these children are given copious amounts of drugs "as a way of bringing them together and desensitizing them against the acts they are being told to carry out."<sup>65</sup> Former child soldiers remain addicted to the drugs forced upon them as children whom create a domestic market for narcotics, increases the cartel's profits, and helps to keep the crime organizations in power.<sup>66</sup> Drug use is on the rise in West Africa as a whole, because of high unemployment rates, the threat of violence, and the easy availability of hard drugs.<sup>67</sup>

Because of the fear of kidnapping and the threat of violence children rarely attend school or withdraw early to avoid contact with militiamen and members of other crime organizations; thus, basic education and literacy levels are low. In Burkina Faso, for example, the literacy rate amongst adults is only 33% for males and 15% for females and only 17% of females and 23% males attend secondary school for even one year.<sup>68</sup>

The violence caused by organized crime and drug trafficking in the region has led to a high number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) throughout the region. As of January 2011, there are approximately 170 thousand

---

<sup>53</sup> Human Rights Watch, *The Regional Crisis and Human Rights Abuses in West Africa: A Briefing Paper to the UN Security Council*, 2003.

<sup>54</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>55</sup> USAID, *West Africa—Malnutrition*, 2006.

<sup>56</sup> Driscoll, *Social Conflict and Political Violence in Africa*, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>58</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>59</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, 2009.

<sup>60</sup> Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, 2010, p. 129.

<sup>61</sup> Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, 2010, p. 129.

<sup>62</sup> Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, 2010, p. 129.

<sup>63</sup> Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, 2010, p. 133.

<sup>64</sup> Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, 2010, p. 133.

<sup>65</sup> Norwegian Council for Africa, *Drug Addiction Hinders Child Soldier Reintegration*, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> Farrah, *Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa*, 2009, p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Traub, *Africa's Drug Problem*, 2010.

<sup>68</sup> UNICEF, *Statistics on Burkina Faso*, 2009.

refugees and 500 thousand IDPs living throughout West Africa.<sup>69</sup> This has become another source of conflict and even violence in many countries, as drought and famine are already causing inner-community conflict, and the refugees and IDPs are often seen as unwelcome outsiders who are stretching already scarce resources.<sup>70</sup> Because of the many upcoming elections in already volatile and fragile countries, this situation is only projected to worsen over the next year.<sup>71</sup>

### ***Previous and Current UN Actions***

The UN has always considered illicit drug trafficking and other drug related issues part of its purpose and has always set out to resolve them. Starting in the 1980's the UN began discussing the issue of illicit drug trade and trafficking extensively because the issue was at the forefront of many Member States' minds. In 1988, the *UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* was adopted. The convention discusses how previous drug law enforcement measures have failed internationally and how narcotics trafficking "undermines the legitimate economies and threatens the stability, security and sovereignty of States."<sup>72</sup> It emphasizes the UN's commitment to ending drug trade and addiction worldwide and served as the start of many drug control resolutions and plans of action, especially for Africa.<sup>73</sup>

Presently, measures are being taken in the West African region in order to secure borders and to curb the drug trafficking and smuggling operations currently taking place. Most notable is the ECOWAS partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The two organizations have come together to create the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan which aims to build or strengthen regional capacities in law enforcement, forensics, intelligence, border management, and money laundering.<sup>74</sup> This partnership has created the *West African Coast Initiative (WACI) Freetown Commitment on Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa (WACI Freetown Commitment)*. The *WACI Freetown Commitment*, specifically designed to implement the ECOWAS Action Plan, has been signed by every Member State in the region and is endorsed by the UN and all international law enforcement agencies.<sup>75</sup> The implementation of both these plans is possible because of the 2008 ECOWAS *Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime in West Africa*. The document marks the first time that the West African community officially condemned drug related illegal actions and the corrupted officials who allow them to take place.<sup>76</sup> It calls upon all ECOWAS Member States and the international community to remain committed to the ending of illicit drug trafficking in the region.<sup>77</sup>

### ***Case Study: The Republic of Niger***

Similar to many other West African countries the post-colonial political history of Niger is characterized by coups and military governance. Since independence in 1960, nearly all Nigerien leaders have taken their position through military coups.<sup>78</sup> And up until the mid-1990's "in terms of institutional instability, Niger's record is unparalleled in Africa" making it an easy target for drug trafficking, smuggling operations, terrorism, and other organized crime.<sup>79</sup> In addition to the political instability, Niger is one of the poorest States in the world, which organized crime groups use to their advantage.<sup>80</sup> Rivalries between the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Hausa and the Djerma, enables organized crime leaders to pretend to be mediators or allies, which lets the people believe that they are more

---

<sup>69</sup> UNHCR, *2011 Region Operations Profile-West Africa*, 2011.

<sup>70</sup> UNHCR, *2011 Region Operations Profile-West Africa*, 2011.

<sup>71</sup> UNHCR, *2011 Region Operations Profile-West Africa*, 2011.

<sup>72</sup> UNODC, *UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, 1988.

<sup>73</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations, *Social and Humanitarian Assistance—International Cooperation for Narcotic Drug Control*, 2011.

<sup>74</sup> UNODC, *Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa, 2008-2011*, 2008.

<sup>75</sup> ECOWAS, *West African Coast Initiative "WACI" Freetown Commitment on Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa*

<sup>76</sup> ECOWAS, *Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime in West Africa*, 2008.

<sup>77</sup> ECOWAS, *Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime in West Africa*, 2008.

<sup>78</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Niger*, 2011.

<sup>79</sup> Idrissa, *Armee et Politique au Niger (English Edition)*, 2008, p. 12.

<sup>80</sup> Idrissa, *Armee et Politique au Niger (English Edition)*, 2008, p. 12.

trustworthy than the country's corrupted government officials.<sup>81</sup> With the cooperation of the rural peoples, drug smugglers are able to easily navigate and work in the deserts of the country.<sup>82</sup> Due to a lack of military personnel – Niger's army only has about 12 thousand members –, there is little that the country's non-corrupted officials can do to counter the problem.<sup>83</sup> The smugglers and criminal organizations are also able to effectively operate in the Nigerien cities because corrupt police officials have been bribed to overlook their activities and in some cases, the police force is working with the smugglers to ensure maximum profits.<sup>84</sup> In recent years, the heavy influence of these crime organizations in Niger has allowed international terrorist groups to penetrate the country's borders. Al Qaeda has attempted to use the influence of crime groups in Niger for "recruitment, people and contraband smuggling, undetected transit, and logistical facilitation" and has been successful in the nation's deserts.<sup>85</sup> The corruption of Nigerien officials has only worked to fuel illegal activity within the country because they often attempt to move past or vote against any legislative measures that would combat these activities.<sup>86</sup>

Despite Niger's questionable past, in recent years there has been a huge anti-corruption movement in the country. In 1999 Mamadou Tandja refused to run for president if there were not at least two parties represented in the race, something unseen before this.<sup>87</sup> His subsequent presidency was "built on his reputation [for] providing political and economic stability."<sup>88</sup> In 2010, when president Tandja was meant to step down from power, he pushed forward with an amendment that abolished presidential term limits, claiming that he needed more time to complete large projects that he had started.<sup>89</sup> This outraged the people, who saw this as another act of a corrupted politician who intended to become a dictator and Tandja was removed from office in February of 2010 by a military coup.<sup>90</sup> Unlike past Nigerien post-coup instabilities, the four opposition parties took temporary control and quickly planned a free democratic election.<sup>91</sup> In March of 2011 the three other opposition parties put their support behind Mahamadou Isouffou who won the election on an anti-corruption platform, becoming the first civilian, freely elected president in Nigerien history.<sup>92</sup>

Isouffou immediately began work on his anti-corruption policies. His first act as president of Niger was to implement the creation of the High Authority to Combat Corruption, which is tasked with "centralizing and processing complaints and information it receives relating to corruption."<sup>93</sup> He has also made public over US\$186 million that went missing during Tandja's presidency and has opened a full investigation.<sup>94</sup> The new government has also revealed that US\$3.3 million had been embezzled by government officials under Tandja and the Budget Minister along with two other departmental officials, were promptly replaced and are now facing criminal charges.<sup>95</sup> In addition, the ten top Tandja officials and advisors are also being prosecuted for charges of corruption.<sup>96</sup> The new president has also launched an Anti-Corruption Hotline, which allows Niger's citizens to anonymously alert officials of any corrupt practices they witness. Brigi Rafini, the country's Prime Minister has called the phone service "an innovation [and] very important tool" in fighting corruption.<sup>97</sup> In Isouffou's fight against corruption, he has also vowed to stop the drug trade, organized crime, and terrorist activities in his country.

The anti-corruption measures are still in early phases but they seem to be effective. Before Isouffou's election, Niger's relationship with developed nations was strained and international aid was limited due to the country's high levels of corruption. Since president Isouffou has implemented his anti-corruption measures, Niger has begun to improve these relationships. The United States has reinstated its Nigerien aid program, which was previously halted

---

<sup>81</sup> Andres, *Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Terrorism: The New Achilles' Heel of West Africa*, 2008, p. 4.

<sup>82</sup> Alhassane, *International Conflicts and National Security in the Republic of Niger: Challenges and Prospects*, 2010, p. 36.

<sup>83</sup> Alhassane, *International Conflicts and National Security in the Republic of Niger: Challenges and Prospects*, 2010, p.36.

<sup>84</sup> Alhassane, *International Conflicts and National Security in the Republic of Niger: Challenges and Prospects*, 2010, p.22.

<sup>85</sup> UNHRC, *2009 Country Report of Terrorism-Niger*, 2009.

<sup>86</sup> Alhassane, *International Conflicts and National Security in the Republic of Niger: Challenges and Prospects*, 2010, p. 25.

<sup>87</sup> BBC News, *Profile: Mamadou Tandja*, 2010.

<sup>88</sup> BBC News, *Profile: Mamadou Tandja*, 2010.

<sup>89</sup> BBC News, *Profile: Mamadou Tandja*, 2010.

<sup>90</sup> BBC News, *Profile: Mamadou Tandja*, 2010.

<sup>91</sup> BBC News, *Niger: Junta Hands Over to President Mamadou Isouffou*, 2011.

<sup>92</sup> BBC News, *Niger: Junta Hands Over to President Mahamadou Isouffou*, 2011.

<sup>93</sup> Okocha, *Niger forms Anti-Corruption Body*, 2011.

<sup>94</sup> Okocha, *Niger forms Anti-Corruption Body*, 2011.

<sup>95</sup> Okocha, *Niger forms Anti-Corruption Body*, 2011.

<sup>96</sup> Reuters Africa, *Niger Launches Telephone Hotline to Fight Corruption*, 2011.

<sup>97</sup> Reuters Africa, *Niger Launches Telephone Hotline to Fight Corruption*, 2011.

due to corruption, and many other developed Member States are now in diplomatic contact with Niger to discuss new relationships.<sup>98</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The people of West Africa face serious human rights violations because of drug trafficking and the activities of crime organizations in their countries. Their access to healthcare, education, and a violence-free existence can be extremely limited. The combating and prevention of narco-trafficking has become a chief concern of ECOWAS, UNODC, ECOSOC, and the UN as a whole. In September 2010, a report was issued by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, which outlines the appropriate response to “combating terrorism, cartels, and organized crime in West Africa through the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy.”<sup>99</sup> This action plan marks narco-trafficking activities as a brand of terrorism and promotes the immediate response of the international community to combat them.<sup>100</sup> International experts in the fields of counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking, and West African politics have all called upon the UN to implement programs that will cease and prevent these illegal actions from taking place in the region, believing that “the human tragedies caused by [the drug trade] in Africa have had profound consequences. Serious changes need to be made when dealing with Africa [and] significant changes in legal and diplomatic practices need to take place.”<sup>101</sup>

When researching this topic, delegates should attempt to address the Commission on Narcotic Drugs’ role in countering these human rights violations and what preventative measures should be implemented to combat the narco-trafficking problems. How can judicial prosecution and ensuring the integrity of government and law enforcement agents be improved? How will preventing drug use and improving addiction treatment in the region and abroad affect the problem? Delegates should also consider ways in which cartels, drug traffickers, and other organized crime groups should be combated while the sovereignty of West African countries is maintained and promoted.

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### ***I. Responding to the Challenge of Narco-Traffic and Organized Crime in West Africa***

Andres, A. (2008). *Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Terrorism: The New Achilles’ Heel of West Africa*. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from [http://www.aprodex.com/UserFiles/File/COM\\_Achilles\\_heel\\_eng\\_may08.pdf](http://www.aprodex.com/UserFiles/File/COM_Achilles_heel_eng_may08.pdf).

*Andres is the Deputy Regional Representative for West and Central Africa to the UNODC and his report outlines various organized crime situations in West Africa. He describes the various crime organizations, militias, cartels, and guerrilla armies operating in the region, what illegal industries they operate in, and the impact they have had in various countries. Andres gives specific examples from many of the countries in the region and outlines specific political and diplomatic recommendations to improve and counter the situations. His suggestions are not limited to Africa, Andres outlines ways in which drug related illicit activities should be handled in South America, the originators of the product, and in the developed world. He believes that drug addiction must be stopped in North America and Europe in order to counter the problem in West Africa.*

Davis, J. (2007). *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

*Davis discusses how terrorism is impacting Africa as a whole and why this is an extreme security issue for developed nations. Chapter 6, Political Terror in West Africa, and Chapter 9, The Bush Model: US Special Forces, Africa, and the War on Terror, discuss the role of West African nations in terrorism, as well as how and why terrorist groups have penetrated the region so heavily. Davis also goes into specifics about the connection between terrorist groups (especially al Qaeda) and the established cartels and drug smuggling operations in West Africa, specifically why these organizations have chosen to work with each other. The book’s chapter on West Africa (chapter 6)*

---

<sup>98</sup> IIP Digital, *United States Resumes Aid Program in Niger*, 2011.

<sup>99</sup> Ipe, Cockayne, Millar, *Implementing the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in West Africa*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>100</sup> Ipe, Cockayne, Millar, *Implementing the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in West Africa*, 2010, p. 16.

<sup>101</sup> Herbst, *Responding to State Failure in Africa*, 1996, p. 1.

*gives specific information about organized crime groups in the region and each of their impacts on regional and international politics, including a comprehensive outline of the ways politicians and law enforcement agents become corrupted. The last few chapters of the book gives suggests on countering the international drug trade problem. The suggestions are not tailored to West Africa specifically but they are comprehensive and far reaching.*

Farrah, D. (2009). *Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs. "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa."* Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FarahTestimony090623a1.pdf>.

*Farrah is an expert on West African politics and international relations; he serves as the USA's resident expert on the situation in the region. Farrah's testimony explains the drug trafficking and smuggling situation in West Africa in great detail and explains the situation's volatility and why there is a need for immediate action. Farrah further explains the connection between international organized crime in West Africa and South America with terrorism. He then goes on to explain how the illegal actions taking place in the region have a direct impact on international security, specifically the security of the United States, and what should be done to count these insecurities; his testimony serves as a specific outline of the occurrences before, during, and after the drugs have arrived in West Africa. He also briefly discusses the human rights implications for the people living in the region.*

Human Rights Watch. (2003). *The Regional Crisis and Human Rights Abuses in West Africa: A Briefing Paper to the UN Security Council.* Retrieved August 20, 2011 from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/06/20/regional-crisis-and-human-rights-abuses-west-africa>.

*Human Rights Watch's official report about the human rights violations in West Africa, many of which are directly connected with drug trafficking, organized crime, or corrupted government officials, the report makes it clear which violations these are. The briefing gives country specific examples of violations as well as regional examples. The violations connected with narco-trafficking, either directly or indirectly, are highlighted and links to full detail report that give country specific examples. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch significantly displays the urgency of the human rights situation in West Africa and calls upon the UN to create and implement an action plan to counter these violations.*

Ipe, J., J. Cockayne, and A. Millar. (2010). *Implementing the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in West Africa.* Washington D.C.: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

*Ipe, Cockayne, and Millar give a full account of the best ways to implement the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in the West African region. It also gives details about how and why terrorism is connected with drug trafficking in West Africa. The report goes on to classify narco-trafficking as a terrorist activity because it promotes terrorism and allows established terrorist groups to infiltrate and flourish in West Africa, also because of the numerous human rights violations it causes. The urgency of the situation is made extremely clear throughout the document. Many helpful strategies and action plans are given in detail and what part each nation in the region and select international community members need to take in the implementation of the plans are outlined.*

McGowan, P. (2005). *Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Theoretical Perspectives.* *Armed Forces and Society*, Volume 32 (1): 17.

*McGowan's text is a comprehensive look at the conflicts in West Africa over 50 years. The journal article goes into all major conflicts and discusses the social, economic, and political impacts of these conflicts both domestically and internationally. McGowan further discusses the emergence of organized crime groups in West Africa and their connection to previous instability and conflict. She also connects current West African instabilities to the previous conflicts and crime organizations. The text gives a solid foundation in understanding the political turmoil in the region and its effects on modern West African affairs and politics. McGowan only briefly discusses*



*modern narco-trafficking problems; however, her article makes it clear that these actions are taking place because of the conflicts of the past.*

Traub, J. (2010). *Africa's Drug Problem*. New York Times. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Trade-t.html>.

*Traub gives a comprehensive, easy to understand explanation of the drug trade in West Africa. The article uses Guinea-Bissau as its example but the account of the trafficking is similar to what happens in the region as a whole. Traub is the best place to get a basic, elementary understanding of how the drug trade in West Africa works and what major consequences it causes. The article also contains links to related articles and citations that are all helpful in understanding the process taking place in the region and how drug trafficking has become so prominent in West Africa.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf>.

*The UNODC's official report on cocaine trafficking in the region, it gives a full detail account of the route of trafficking (starting in South America and ending in Europe). It also analyses the root causes of the problem and its effects on West African governments, law enforcement, and civilian citizens. There is an extensive analysis of the causes and effects of drug addiction in the region, what needs to be done to combat it and ways in which to improve substance abuse treatment programs and facilities in the region. Substance abuse treatment programs are a major focus of the report and the reasons it is one of the most import parts of combating the problem is given. The UNODC's report is an in-depth look at cocaine trafficking and is a good source of specific information on the problem.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 14, 2009 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West\\_Africa\\_Report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf).

*The UNODC's official report on drug trafficking in West Africa, it presents all relevant information on trafficking in the region, with a heavy emphasis on cocaine. The origins of the illicit substances are outlined and a full account of their trafficking route is given. The report gives specific statistics, numbers, and projections about the economic consequences of West African drug trafficking. It also outlines social effects on people living in West Africa and the West Africans abroad who have been trafficked into Europe. Information on health concern, human trafficking, and counterfeit medications are all given in the report. It best serves as a beginning source for all of the social problems connected with the West African drug trade. Finally, the report outlines the UN's plan of action to combat illicit drug trade in the region.*

United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (2011). *2011 Regional Operations Profile-West Africa*. UNHCR: Geneva. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html>.

*The UNHRC's 2011 projection for refugees and IDP's throughout West Africa. The numbers are based on January 2011 statistics. The report outlines why the number of refugees and IDPs will be increasing the region over the next year. Furthermore, a discussion of the challenges that refugees, IDPs, and natives to the countries will face do to the increased influx of refugees and IDPs is given. A comprehensive plan of action is also outlined. The connection between crime organizations and this rise in refugees and IDPs is also briefly discussed, but a significant amount of links are given to reports that further explain the connections between smuggling operations and refugees and IDPs in the region.*

## II. Drug trafficking and its Role in Fueling Conflict in Central and South America

*“Youngsters, in their schools and neighborhoods, see their future menaced by the easy offer of drugs; our health systems are overwhelmed by the problem of addiction; the integrity of our institutions is menaced by corruption and aggression, and violence reaches never seen levels.”*<sup>101</sup>

### **Introduction**

The “production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs” can be both a result of conflict, as well as a cause.<sup>102</sup> Historically, the “majority of illicit drug crops are cultivated in countries characterized by civil wars, conflict, instability, and violence.”<sup>103</sup> It is easier for criminal groups to produce drugs in “areas where the basic political framework is insufficient and a weak government and the national forces have limited control.”<sup>104</sup> This in turn can lead to the financing of conflict, and further prolong the conflict itself, as the struggle for control over the profit from the drug trade often turns violent.<sup>105</sup>

Drug trafficking, as a component of broader transnational organized crime, is a serious issue in Central and South America, “affecting numerous states both in and beyond the region and having severe repercussions for political, economic, and human security.”<sup>106</sup> The drug trade is the singular issue that links the myriad of challenges facing the region, contributing to ongoing violence in Mexico and Colombia.<sup>107</sup> Further, the transit of illicit trade has “had devastating consequences for Central America, including spikes in violent crime, drug use and the corroding of government institutions,” in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.<sup>108</sup> As can be seen in the case of cocaine, the majority of the world’s supply of cocaine is produced in South America, trafficked through Central America, and consumed in the United States.<sup>109</sup> To be more specific, an estimated 90% of the cocaine traveling into the US is routed through Central America and Mexico.<sup>110</sup> This “supply chain” has led to increased acts of violence, armed conflict, and terrorist activities, fuelled by the direct involvement of the armed rebel forces, which earns up to \$300 million per year as a direct result of the refinement and trafficking of cocaine.<sup>111</sup>

In order to gain a better understanding of the challenges faces by countries in Central and South America, it is “essential” to understand “the growth and complexity of drug trafficking organizations in the region.”<sup>112</sup> The *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime* (UNTOC) (2000), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly pursuant to *Resolution 55/25* of November 15, 2000, defines a transnational criminal network as, “a structured group of three or more persons that exists over a period of time, the members of which act in concert aiming at the commission of serious crimes in order to obtain a direct or indirect financial or other material benefit.”<sup>113</sup> Transnational criminal networks are also referred to as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).<sup>114</sup>

As a result of aggressive international strategies to dismantle drug operations, TCNs have adapted their tactics of trafficking drugs by strengthening supply lines through Central American States which often lack the capacity to respond to increased crime levels and the subsequent increased violence.<sup>115</sup> The drug trafficking situation in Central America has reached a level of crisis and it is undeniably as serious as the situation in Mexico, which “receives most

---

<sup>102</sup> GTZ, *Drugs and Conflict*, 2002, p. 5.

<sup>103</sup> GTZ, *Drugs and Conflict*, 2002, p. 4.

<sup>104</sup> GTZ, *Drugs and Conflict*, 2002, p. 10.

<sup>105</sup> GTZ, *Drugs and Conflict*, 2002, p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> Chalk, *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*, 2011, p. iii.

<sup>107</sup> Chalk, *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*, 2011, p. iii.

<sup>108</sup> Dudley, *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>109</sup> Chalk, *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*, 2011, p. xi.

United Nations News Center, *Central America under threat from tentacles of drug trade*, 2010.

<sup>110</sup> Hamdeh, *The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?*, 2011.

<sup>111</sup> Goeshing, *A Multi-Pronged Approach to Transnational Criminal Networks: The Case of LAC*, 2006, p. 5.

World Bank, *Crime and Violence: A Staggering Toll on Central American Development*, 2011, p. 2.

Chalk, *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*, 2011, p. xii.

<sup>112</sup> Dudley, *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*, 2010, p. 5.

<sup>113</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (A/RES/55/25)*, 2000.

<sup>114</sup> Dudley, *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*, 2010, p. 64.

<sup>115</sup> New York Times, *Drug Wars Push Deeper Into Central America*, 2011.

ECOSOC, *Strategy for the period 2008-2011 for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (E/CN.7/2007/14)*, 2007.

of the media attention” and the largest financial assistance, despite “the Northern Triangle –El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras together have a murder rate double that of Mexico.”<sup>116</sup>

In spite of the “gravity of the problem,” the region has “had little regional or international cooperation to combat it.”<sup>117</sup> Efforts to create systems of coordination between states, regional organizations and the international community have not been successful, signaling the urgency of identifying opportunities for improving policy and programs at a local, regional, and international level in order to reverse and end the undermining effect of drugs on development, peace, security, and stability in the region.<sup>118</sup>

### ***History of Drug Trafficking in Central and South America***

The countries that produce some of the largest quantities of cocaine, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, are located in South America.<sup>119</sup> Colombia, in particular, began producing large quantities of marijuana in the early 1900s, but it was the US cultural revolution of the 1960s that enabled Colombian drug producers to find large, demand-driven markets for their supply of marijuana.<sup>120</sup> By the 1970s, cocaine had become the drug of choice for the US illicit substance market, and Colombia was its main supplier.<sup>121</sup> There are several underlying factors which allow drug trafficking to continue such as poverty, financial disparity and lack of employment for the youth; the security and police forces receive low wages, which creates a system which is easily susceptible to corruption. It is estimated that only 5% of the murders committed in Latin America result in conviction.<sup>122</sup>

TCNs active in drug trafficking, also referred to as drug trafficking organizations, use their financial assets, criminal connections, and paramilitary resources to undermine and corrupt state institutions in order to maintain control over their profitable businesses.<sup>123</sup> With the profits from drug trafficking, these groups are able to bribe officials and fund paramilitary operations that rival state militaries in size, weaponry, and organization.<sup>124</sup> Paramilitaries, defined as “designating, of, or relating to a force or unit whose function and organization are analogous or ancillary to those of a professional military force, but which is not regarded as having professional or legitimate status”<sup>125</sup> are notorious for their human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings.<sup>126</sup> These illegal groups profit from and protect drug production and trafficking by offering an income to young men in areas of growing unemployment and poverty.<sup>127</sup>

The largest guerrilla group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” of “FARC”) has a strong connection to the illicit drug production and trafficking problem.<sup>128</sup> Prior to the 1980s, FARC upheld a system of taxation on the production of drugs in the area they controlled; in exchange for protection of the farmers, FARC demanded a large portion of the revenues made by the illicit drug sale. In the 1990s, FARC expanded its operations to include trafficking and production.<sup>129</sup>

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the lead agency within the UN system on drug control, recently released a report stating that there is no single issue that has had a greater impact on the stability and development of Central America than crime.<sup>130</sup> Statistics show that in recent years, the Central American region has emerged as the most violent in the world, with the average number of homicides in 2008 rising to 33 per 100,000 people, which is three times the global average.<sup>131</sup> It is important to note that these statistics are gathered from a complex set of social, political, and economic circumstances which affect economic opportunities and attract high

---

<sup>116</sup> Dudley, *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>117</sup> Dudley, *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*, 2010, p. 64.

<sup>118</sup> GTZ, *Drugs and Conflict*, 2002, p. 22.

<sup>119</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 99.

<sup>120</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 4.

<sup>121</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>122</sup> Ungar, *Democracy, Law, and Order*, 2009.

<sup>123</sup> World Bank, *Crime and Violence: A Staggering Toll on Central American Development*, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>124</sup> Tate, *Paramilitaries in Colombia*, 2001, p. 169.

<sup>125</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, *Paramilitary group*, 2011.

<sup>126</sup> Amnesty International, *Colombia*, 2011.

<sup>127</sup> Tate, *Paramilitaries in Colombia*, 2001, p. 169.

<sup>128</sup> Vargas, *The revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the illicit drug trade*, 1999.

<sup>129</sup> Youngers, *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*, 2005, p. 103.

<sup>130</sup> UNODC, *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire*, 2007, p. 87.

<sup>131</sup> UNDP, *Opening spaces to citizen security and human development*, 2010.

levels of violence.<sup>132</sup> Several Central American scholars have noted that the security and development challenges are rooted in illegal activity and exacerbated by the mobility of small arms, drug trafficking, and TCNs.<sup>133</sup> Drug trafficking is a complex challenge.<sup>134</sup>

In 2009, in accordance with the Regional Program for Central America, a regional expert meeting was held in Costa Rica to define the priorities for action from 2009 to 2011.<sup>135</sup> Also in 2009 there was a conference for Central America governments, which addressed the Central America and Mexico Security Strategy Action Plan.<sup>136</sup>

The plan includes the following objectives:

1. "To better integrate the various efforts taken in the Region in order to achieve enhanced results;"
2. "To coordinate and exchange information and experiences among the various working groups and agencies in the Region with the aim to fight the regional crime organizations in a more effective way;" and
3. "To recognize the need for financial and resource training for the institutions responsible for managing the regions security."<sup>137</sup>

The meeting served as a starting point to the formation of the Centers of Excellence (COE).<sup>138</sup> The purpose of the COE is to collect the expertise in different areas and to provide assistance to programs and projects in the region.<sup>139</sup> The UNDOC has agreed to support the COE with advisory and technical assistance and is taking measures to respond to the illicit drug trade, including the Santo Domingo Pact which is a program for Central America and the Caribbean.<sup>140</sup> This seeks to improve organization regarding policies against drug trafficking and organized crime.<sup>141</sup>

### ***International framework***

Drug trade and trafficking is an important topic within the United Nations, across many committees, including the General Assembly and Commission on Narcotic Drugs.<sup>142</sup> Member States have, when discussing the issue, expressed their concern regarding the growth of drug cartels, and the negative impact the related crime and violence has on the stability of developing countries in Central America and West Africa.<sup>143</sup> The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the lead agency within the UN system on drug control.<sup>144</sup> The mandate of the UNODC is to support Member States in the prevention of illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism.<sup>145</sup> The Office provides comprehensive assessments of the global drug problem and publishes an annual evaluation on the international drug trade with the publication of the World Drug Report.<sup>146</sup> UNODC also promote research and studies of new and emerging forms of crime in collaboration with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).<sup>147</sup>

There are three United Nations conventions on the subject of drugs. The *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* (1961) was adopted and open for signature on March 30, 1961, and focuses primarily on the issue of drug abuse.<sup>148</sup> It also created a framework for international drug control by forming the criteria that countries should follow with regard to drug policy.<sup>149</sup> The second drug-related convention, the *Convention on Psychotropic Substances* (1971),

---

<sup>132</sup> UNDP, *Opening spaces to citizen security and human development*, 2010.

<sup>133</sup> Finlay, *WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America*, 2010, p. 8.

<sup>134</sup> UNODC, *A New Strategy and New Partnerships for Drug Control*, 2011.

<sup>135</sup> UNODC, *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*, 2011.

<sup>136</sup> US Department of State, *Security Strategy for Central America and Mexico*, 2007.

<sup>137</sup> US Department of State, *Security Strategy for Central America and Mexico*, 2007.

<sup>138</sup> UNODC, *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*, 2011.

<sup>139</sup> UNODC, *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*, 2011.

<sup>140</sup> UNODC, *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*, 2011.

<sup>141</sup> UNODC, *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*, 2011.

<sup>142</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations, *Social and Humanitarian assistance - International cooperation for narcotic drug control*, 2011.

<sup>143</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Secretary-General remarks to SC meeting on drug trafficking as a threat to international peace and security*, 2009.

<sup>144</sup> International Drug Policy Consortium, *UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)*, 2011.

<sup>145</sup> International Drug Policy Consortium, *UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)*, 2011.

<sup>146</sup> UNODC, *Data and analysis*, 2011.

<sup>147</sup> UNODC, *United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute*, 2011.

<sup>148</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (E/RES/1961/833)*, 1961.

<sup>149</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (E/RES/1961/833)*, 1961.

was created as a response to the growing variety of drugs that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Lysergic acid diethylamide (commonly known as LSD) and amphetamines.<sup>150</sup> Finally, the *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* (1988) is aimed at effectively tackling the issue of drug trafficking.<sup>151</sup> It provides important countermeasures to halt drug trafficking such as how to control precursors (substances that are not dangerous in and of themselves but are used in the production of illicit drugs) and how to combat money laundering.<sup>152</sup>

These conventions are nearly universal, as over 180 countries have signed and ratified all three of them.<sup>153</sup> Due to the controversial nature of this subject for many Member States, such vast support is an impressive achievement and indicates the global nature of this problem.<sup>154</sup>

In spite of this, the international drug control system and the associated international frameworks have their critics, citing the unforeseen, negative impact of the implementation of relevant conventions on illicit drugs on the formation of black markets.<sup>155</sup> Additionally, the considerable financial and logistical resources needed to effectively fight the increased violence, which is linked to drug trafficking, and the fact that suppression of drug production in some locations has shifted the burden to other regions are other critiques leveled at the existing system.<sup>156</sup>

There are two crime-related treaties which underpin the work of UNODC and support the previously mentioned drug conventions. The *Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (UNTOC), adopted via General Assembly *Resolution 55/25* in 2000 is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime.<sup>157</sup> The Convention is further supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas of organized crime such as the *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air*; and the *Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms*. The UNTOC works in conjunction with the second treaty, the *Convention against Corruption* (CAC).<sup>158</sup> CAC was adopted via General Assembly *Resolution 55/61* of 2003 and is the first legally binding international anti-corruption instrument requiring states to implement anti-corruption methods.<sup>159</sup>

### ***The Illicit Drug Chain***

The UN refers to the term “illicit drugs” as drugs which are under international control which could possibly be used for licit medical purposes but which are produced, trafficked, or consumed illegally.<sup>160</sup> The UN drug control conventions; the *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961)*, the *Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)* and the *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)* do not distinguish between licit and illicit drugs, instead they concern themselves with the ways in which these drug types are used.<sup>161</sup> To be able to build an effective policy strategy against illicit drug trade, it is important to examine the economic, social, and political impacts of the production, trafficking, and consumption stages in the illicit drug chain.

#### *Production*

Although the main producing countries in the region are Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, drug production has become an integral part of the economy in many Central and South American countries, particularly within the countries which mainly produce cocaine.<sup>162</sup> The drug market opens up employment for many thousands of people who would otherwise be marginalized, especially poor farmers in the countryside who have become a key part of drug

---

<sup>150</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on Psychotropic Substances (E/RES/1971/1576)*, 1971.

<sup>151</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (A/RES/43/120)*, 1988.

<sup>152</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (A/RES/43/120)*, 1988.

<sup>153</sup> UNODC, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 2008, p. 9.

<sup>154</sup> Blickman, *Caught in the Crossfire*, 1998, p. 1.

<sup>155</sup> UNODC, *A Century of Drug Control*, 2008, p. 9.

<sup>156</sup> UNODC, *A Century of Drug Control*, 2008, p. 9.

<sup>157</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention against Transnational organized crime (A/RES/55/25)*, 2000.

<sup>158</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *Convention against Corruption (A/RES/55/61)*, 2003.

<sup>159</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2010, p. 4.

<sup>160</sup> UNODC, *Information on drugs*, 2011.

<sup>161</sup> UNODC, *Information about drugs*, 2011.

<sup>162</sup> UNODC, *Coca cultivation in the Andean Region*, 2007, p. 13.



production.<sup>163</sup> It is hard to judge them for their choice of action since most of them have earned more money, gained more control over their destinies and improved their children's lives in ways they could never have legally.<sup>164</sup> The majority of revenues from the drug production leave the countryside but portions of the profit have been invested in better schools, infrastructure and shelter.<sup>165</sup>

### *Trafficking*

Today illegal drug trafficking is carried out by organized groups who focus their business on cocaine and heroin, the two most expensive drugs on the market. The drug traffickers have organized networks at all stages, not only in the consuming countries, but also in the producing, processing, and transit regions.<sup>166</sup> The illicit drug trade controlled by TCNs is estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.<sup>167</sup> The drug trafficking business undermines the economic stability in the producing and transit countries since the TCNs engaging in drug trafficking conduct business through infiltration and corruption of government officials and impinge on public decisions through terrorism.<sup>168</sup> Drug trafficking creates an underground world and corrupts a large proportion of the public, particularly the youth.<sup>169</sup> In the long-term, this contributes to a fragmentation and disintegration of societies.<sup>170</sup>

### *Consumption*

Globally, some 210 million people, between the ages of 15-64 years use illicit drugs each year.<sup>171</sup> The total number of illicit drug users has increased since the late 1990s, but the frequency rates have remained largely stable, as has the number of problem drug users, which is estimated at between 15 and 39 million.<sup>172</sup> The consumption of illicit drugs is rapidly spreading across the world, mainly in Canada, the US, and Eastern Europe. The latter has experienced increased drug demand due to high unemployment rates and facilitated movement in the European Union.<sup>173</sup> In recent years, drug consumption within the Central and South American region has grown.<sup>174</sup>

### ***Case Study: Cocaine in the Americas***

Research has shown that criminality related to drug trafficking has replaced political and regional conflicts as the primary source of citizen insecurity in the Americas.<sup>175</sup> There is violence directly associated with the protection of drug trafficking but violence also occurs as TCNs corrupt police and criminal justice institutions.<sup>176</sup> The illegal drug trade is directly linked to the increased rate of kidnapping, money laundering and arms trafficking; many of the issues facing the region transcend national boundaries and require a regional response.<sup>177</sup>

North America has statistically recorded the highest use of cocaine, but recent trends are showing consumption in the US is declining while European states have shown an increase in their use of the drug.<sup>178</sup> The decline of cocaine use in the US is due to the increase in international and national efforts to stop its importation and production. Prevention programs such as those promoted in schools are designed to show the significant negative effects of cocaine use and the violence associated with drug trafficking and TCNs, persuading and inspiring youth to abstain from using the drug.<sup>179</sup> Overall coca cultivation in the main producing countries has declined in recent years from 181 thousand hectares in 2007 down to 158 thousand hectares in 2009, a 12% decrease.<sup>180</sup> Colombia has seen the largest decline out of the three producing countries from 80 thousand hectares in 2008 down to 68 thousand hectares in 2009.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>163</sup> UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social impacts and policy response*, 1994, p. 22.

<sup>164</sup> UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social impacts and policy response*, 1994, p. 22.

<sup>165</sup> UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social impacts and policy response*, 1994, p. 22.

<sup>166</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 4.

<sup>167</sup> Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Towards a paradigm shift*, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>168</sup> World Bank, *Crime and Violence in Central America*, 2011, p. 18.

<sup>169</sup> World Bank, *Crime and Violence in Central America*, 2011, p. 18.

<sup>170</sup> World Bank, *Crime and Violence in Central America*, 2011, p. 18.

<sup>171</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>172</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>173</sup> World Bank, *Crime and Violence in Central America*, 2011, p. 18.

<sup>174</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>175</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 4.

<sup>176</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 4.

<sup>177</sup> Bibies, *Transnational organized crime and terrorism*, 2011, p. 243- 258.

<sup>178</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 174.

<sup>179</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 174.

<sup>180</sup> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, *Hemispheric report fifth evaluation round*, 2011, p. 18.

<sup>181</sup> UNODC, *The Global Cocaine Market*, 2010, p. 66.

*Plan Colombia* along with the *Andean Counterdrug Initiative* (ACI) have been influential and pragmatic in fighting the production of coca by using increased funding for alternative farming to create economic opportunities for farmers previously employed in the cultivation of coca. The main objectives of *Plan Colombia* and ACI are to promote peace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking.<sup>182</sup>

The Andean region, specifically the northern mountains in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, is where the largest amount of cocaine is produced and exported to the world.<sup>183</sup> The Andeans are the only area in the world where coca leaves are grown in mass quantities. They have been bombarded by regional and international anti-drug policies aimed towards various parts of the cocaine problem.<sup>184</sup> Production, trafficking and consumption are the main focuses of many anti drug measures, but the problems are deeper than stopping coca cultivation or cartel operations.<sup>185</sup> ACI and *Plan Colombia* work toward their goals by implementing various initiatives aimed at increasing the security forces resources and training, supporting and financing alternative crop development programs and infrastructure development to support farmers with new sources of income.<sup>186</sup> ACI and *Plan Colombia* focus on institution building and strengthening the rule of law and democracy throughout Colombia to create a society united behind the eradication of cocaine and drug production. Strengthening institutions, economic equality and alternative sources of economic opportunities is imperative to the transformation of Colombian and Andean regions.<sup>187</sup> The *Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act* created in 2002 are focused on an incentive driven base for economic rewards.<sup>188</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Central America has become a major transit point for drugs, mainly cocaine, destined for the US and Europe.<sup>189</sup> This region, now considered the most violent in the world, which also includes some of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>190</sup> The economic incentives for the producers and traffickers are so high that the market is constantly fueled, resulting in failure on the part of many governments in their attempts to reduce the drug supply through initiatives such as eradication of drug crops.<sup>191</sup> International attempts to reduce consumption through legal sanctions have also failed, as the areas in which drugs are grown are often inhabited by some of the most marginalized populations.<sup>192</sup>

The illicit drug trade affects all Member States in one way or another, posing a challenge to properly coordinated strategies. Important questions for delegates to reflect on while conducting research include: which kind of campaigns would be effective to undertake against drug producers and traffickers? Should there be more economic incentives combined with educational campaigns to discourage consumers and producers? Should there continue to be military interventions such as we have seen in Mexico and “the war on drugs”? To what extent are the existing international initiatives being effective to address drug trafficking in Central and South America? What kind of new mechanisms could be introduced? As delegates, you must decide on an effective solution that appeals to the CND to resolve this global dilemma, since Member States are all affected in one way by the illicit drug trade, it is therefore the shared responsibility and challenge for Member States to collectively develop a coordinated strategy.

---

<sup>182</sup> Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report*, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>183</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>184</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>185</sup> Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, *Hemispheric report fifth evaluation round*, 2011, p. 31.

<sup>186</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>187</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 26.

<sup>188</sup> Seelke, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, 2011, p. 26.

<sup>189</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2011, p. 124.

<sup>190</sup> UNODC, *A New Strategy and New Partnerships for Drug Control*, 2011.

<sup>191</sup> UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social impacts and policy response*, 1994, p. 27.

<sup>192</sup> UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social impacts and policy response*, 1994, p. 27.

## Annotated Bibliography

### *II. Drug trafficking and its Role in Fueling Conflict in Central and South America*

Chalk, P. (2011). *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*. RAND. Retrieved October 16, 2011, from [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\\_MG1076.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf)  
*Published by RAND Project AIR FORCE with the goal of identifying and analyzing major security trends in Latin America, this report provides a concrete overview of transnational crime, specifically as it relates to drugs. The report provides a comprehensive overview of the main players in the drug trade, the process of trafficking, and the impact. This document is enormously valuable for delegates as it provides a strong analysis of the current issues under discussion.*

Dudley, S. (2010). *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*. Retrieved September 22, 2011, from, <http://www.stevendudley.com/pdf/Wilson%20Center%20Central%20America%20Dudley%2005%2017%2010.pdf>  
*Dudley's report focus on the drug trafficking organizations (DTO) operating in Central America. The report is presented by theme rather than by country. It provides a brief history of DTO activity in the region; descriptions of who operates the DTOs, both locally and internationally, DTO infiltration in government and security forces; local, regional and international efforts and challenges as they try and combat DTOs. This chapter is centered on the three countries where the problem of DTOs appears to be the most acute: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.*

German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). (2002). *Drugs and Conflict*. Discussion Paper by the GTZ Drugs and Development Programme. Retrieved October 16, 2011, from <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-drugs-conflict.pdf>  
*The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between drugs and conflict, which according to the authors, has been under researched. The document provides an introduction to the topic and puts forth a set of research questions for further work. This document is very relevant for delegates as the key element of this topic is the link between drugs in fueling conflict, and this document provides some guidance on that link.*

Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy. (2011). *Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift*. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from [http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/livro\\_ingles\\_02.pdf](http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/livro_ingles_02.pdf)  
*The report is written by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, a think tank initiated by ex-presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, César Gaviria of Columbia and Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, and 17 other independent thinkers. The report evaluates the impact of policies on the "war on drugs" and forms recommendations for more efficient, secure, and humane strategies. As the title implies the report introduces a new paradigm, based on three main directives; treating drug users as a matter of public health, reducing drug consumption through information, education and prevention and focusing repression on organized crime.*

Tullis, P. (1994). *Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses: World Summit for Social Development*. Retrieved September 10, 2011, from [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/\\$file/bp2.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/$file/bp2.pdf)  
*Tullis paper was published by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), an autonomous agency engaging in research on the social dimensions of contemporary problems affecting development. This report examines the social consequences of illicit drug production, trafficking and consumption, as well as the factors contributing to the global drug problem. In the light of this analysis, it considers the potential and limitations of the various possible policy responses—both those strategies already attempted and those that have as yet only been proposed. The authors provide presents alternative development strategies based on education and treatment in consuming countries, and rural development in producing countries and how decriminalization has the potential to reduce the crime associated with the drug trade by reducing its profits.*

United Nations Development Program. (2010). *Opening spaces to citizen security and human development*. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/latinamericathecaribbean/irdhc-2009-2010-summary.pdf>

*United Nations Development program releases an annual report on Human Development; this report is focusing on Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the Report, people's insecurity is a big challenge to human development in Central America, but this challenge comes with a solution. The document states that there is a need for a so-called "smart strategy" of security for human development. This new comprehensive strategy must include preventive and coercive actions, include the justice system and respect the establishment of the values of civility. The report focuses on the importance of citizen's security as a key to success for a new security strategy in Central and South America.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008). *A Century Of International Drug Control*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100\\_Years\\_of\\_Drug\\_Control.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf)

*In 2011, this report was published by UNDOC presenting the international drug control systems history and future challenges. The report include discussion on how the Chinese opium epidemic spurred international action on drug control as policymakers realized that the problem was too complex for any one country to tackle in isolation. The report aims to present the history and the modern drug control system, why and how it started, and how is has impacted the drug production and consumption and future challenges for the international drug control efforts.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Coca cultivation in the Andean Region*.(2007). Retrieved September 24, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Andean\\_report\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Andean_report_2008.pdf)

*UNODCs report shows an increased level in the Coca production in the Andean Region. The total area of land under coca cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in 2007 was 181,600 hectares, a 16% increase over 2006, and the highest level since 2001. The increase was driven by a 27% rise in Colombia and smaller increases of 5% and 4% respectively in Bolivia and Peru. The report points out that peripheral coca plots are growing in remote locations and the strategies governments have used to destroy large- scale coca farms have unsettled armed groups and drug traffickers.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire*. Retrieved September 10, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central\\_America\\_Study\\_2007.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central_America_Study_2007.pdf)

*The report Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, highlights the need for greater international support for the region if development efforts are to have any long-term impact. No issue today affects the stability and development of Central America more than crime, it says. The region's many vulnerabilities create conditions to criminality, which in turn undermine growth and impede social development. The report explains that several countries of the region are vulnerable because of socio-economic factors resulting from income inequality, urbanization, mass poverty, a high proportion of youth, easy access to a large supply of guns, and an unstable post-conflict environment.*

United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. (2001). *Concept Note the Santo Domingo pact and Managua mechanism: A Partnership and monitoring mechanism for the Caribbean and Central America*. Retrieved September 12, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/SDP\\_MM\\_Concept\\_Note\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/SDP_MM_Concept_Note_FINAL.pdf)

*The UNDOC concept note explains the action planned for "The Santo Domingo Pact and Managua Mechanism (SICA) for the period of March 2010- February 2013. SICA is an inter-regional technical assistance program working towards a more effectively responses to illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime affecting the Caribbean and Central America. The document gives an in-depth overview of the structure of the program, key issues and future challenges and opportunities.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report*. Retrieved DATE from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2011\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf)

*The World Drug Report is a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime annual publication that analyzes market trends, compiling detailed statistics on drug markets. The World Drug Report 2011 provides update information and statistic on the global drug market. This year's report states that the global markets for cocaine, heroin, and cannabis have declined, but the abuse of prescription drugs have increased. The report discusses the different drugs and provides data for the whole drug chain: production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs.*

World Bank. (2011). *Crime and Violence: A Staggering Toll on Central American Development. Vol. I*. Retrieved September 12, 2011, from

[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL\\_VOLUME\\_I\\_ENGLISH\\_CrimeAndViolence.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf)

*Crime and Violence: A Staggering Toll on Central American Development is a publication by the World Bank. The report shows that growing crime and violence in Central America not only has an immediate human impact but also poses a tremendous threat to development in the region. The report presents a detailed analysis on three main drivers of high crime and violence rates in Central America: drug trafficking, youth violence and gangs, and the widespread availability of firearms. The report estimates that violence costs Central American economies 8% of their GDP as a result of the high costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care costs alone. This is significant when considering that, in 2010, Central America's GDP growth rate in was only 2% compared to the rest of Latin America's GDP, which grew about 6%.*

### **III. Exploring the Effects of Decriminalization Strategies within International Drug Policy**

*“On the demand side, there is growing recognition that we must draw a line between criminals (drug traffickers) and their victims (drug users), and that treatment for drug use offers a far more effective cure than punishment.”<sup>193</sup>*

#### ***Introduction***

Drug decriminalization is a sensitive topic, generating debate both domestically and internationally. In 2011, an independent high-level commission composed of many former heads of state reactivated the debate around decriminalization, published a report which strongly advocated decriminalization and claimed the “war on drugs” was a failure.<sup>194</sup> Although a few states are now implementing decriminalization strategies, the global paradigm remains that of prohibition, thus a shift towards decriminalization would fundamentally change the practice and approach to drugs that has been standard for decades, uprooting many commonly held beliefs regarding drug use.<sup>195</sup>

Regardless of the divisiveness of the issue, drug control remains high on the international agenda, due in part to the illicit nature of the trade, but also to the high number of drug users. In 2008, there were around 200 million illicit drug users worldwide, and between 11 and 20 million of these users were injecting drugs, and around 170 million are regular users of cannabis.<sup>196</sup> The issue of illicit drug consumption is therefore a global issue, and the question of decriminalization deserves to be debated as a legitimate alternative to current drug control methods. Such debate, however, should be discussed within the framework of the existing international treaties on drug related issues, building on existing good practice, and building partnerships within the UN system, as well as between regional organizations, Member States and civil society organizations.<sup>197</sup>

---

<sup>193</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011.

<sup>194</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. 2011. p. 1.

Csete, *From the Mountaintops: What the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in Switzerland*, 2010.

<sup>195</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>196</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2010 – Executive Summary*, 2010. p. 13.

<sup>197</sup> Latin American Commission on drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. 2010. p. 11.  
United Nations, *The Social Impact of Drug Abuse*, 1995.

## ***History of Drug Regulation and Decriminalization***

### *Defining decriminalization, legalization, and prohibition*

Decriminalization is most easily defined by what it is not: prohibition nor legalization. Decriminalization removes the illegality of an act; therefore, a decriminalized act has previously been penalized but no longer carries a penalty.<sup>198</sup> There are two types of decriminalization: a *de jure* decriminalization, which involves passing a law to decriminalize, while a *de facto* decriminalization can only result in an administrative decision.<sup>199</sup> A *de facto* decriminalization essentially requires an administrative decision “not to prosecute acts that nonetheless remain subject to arrest and imprisonment under the law.”<sup>200</sup>

The concept of decriminalization has increasingly earned support over the past few decades, particularly within Europe, as an alternative to prohibition.<sup>201</sup> It is important at this point to properly differentiate decriminalization and legalization: while decriminalization seeks to *remove criminal prosecutions* on drug users, legalization creates a system where drug production and selling becomes *regulated by the state*.<sup>202</sup> Legalization of one or many drugs would thus create a system resembling that of the regulation of tobacco or alcohol in most countries.

A comparison between drug prohibition and the “Prohibition Era” in the United States of America is therefore not irrelevant; alcohol prohibition indeed compares very well to drug prohibition.<sup>203</sup> Alcohol prohibition came into force on January 16, 1920, in the United States and was largely motivated by the temperance movement, whose belief that alcohol was at the heart of most problems in the American society: “prohibitionists were utopian moralists; they believed that eliminating the legal manufacture and sale of alcoholic drink would solve the major social and economic problems of American society.”<sup>204</sup> The same idea can be identified when considering the motives of the “war on drugs.”<sup>205</sup>

The impact of prohibition can also be compared to that of drug prohibition. Alcohol prohibition, for example, did not succeed in reducing consumption levels, and even encouraged consumption of strong liquors compared to beer, because they are easier to smuggle, and the same observations are made in the context of drug prohibition when comparing cannabis to stronger drugs.<sup>206</sup> The situations of drug prohibition and alcohol prohibition are therefore comparable, and lesson from the implementation of an alcohol control could be drawn and applied to a drug control policy.<sup>207</sup> Some would even advocate legalization and control of drugs based on observations made on the alcohol control that followed the prohibition era. However differences exist as well, and it is interesting for example to note that drug prohibition has never really been referred to as “prohibition” by most governments.<sup>208</sup>

Drug prohibition is actually a worldwide system, and since the twentieth century the international community has taken a very important role in it and international treaties.<sup>209</sup> For this reason, it would be unrealistic to suppose that implementing a drug control system – like the post-prohibition alcohol control system in the US – would be easy or even feasible under the present circumstances.<sup>210</sup> This explains why, when overlooking the level of drug prohibition in countries over the world, none of them have actually implemented a legalization of drugs through the creation of a drug control system. The level of drug tolerance remains that of *de facto* or *de jure* decriminalization, like the

---

<sup>198</sup> Drug Policy Forum of Texas, *Policy*, 2009.

<sup>199</sup> Drug Policy Forum of Texas, *Policy*, 2009.

Sinha, *The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions*, 2001.

<sup>200</sup> Drug Policy Forum of Texas, *Policy*, 2009.

<sup>201</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009. p. 3.

<sup>202</sup> Drug Policy Forum of Texas, *Policy*, 2009.

<sup>203</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

Sinha, *The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions*, 2001.

<sup>204</sup> Sinha, *The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions*, 2001.

<sup>205</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>206</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

Sinha, *The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions*, 2001.

<sup>207</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>208</sup> Nadelmann, *Thinking Seriously about Alternatives to Drug Prohibition*, 2004.

<sup>209</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>210</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition: Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

Netherlands or Portugal and is often limited to cannabis.<sup>211</sup> When considering an alternative to drug prohibition, it therefore seems logical that the most frequently mentioned one be decriminalization.

### *From prohibition to decriminalization*

Prohibition of drugs as a public policy in the modern era can be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century, when Napoleon prohibited his troops from using cannabis during his campaign in Egypt.<sup>212</sup> The 1858 *Passage of Poison Act* in the United Kingdom is also seen as a starting point in drug prohibition policies.<sup>213</sup> This law can be identified as the basis for many drug legislations that followed, the goal of which was to prevent such drugs from circulating even at the expense of pharmaceutical research.<sup>214</sup>

Governments have therefore regulated and prohibited drugs since the nineteenth century, but such regulation grew to a stronger extent in the twentieth century when the international community signed several treaties on the matter, the most important being the *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, signed in 1961.<sup>215</sup> This convention combines and codifies the previous treaties into one, and “The principal objectives of the Convention are to limit the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture, and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes and to address drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers.”<sup>216</sup> This was followed by the beginning of the “War on Drugs,” launched by United States President Richard Nixon when he declared drug abuse as “public enemy number one” in 1971.<sup>217</sup> Many countries have been involved in this war; for example, Plan Colombia entailed the USA working with Colombia in an effort to rid the state of its drug problem.<sup>218</sup>

Since the early 1970s, a movement in favor of marijuana decriminalization has also formed, often supported by the academic community broadly, with particularly strong advocates within the scientific community.<sup>219</sup> An emblematic example of that was Jimmy Carter’s campaign for decriminalization in 1976, supported by several prominent scientists, including Dr. Peter Bourne, who did not view cannabis as a dangerous substance.<sup>220</sup> The decriminalization movement then grew stronger and is now using the “War on Drugs” as a counter-example.<sup>221</sup> Reports in favor of decriminalization sometimes identify the “War on Drugs” as a failure and call for alternative strategies to combat the negative impacts of narcotic drugs on society, such as the 2011 *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, signed by many high-profile personalities, including former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.<sup>222</sup> One of the main ideas of this report is a call to “end the criminalization, marginalization, and stigmatization of people who use drugs but do no harm to others.”<sup>223</sup>

### ***Impacts of Decriminalization***

Discussing drug decriminalization must include weighing the potential impacts of such measure. While the available data on the issue is limited – given the relatively limited number of countries that have implemented decriminalization as a policy – there are arguments in favor and against decriminalization based on empirical evidence and qualitative observation which can contribute to the discussion within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.<sup>224</sup>

---

<sup>211</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*. 2009.

<sup>212</sup> Transform Drug Policy Foundation, *A History of Drug Prohibition*, 2010.

<sup>213</sup> Transform Drug Policy Foundation, *A History of Drug Prohibition*, 2010.

<sup>214</sup> Holloway, *The regulation of the supply of drugs in Britain before 1868*, 1996.

<sup>215</sup> *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, 1961.

<sup>216</sup> *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, 1961.

<sup>217</sup> Vulliamy, *Nixon's 'war on drugs' began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging*, 2011.

<sup>218</sup> United States Department of State, *Plan Colombia*, 2001.

<sup>219</sup> PBS, *Thirty Years of America's Drug War, a chronology*, 2000.

UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses*, 1994.

<sup>220</sup> PBS, *Thirty Years of America's Drug War, a chronology*, 2000.

UNRISD, *Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses*, 1994.

<sup>221</sup> Nadelman, *Thinking Seriously about Alternatives to Drug Prohibition*, 1992.

<sup>222</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, 2011.

<sup>223</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, 2011, p. 1.

<sup>224</sup> Califano, *Should drugs be decriminalised? No*, 2007.

Chand, *Should drugs be decriminalised? Yes*, 2007.



### *Potential impact on social issues*

One of the main debates around drug decriminalization is the social impact that such measure could have, including on drug consumption. Indeed, those advocating decriminalization are confident that it has a positive impact on drug consumption, as it allows reducing consumption and providing better help to drug addicts.<sup>225</sup> Drugs addicts would therefore not be considered as criminals but as victims and could be treated “as a matter of public health.”<sup>226</sup> The claim is also that decriminalization would allow better communication and prevention, therefore reducing the levels of drug consumption.<sup>227</sup> Fears, on the other side, are that levels of drugs consumption may actually increase as a consequence to drug decriminalization policies, and concerns are particularly expressed for the youth.<sup>228</sup> However, experiences have proved that concerns of seeing consumption increase were not justified, and the Portuguese example of drug decriminalization has washed those concerns away: consumption levels amongst teenagers between 15 and 19 years old have actually decreased since the decriminalization policy was implemented.<sup>229</sup>

Aside from consumption of drugs, the social impact decriminalization regards matters of public health and safety. Indeed reports in favor of drug decriminalization argue that decriminalization of drug usage would allow the state to focus on reducing drug-related violence and criminality.<sup>230</sup> On the other hand, decriminalization is sometimes denounced because it would create a harmful climate and make dangerous drugs available to anyone.<sup>231</sup> Decriminalization policies can also relate to public health, as they can be combined with harm reduction policies that seek to reduce the spread of infections related to drug usage.<sup>232</sup> The most important issue that could be tackled through decriminalization is the spread of HIV: in Russia, almost 37% of drug users are HIV positive.<sup>233</sup> However, those against drug decriminalization argue that harm-reduction policies need not be included in a wider decriminalization strategy, as this would make the measure more costly.<sup>234</sup>

### *Potential economic impact*

This leads us to discuss the economic implications of decriminalization. The debate on this issue mainly concentrates on drug-enforcement related spending. Supporters of decriminalization argue that enforcing existing laws has a very high cost: in the USA, the cost of arrest and trial of a drug trafficker is of \$150,000.<sup>235</sup> Decriminalization can help reduce the law enforcement costs, since drug consumers are no longer criminally prosecuted under these circumstances.<sup>236</sup> However, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the USA argues that the spending on drug control in the USA is minimal, especially when comparing it to the social cost of drug abuse.<sup>237</sup> Another side of the economic impact is the potential revenue that could be drawn from decriminalization. Again, it is important here to distinguish decriminalization and legalization: governments implementing a decriminalization policy cannot extract revenue from such strategy; it is under a legalization policy that a government could create a tax and benefit financially from the policy.<sup>238</sup> Therefore, the economic benefit that can be drawn from decriminalization is that of reducing the costs of prohibition and drug control.

### ***Implementing Decriminalization Strategies within the Existing International System***

The current international drug policy is coordinated by the United Nations, mainly through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).<sup>239</sup> The work of these organizations relies on a set of international treaties, most of which were combined, as explained before, in the

---

<sup>225</sup> Latin American Commission on drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*, 2010, p. 11. Yeates, *Globalization and Social Policy in a Development Context Regional Responses*, 2005.

<sup>226</sup> Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. 2010. p. 11.

<sup>227</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. 2011. p1.

<sup>228</sup> Dupont, *Drug Legalization, Harm Reduction, and Drug Policy*, 1995, p464.

Coomber, *The Control of Drugs and Drug Users: Reason or Reaction*, 1998.

<sup>229</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*. 2009, p. 14.

<sup>230</sup> Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. 2010. p. 25.

<sup>231</sup> Drug Watch International, *Against the Legalization or Decriminalization of drugs*.

<sup>232</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. 2011. p. 2.

<sup>233</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2010 – Executive Summary*, 2010. p. 22.

<sup>234</sup> Dupont, *Drug Legalization, Harm Reduction, and Drug Policy*, 1995, p. 464.

<sup>235</sup> Latin American Commission on drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. 2010. p. 27.

<sup>236</sup> Latin American Commission on drugs and Democracy, *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. 2010. p. 27.

<sup>237</sup> Drug Enforcement Administration, *Speaking Out Against Legalization*, 2010.

<sup>238</sup> Miron, *The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Publications*. 2005.

<sup>239</sup> Bewley-Taylor, *Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities*, 2002. p. 172.

*United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*.<sup>240</sup> The 1961 *Convention* was supplemented by the 1971 *Convention on Psychotropic substances* and the 1988 *United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances*.<sup>241</sup> The 1988 *Convention* has played an important role in shaping the current situation for drug related policy-makers, as it defined the conditions under which drugs were subject to criminal offense.<sup>242</sup> The text determined that “cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plants for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs” should be considered a criminal offense by the states and that personal consumption should also be considered as such but “subject to the constitutional principles and the basic concepts of [the state’s] legal system.”<sup>243</sup> This leaves little room for decriminalization policies, but explains how decriminalization strategies that only decriminalize the user are respectful of the 1988 convention.

Very often, cannabis is the targeted drug for such policies, because it is sometimes thought that its dangerousness was overestimated when the 1961 convention was established.<sup>244</sup> Thus, most decriminalization examples around the world concern small amounts of cannabis for personal consumption; it is the case in Belgium, Italy, Australia, and some US states.<sup>245</sup> Further attempts to decriminalize drugs have been made in several countries, it is the case in Portugal, where decriminalization concerns more than cannabis, but also the Netherlands, where a *de facto* decriminalization exists regarding the transport and selling of cannabis, pushing the 1988 convention to its limits.<sup>246</sup>

All these attempts, however, are often very limited by the current international drug policy. Indeed, the fact that drug prohibition is a global system has been identified as a strong barrier.<sup>247</sup> The issue mainly stands in how the international community has organized itself around the issue of drug prohibition: “*Global drug prohibition* is a world-wide system structured by a series of international treaties that are supervised by the United Nations. Every nation in the world is either a signatory to one or more of the treaties or has laws in accord with them.”<sup>248</sup> The three conventions mentioned earlier are organized in such a way that they are complex to revise, and the revision process is unbalanced to the benefit of the States supporting a *status quo*.<sup>249</sup> Moreover, the wiggle room for interpretation of the treaties is very limited, and leaves little space for strategies of decriminalization.

Internal oppositions, from either politicians or academics, also exist. Scholars have sometimes argued that even a small degree of decriminalization could represent risks of increased consumption, particularly amongst the youth.<sup>250</sup> Therefore, due to the strong weight of the international community in the matter, and the supervisory role given to the UN, calls for decriminalization are sometimes expected from the UN and its agencies, as demonstrated by some reports.<sup>251</sup> The UN position on decriminalization has often been regarded as ambiguous, but in the past few years the UN and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) have taken stances that favored decriminalization.<sup>252</sup> Increasingly, the UNODC seems to be supportive of strategies that favor treatment over punishment of drug users, as underlined by Yuri Fedotov, the UNODC’s executive director, in the *World Drug Report 2011*.<sup>253</sup> The clearest position was taken in 2009, when the UNODC praised Portugal’s decriminalization strategy in its yearly report.<sup>254</sup> Despite these recent interventions, the international legal framework remains a

---

<sup>240</sup> *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*, 1961.

<sup>241</sup> *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*, 1971.

*United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Illicit Substances*, 1988.

<sup>242</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*, 2009, p. 6.

<sup>243</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*, 2009, p. 6.

*United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Illicit Substances*, 1988. Art 3.

<sup>244</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*, 2009, p. 10-11.

Jelsma, *The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the Future*, 2011.

<sup>245</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*, 2009, p. 11.

Jelsma, *The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the Future*, 2011.

<sup>246</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*, 2009, p. 10-11.

<sup>247</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition. Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>248</sup> Levine, *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition. Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*, 2004.

<sup>249</sup> Bewley-Taylor, *Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities*, 2002, p. 173.

<sup>250</sup> Dupont, *Drug Legalization, Harm Reduction, and Drug Policy*, 1995, p. 464.

Csete, *From the Mountaintops: What the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in Switzerland*, 2010.

<sup>251</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, 2011, p. 1.

Zimring, *The Search for Rational Drug Control*, 1992.

<sup>252</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011.

<sup>253</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2011*, 2011.

<sup>254</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2009*, 2009, p. 168.

complicated barrier for policy makers wishing to implement a drug decriminalization strategy.<sup>255</sup> It is not impossible, however, as demonstrated by the Portuguese example.

### ***Case Study: Drug Decriminalization in Portugal***

Portugal's decriminalization initiative started in July 2001, when a national decriminalization law took effect.<sup>256</sup> The law is unique because it is nationwide, and it does not only include "soft drugs," such as marijuana, but also "hard drugs," such as cocaine and heroin.<sup>257</sup> Portugal's decriminalization policy is now considered to be a resounding success by many:

*"None of the fears promulgated by opponents of Portuguese decriminalization has come to fruition, whereas many of the benefits predicted by drug policymakers from instituting a decriminalization regime have been realized. While drug addiction, usage, and associated pathologies continue to skyrocket in many EU States, those problems – in virtually every relevant category have been either contained or measurably improved within Portugal since 2001."*<sup>258</sup>

Portugal's strategy focuses on reducing or even eliminating sentences related to drug usage.<sup>259</sup> Drug possession or usage is not a criminal offense in Portugal but an administrative violation; however drug trafficking remains a criminal offense (which is important in the context of the European free market).<sup>260</sup> This allows the Portuguese administration to monitor the use of drugs and implement, among other things, a harm-reduction strategy regarding drug-related infections such as HIV.<sup>261</sup> Among the interesting results of Portuguese decriminalization, it has been shown that drug consumption has not increased, especially amongst young people.<sup>262</sup> As stated previously, the UNODC has recognized that Portugal's decriminalization was a success.<sup>263</sup>

The Portuguese case study must however be understood within its context, as it was implemented under very specific circumstances. The political context is noteworthy: there was little to no opposition to the 2001 decriminalization law in Portugal amongst local politicians, which helped in shaping a strong law and defining exactly what the terms would be.<sup>264</sup> We have shown earlier that internal opposition could be a problem when designing decriminalization strategies, and the Portuguese example demonstrates that decriminalization strategies are more likely to be successful when they receive full support in the country. In addition, within the European context it is also unusual, as most European Union countries are implementing "depenalization" rather than "decriminalization," which only reducing criminal prosecutions.<sup>265</sup> Moreover, most European countries have focused on cannabis, while Portugal has applied decriminalization to all drugs.<sup>266</sup> Portugal is an instructive case-study, as it shows two things. First of all, it shows that decriminalization strategies can be successful and yield satisfactory results in terms of consumption levels and public health. Secondly, this case demonstrates that large-scale decriminalization policies can be implemented within the current international legal framework of drug policy.

### ***Conclusion***

The current situation on decriminalization and international drug policy is still very much shaped by the 1961 *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* and the 1988 *UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*. As underlined, the latter convention leaves room for decriminalization of drug use, but

---

<sup>255</sup> Domoslawski, *Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>256</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 1.

Domoslawski, *Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>257</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 1. Drug Policy Alliance, *Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach to Drug Use*, 2011.

Domoslawski, *Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>258</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 27-28.

Domoslawski, *Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>259</sup> Drug Policy Alliance, *Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach to Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>260</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 3.

ENCOD, *European NGOs Campaign for Legal Regulation of Drugs*, 2004.

<sup>261</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>262</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009.

<sup>263</sup> UNODC, *World Drug Report 2009*, 2009, p. 168.

<sup>264</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009, p. 1.

<sup>265</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009.

<sup>266</sup> Greenwald, *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*, 2009.

not production and transport.<sup>267</sup> If the situation remains the same, it is then unlikely that a shift in global policy will happen.<sup>268</sup> However, recent UN declarations, like the recognition of Portugal's successful decriminalization in the *2009 World Drug Report*, and the recently published *Report of the Global Commission For Drug Policy* might indicate a future trend.<sup>269</sup> Although they were focusing almost exclusively on cannabis, many reports like this one have been produced in the past in the USA (Shafer Report), the United-Kingdom (Wooton Report), France (Trautman Report), or Canada (Le Dain Report), but have been ignored.<sup>270</sup> It is thus unsure whether the *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy* will get attention from the international community, and much remains to be done if the international community wishes to see a shift in the current international drug policy.<sup>271</sup> The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has not yet produced a resolution on the issue of drug decriminalization.

Is decriminalization incompatible to the current drug policy scheme? What can the international community learn from the Portuguese example? How could the current international drug policy evolve regarding decriminalization? How should cannabis be considered in comparison to other drugs in the framework of decriminalization strategies?

## Annotated Bibliography

### III. Exploring the Effects of Decriminalization Strategies within International Drug Policy

Bewley-Taylor, D. (2003). Challenging the UN Control Conventions: problems and possibilities. *International Journal of Drug Policy*. 14 (2003): 171-179.

*United Nations treaties and conventions regarding drug control are a very complex aspect of the topic of drug decriminalization, but their understanding is absolutely necessary if the issue is to be debated. This article provides a great overview of what those conventions are and what they imply in terms of drug policy-making at national and international levels. Since the conventions have remained unchanged since they were signed, this paper is still up to date on the issue and does a good job at explaining what type of challenge the conventions can represent for decriminalization policies.*

Blickman, T. and M. Jelsma. (2009). Drug Policy reform in practice. *La Nueva Sociedad*, No. 222. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.tni.org/paper/drug-policy-reform-practice>

*This report from the TransNational Institute (TSI) is a study of drug policy practices mostly in European country. It contains a very instructive part on decriminalization and depenalization, which explains how the current international legal framework affects the states policy-making on the issue. It also has a separate section on cannabis decriminalization, where several decriminalization are detailed and explained.*

Drug Enforcement Administration. (2010). *Speaking Out Against Legalization*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from <http://www.justice.gov/dea/demand/speakout/05so.htm>

*Through a few quick facts, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the United States of America explains its position against legalization. Although it does not refer precisely to decriminalization, the pages are rich of statistics and facts that can provide a better understanding of the issue of prohibition, decriminalization and legalization through the eyes of policy-makers law enforcement administrations.*

Drug Watch International. (1996). *Against the Legalization or Decriminalization of drugs*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from <http://www.drugwatch.org/Against%20Legalization%20of%20Drugs.htm>

---

<sup>267</sup> Blickman, *Drug Policy reform in practice*. 2009. p. 6.

International Drug Policy Consortium, *Five Policy Principles*, 2009.

<sup>268</sup> Drug Policy Alliance, *Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach to Drug Use*, 2011.

International Drug Policy Consortium, *Five Policy Principles*, 2009.

<sup>269</sup> Global Commission on Drug Policy, *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, 2011.

ENCOD, *The Hard Way Forward to Another Drug Policy*, 2004.

<sup>270</sup> Gén , 'Cannabis: la france accro   la prohibition' in *Le Monde*, 2011.

ENCOD, *ENCOD Bulletin on Drug Policies in Europe*, 2011.

Drug Policy Alliance, *Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach to Drug Use*, 2011.

<sup>271</sup> International Drug Policy Consortium, *Five Policy Principles*, 2009.

*In this position statement, drug watch international explains its position against drug decriminalization and legalization. Drug Watch International is an international information network that promotes a drug-free culture and a drug free world. Although it is not updated very often, the Web site of the organization provides a good starting for those wishing to research more about prohibitionist stances in the decriminalization debate.*

Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2011). *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report>

*This document was published in June 2011 by a commission of high-profile personalities, including several former chiefs of state, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and Virgin Group Founder Richard Branson. It challenges the current War on Drugs and makes several recommendations to policymakers. It is largely in favor of decriminalization and harm-reduction strategies. This is a key document that is also very recent and should therefore be read by every delegate.*

Greenwald, G. (2009). *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*. Washington DC: CATO institute. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10080%2520](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10080%2520)

*Greenwald explains in detail Portugal's decriminalization strategy and shows how and why it can be considered as a success. It is a very complete and very interesting document, which also tackles more general issues about international drug policy, including the fact that decriminalization is not necessarily encouraged by the present treaties. It shows how Portugal has been able to push the limits of the existing treaty to create a legal decriminalization strategy.*

Levine, H. and C. Reinerman. (2004). *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition. Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*. Amsterdam: CEDRO. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/levine.alcohol.html>

*The comparison between the Prohibition Era and drug prohibition is an instructive part of this document, but the article also focuses on current international drug policy and its problems. The author seems to advocate legalization to a certain extent and explains that the current policy of drug prohibition at the international level is not good according to him. This document is a great and complete reading, as it tackles many aspects of drug policy.*

Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy. (2010). *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from [www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao\\_ingles\\_site.pdf](http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf)

*This report is similar to the Global Commission on Drug Policy Report, but provides its ideas under the regional perspective of Latin America. This allows the authors to focus extensively on crime rates and conflicts related to drug traffic and drug use. For example, the report explains that how corruption within the police and the administration in some countries is a real issue for both prohibition and decriminalization policies. This report also expresses an underlying feeling amongst Latin American states that prohibition is not working in the region.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *World Drug Report 2009*. Retrieved August 29, 2011, from [www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2009/WDR2009\\_eng\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf)

*Most World Drug Reports from the UNODC constitute a good reading – even if only limited to the executive summary – as they provide a good overview of the drug situation and drug policies around the world. This report is particularly significant since it is the report in which the UNODC approved the Portuguese decriminalization and its successful results. Reports of the UNODC can generally be considered to be a good overview of what the UN position is about drug policies.*

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report 2011*. Retrieved August 29, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html>

*This is the latest of the UNODC's yearly reports. It contains the latest available data regarding drug traffic and most importantly, illicit drug use around the world. This is a resource of statistics approved and developed by the United Nations, which can be very useful during the conference. Delegates are encouraged to spend time reading this report in order to have up-to-date information in their position papers and working papers. In this report, the UNODC director also mentions the issue of drug decriminalization, making it very relevant for the topic at hand.*

*United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Illicit Substances.* (1988). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from [www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1988\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf)

*This convention is at the core of international drug policy. Because it defines the drug-related acts that should be criminalized by all states, it also sets the framework in which drug decriminalization can be implemented by states. Article 3 of the Convention is particularly meaningful. All delegates should be familiar with this document, since it will most likely have to be quoted when debating and writing resolutions.*

## Bibliography

### *Committee History*

Chapter XIV. International drug control. (2011). In *Yearbook of the United Nations 2007*. Volume 61 (pp. 1275–1312). New York: Department of Public Information. Retrieved from [http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/2fee2152-ad0b-43ae-8f3c-b45a8472d60f/2/doc/2007\\_P3\\_CH14.pdf#xml=http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/2fee2152-ad0b-43ae-8f3c-b45a8472d60f/2/hilite/](http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/2fee2152-ad0b-43ae-8f3c-b45a8472d60f/2/doc/2007_P3_CH14.pdf#xml=http://unyearbook.un.org/isysquery/2fee2152-ad0b-43ae-8f3c-b45a8472d60f/2/hilite/).

Bayer, I., & Ghodse, H. (1999). Evolution of international drug control, 1945-1995. *Bulletin on Narcotics (Occasional Papers)*, LI(1-2), 1–17. Retrieved from <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.1075&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=9>.

Fazey, C. S. J. (2003). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme: politics, policies and prospect for change. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 14(2), 155–169. doi:10.1016/S0955-3959(03)00004-5.

Fedotov, Y. (2011, June). *Launch of the 2011 World Drug Report: Speech by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, New York. Retrieved from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2011/June/2011-06-23-world-drug-report-launch.html>.

Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2011). *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. Retrieved July 09, 2011, from <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report>.

Keefer, P. & Loayza, N. (Eds.). (2010). *Innocent Bystanders. Developing Countries and the War on Drugs*. Washington DC: World Bank.

United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. (2011). *Report on the fifty-fourth session (2 December 2010 and 21-25 March 2011)*. Retrieved July 09, 2011, from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V11/819/03/PDF/V1181903.pdf>.

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (1946, February 16). *Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. E/RES/1946/9(I). Retrieved September 02, 2011, from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/041/51/IMG/NR004151.pdf>.

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (1991, 21 June). *Terms of reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. E/RES/1991/38. Retrieved September 02, 2011, from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/696/36/IMG/NR069636.pdf>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *A Century of International Drug Control*. Retrieved August 12, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100\\_Years\\_of\\_Drug\\_Control.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Membership*. Retrieved September 02, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/02-membership.html>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *The Commission on Narcotic Drugs as governing body*. Retrieved September 02, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/cnd-governing-body.html>.



United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report 2011*. Retrieved July 09, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2011\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf).

Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (Eds.). (2008). *The Oxford handbook on the United Nations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yoder, A. (1997). *The Evolution of the United Nations System* (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis.

### ***I. Responding to the Challenge of Narco-Traffic and Organized Crime in West Africa***

Abdullah, I. (2004). *Between Terror and Democracy: The Sierra Leone Civil War*. Dakar, Senegal: The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Alhassane, B. (2010). *International Conflicts and National Security in the Republic of Niger: Challenges and Prospects*. Abuja, Nigeria: National Defense College.

Andres, A. (2008). *Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Terrorism: The New Achilles' Heel of West Africa*. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from [http://www.aprodex.com/UserFiles/File/COM\\_Achilles\\_heel\\_eng\\_may08.pdf](http://www.aprodex.com/UserFiles/File/COM_Achilles_heel_eng_may08.pdf).

BBC News. (2009). *Guinea Calls Corruption Hearing*. Retrieved August 16, 2011 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7844674.stm>.

BBC News. (2010). *Profile: Mamadou Tandja*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8181537.stm>.

BBC News. (2011). *Niger: Junta Hands Over to President Mahamadou Isouffou*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13002902>.

CBSNews. (2009). *In Nigeria, Clinton Lambastes Corruption*. Retrieved August 16, 2011 from <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/12/politics/main5237748.shtml>.

Davis, J. (2007). *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.

Digital Journal. (2011). *Niger Forms Anti-Corruption Body*. Retrieved August 16, 2011 from <http://digitaljournal.com/article/309680>.

Driscoll, J. (2009). Social Conflict and Political Violence in Africa. *Stanford Program on International and Cross Cultural Education*. Retrieved August 12, 2011 from <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/237/SocialConflict.pdf>.

Economic Community of West African States. (2008). *Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime in West Africa*. ECOWAS: Freetown. Retrieved August 29, 2011 from <http://www.uneca.org/coda/unodc/PoliticalDeclarationEnglish.pdf>.

Economic Community of West African States. (2010). *West African Coast Initiative "WACI" Freetown Commitment on Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa*. ECOWAS: Freetown. Retrieved August 29, 2011 from <http://unipsil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=z%2FPDhrb8LiY%3D&tabid=2480&mid=2793>.

Encyclopedia of the Nations. (2011). *Social and Humanitarian Assistance—International Cooperation for Narcotic Drug Control*. Retrieved September 14, 2011 from <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/Social-and-Humanitarian-Assistance-INTERNATIONAL-COOPERATION-FOR-NARCOTIC-DRUGS-CONTROL.html>.



- Farrah, D. (2004). *Fighting Terrorism in Africa (Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa)*. Retrieved September 8, 2011 from <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/232.pdf>.
- Farrah, D. (2009). *Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa (Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs)*. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FarahTestimony090623a1.pdf>.
- Global Financial Integrity. (2011). *Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2008*. Retrieved August 16, 2011 from <http://iff-update.gfi.org/>.
- Herbst, J. (1996). Responding to State Failure in Africa. *International Security*, Volume 21 (3): 1.
- Human Rights Watch. (2003). *The Regional Crisis and Human Rights Abuses in West Africa: A Briefing Paper to the UN Security Council*. Retrieved August 20, 2011 from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/06/20/regional-crisis-and-human-rights-abuses-west-africa>.
- Idrissa, K. (2008). *Armée et Politique au Niger (English Edition)*. Oxford, United Kingdom: African Books Collective.
- IIP Digital. (2011). *United States Resumes Aid Program in Niger*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/07/20110705134018ynattirb0.3476308.html#axzz1W4sidYIC>
- Ipe, J., J. Cockayne, and A. Millar. (2010). *Implementing the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in West Africa*. Washington D.C.: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.
- Levinson, D. (2002). *The Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, Volume 4*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- McGowan, P. (2005). Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Theoretical Perspectives. *Armed Forces and Society*, Volume 32 (1): 17.
- Norwegian Council for Africa. (2010). *Drug Addiction Hinders Child Soldier Reintegration*. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/19250.html>.
- Okocha, S. (2011). *Niger forms Anti-Corruption Body*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://digitaljournal.com/article/309680>.
- Olaniyan, O. (1996). *Foreign Aid, Self Reliance, and Economic Development in West Africa*. Connecticut, United States: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Reuters Africa. (2011). *Niger Launches Telephone Hotline to Fight Corruption*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJ0E77C05P20110813>.
- Shelley, L. (2010). *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Saidou, D. and J. McLure. (2011). *Mahamadou Issoufou Unites Opposition in Niger's Presidential Runoff Vote*. Retrieved August 25, 2011 from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-11/mahamadou-issoufou-unites-opposition-in-niger-s-presidential-runoff-vote.html>.
- Strategy Page. (2010). *Al Qaeda in West Africa*. Retrieved September 8, 2011 from <http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/20100812.aspx>.
- Traub, J. (2010). Africa's Drug Problem. *New York Times*. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Trade-t.html>.

United Nations Children's Fund. (2004). *Socio-Economic Impact of the Ivory Coast Crisis on Burkinabe Women and Children*. UNICEF: New York. Retrieved September 8, 2011 from [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burkinafaso\\_2135.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burkinafaso_2135.html).

United Nations Children's Fund. (2009). *Statistics on Burkina Faso*. UNICEF: New York. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burkinafaso\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/burkinafaso_statistics.html).

United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (2009). *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism-Niger*. UNHRC: Geneva. Retrieved August 29, 2011 from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USDOS,,NER,4c63b62f8,0.html>.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (2011). *2011 Regional Operations Profile-West Africa*. UNHCR: Geneva. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a9c6.html>.

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (1988). *UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1988\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 23, 2011 from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008). *Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Drug Abuse in West Africa, 2008-2011*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 29, 2011 from <http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowasresponseactionplan.html>.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 14, 2009 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West\\_Africa\\_Report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *World Drug Report*. UNODC: Vienna. Retrieved August 14, 2011 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2009/WDR2009\\_eng\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf).

United Nations Office for West Africa. (2009). *Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime*. UNOWA: Dakar. Retrieved August 22, 2011 from <http://unowa.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=800>.

United Nations Secretary General. (2011, 23 June). *Message for International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking*. Retrieved August 9, 2011 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13662.doc.htm>.

U.S. Agency for International Development. (2006). *West Africa—Malnutrition*. USAID: Washington D.C. Retrieved September 14, 2011 from [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/humanitarian\\_assistance/disaster\\_assistance/countries/west\\_africa/fy2006/west\\_africa\\_ma\\_sr01\\_02-23-06.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/west_africa/fy2006/west_africa_ma_sr01_02-23-06.pdf).

U.S. Department of State. (2011). *Background Note: Niger*. U.S. Department of State: Washington D.C. Retrieved September 14, 2011 from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5474.htm>.

Vanguard. (2011). *Jonathan Pledges Cooperation to Fight 'Terrorism'*. Retrieved September 11, 2011 from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/jonathan-pledges-cooperation-to-fight-terrorism/>.

## **II. Drug trafficking and its Role in Fueling Conflict in Central and South America**

Amnesty International. (2011). *Colombia*. Retrieved September 22, 2011, from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/colombia/report-2011>

Bibies, P. (2001). Transnational organized crime and terrorism. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*: 17(3):243-258.

- Blickman, T. (1998). *Caught in the Crossfire*. Retrieved September 27, 2011, from <http://www.undrugcontrol.info/en/un-drug-control/ungass/item/2485-caught-in-the-crossfire>
- Chalk, P. (2011). *The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response*. RAND. Retrieved October 16, 2011, from [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND\\_MG1076.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf)
- German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). (2002). *Drugs and Conflict*. Discussion Paper by the GTZ Drugs and Development Programme. Retrieved October 16, 2011, from <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-drugs-conflict.pdf>
- Dudley, S. (2010). *Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras*. Retrieved September 22, 2011, from <http://www.stevendudley.com/pdf/Wilson%20Center%20Central%20America%20Dudley%2005%2017%2010.pdf>
- Encyclopedia of the Nations. (2011). *Social and Humanitarian assistance - International cooperation for narcotic drug control*. Retrieved October 11, 2011, from <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/Social-and-Humanitarian-Assistance-INTERNATIONAL-COOPERATION-FOR-NARCOTIC-DRUGS-CONTROL.html>
- Fajnzylber, P, Lederman, D, & Loayza, N. (2001). *Inequality and Violent Crime*. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Crime&Inequality.pdf>
- Finlay, B. (2010). *WMD, Drugs, and Criminal Gangs in Central America: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Need With UN Security Council Resolution 1540*. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from [http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/CArpt710\\_1.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/CArpt710_1.pdf)
- Glüsing, J. (2010). *Could Decriminalization Be the Answer?*. Retrieved September 21, 2011, from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,676861,00.html>
- Goeshing, J. (2006). *A Multi-Pronged Approach to Transnational Criminal Networks: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean*. Retrieved September 24, 2011, from [http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working\\_papers/05JULIA.pdf](http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/05JULIA.pdf)
- Hamdeh, S. (2011). *The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?*. Retrieved September 20, 2011, from <http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/2011v4/content/merida-initiative.pdf>
- International Drug Policy Consortium. (2011). *UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)*. Retrieved September 20, 2011, from <http://www.idpc.net/policy-advocacy/global-advocacy/global-system-drug-control/unodc>
- International Narcotic Control Board. (2011). *Mandate and Functions*. Retrieved September 19, 2011, from <http://www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html>
- Latin America Commission on Drugs and Democracy. (2011). *Drugs and Democracy towards a paradigm shift*. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from [http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/livro\\_ingles\\_02.pdf](http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/livro_ingles_02.pdf)
- Oppenheimer, A. (2011). *Obama's biggest challenge – Central America*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from [http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/03/obamas\\_biggest\\_challenge\\_cent.html](http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/03/obamas_biggest_challenge_cent.html)
- Oxford English Dictionary. (2011). *Paramilitary*. Oxford University Press. Online version. Retrieved September 21, 2011, from <http://oed.com/search?searchType=dictionary&q=paramilitary>
- Seelke, W, Beittel, S. (2011). *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf>
- Stokes, D. (2005). *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*. New York: Zed Books
- Tate, W. (2001). *Paramilitaries in Colombia*. Retrieved September 14, 2011, from <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/8.1/Essays/Tate.pdf>

The New York Times. (2011). *Drug Wars Push Deeper Into Central America*. Retrieved September, 20, 2011, from [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/americas/24drugs.html?\\_r=1&pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/americas/24drugs.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)

World Bank. (2011). *Crime and Violence: A Staggering Toll on Central American Development*. Retrieved from 12, 2011, from <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22881633~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

World Bank. (2011). *Crime and Violence in Central America*. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL\\_VOLUME\\_I\\_ENGLISH\\_CrimeAndViolence.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/FINAL_VOLUME_I_ENGLISH_CrimeAndViolence.pdf)

Tullis, L. & Painter, J. (1994). *Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses: World Summit for Social Development*. Retrieved September 10, 2011, from [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/\\$file/bp2.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/$file/bp2.pdf)

Ungar, M. (2009). Democracy, Law, and Order, *Latin American Research Review*, 44 (3): 235-246.

United Nations Development Program. (2010). *Opening spaces to citizen security and human development*. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/regionalreports/latinamericathecaribbean/irdhc-2009-2010-summary.pdf>

United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2007). *Strategy for the period 2008-2011 for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Note by the Secretariat (E/CN.7/2007/14)*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=E/CN.7/2007/14>

United Nations General Assembly. (2003). *United Nations Convention against Corruption. (A/RES/55/61)*. Retrieved September 27, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention\\_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf)

United Nations General Assembly. (2000). *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (A/RES/55/25)*. Retrieved September 22, 2011, from [http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final\\_documents\\_2/convention\\_eng.pdf](http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_eng.pdf)

United Nations General Assembly. (2011). *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>

United Nations General Assembly. (1971). *United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (E/RES/1971/1576)*. Retrieved September 14, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1971\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf)

*United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Illicit Substances*. (1988). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from [www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1988\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf)

United Nations General Assembly. (2004). *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Retrieved September 16, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>

United Nations General Assembly. (1961). *United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (E/RES/1961/833)*. Retrieved October 1, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1961\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf)

United Nations General Assembly. (1971). *United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (E/RES/1971/1576)*. Retrieved October 17, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1971\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf)

United Nations Security Council. (2009). *Presidential Statement Calls for Stronger International Cooperation with Global, Regional Bodies against Drug Trafficking*. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9807.doc.htm>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008). *A Century of International Drug Control*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100\\_Years\\_of\\_Drug\\_Control.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. (2010). *Concept Note the Santo Domingo pact and Managua mechanism: A Partnership and monitoring mechanism for the Caribbean and Central America*. Retrieved September 26, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/SDP\\_MM\\_Concept\\_Note\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/SDP_MM_Concept_Note_FINAL.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Alternative Development - Drug Control through Rural Development*. Retrieved September 19, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/alt-development\\_rural-development.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/alt-development_rural-development.pdf)

United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime. (2011). *A New Strategy and New Partnerships for Drug Control*. Retrieved September 26, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/2011/March/2011-03-21-cnd-opening-session.html>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire*. Retrieved in September 10, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central\\_America\\_Study\\_2007.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central_America_Study_2007.pdf)

United Nations News Center. (2011). *Central America under threat from tentacles of drug trade, UN debate hears*. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=drug&Cr1=&NewsID=36105>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2007). *Coca cultivation in the Andean Region*. Retrieved September 24, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Andean\\_report\\_2008.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Andean_report_2008.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Data and analysis*. Retrieved September, 25 from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/index.html?ref=menuse>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2008). *Drugs and crime in Central America and the Caribbean*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drugs-and-crime-in-central-america-and-the-caribbean.html>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *Homicide Statistics*. Retrieved September, 19 from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2010/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2010\\_lo-res.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Information on drugs*. Retrieved September 15, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/illicit-drugs/definitions/index.html>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/mexico-central-america-and-the-caribbean.html>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *World Drug Report 2009*. Retrieved September 12, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2009/WDR2009\\_eng\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *World Drug Report 2010*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2010/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2010\\_lo-res.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report 2011*. Retrieved September 24, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2011\\_ebook.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *Political Declaration and the Plan of Action on the international cooperation towards an integrated and balanced strategy to counter the world drug problem*. Retrieved October 12, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Uploads/CND-52-RelatedFiles/V0984963-English.pdf>



United Nations Security Council. (2009, December 8). *Secretary-General remarks to Security Council meeting on drug trafficking as a threat to international peace and security*. Retrieved September 29, 2011, from [http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/SG\\_SC\\_Drug\\_Trafficking.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/SG_SC_Drug_Trafficking.pdf)

United States Department of State. (2007). *Security Strategy for Central America and Mexico*. Retrieved September 26, 2011, from <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/93586.htm>

Vargas, R. (1999). *The revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the illicit drug trade*. Retrieved October 13, 2011, from <http://www.tni.org/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade>

Youngers, C. & Rosin, E. (2005). *Drugs and democracy in Latin America: the impact of U.S. policy*. New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Retrieved October 12, 2011, from <http://books.google.com/?id=jAzNQGZ0AV4C&pg=PA103&dq=farc+paramilitaries&cd=54#v=onepage&q=farc%20paramilitaries>.

### ***III. Exploring the Effects of Decriminalization Strategies within International Drug Policy***

Bewley-Taylor, D. (2003). Challenging the UN Control Conventions: problems and possibilities. *International Journal of Drug Policy*. 14: 171-179.

Blickman, T. & Jelsma, M. (2009). Drug Policy reform in practice. *La Nueva Sociedad*. 222. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.tni.org/paper/drug-policy-reform-practice>

Califano, J. (2007, November 8). *Should drugs be decriminalised? No*. British Medical Journal. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.bmj.com/content/335/7627/967.full>

Chand, K. (2007, November 8). *Should drugs be dicriminalised? Yes*. British Medical Journal. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.bmj.com/content/335/7627/966.full>

Coomber, R. (1998, January 18). *The Control of Drugs and Drug Users: Reason or Reaction*. New York: CRC Press.

Csete, J. (2010, October). *From the Mountaintops: What the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in Switzerland*. Open Society Foundations. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles\\_publications/publications/csete-mountaintops-20101021](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles_publications/publications/csete-mountaintops-20101021)

Domoslawski, A. (2011, August). *Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use*. Open Society Foundations. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles\\_publications/publications/drug-policy-in-portugal-20110829](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles_publications/publications/drug-policy-in-portugal-20110829)

Drug Policy Forum of Texas. (2009). *Policy*. Retrieved August 27, 2011, from <http://www.dpft.org/policy.htm>

Drug Enforcement Administration. (2010). *Speaking Out Against Legalization*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from <http://www.justice.gov/dea/demand/speakout/05so.htm>

Drug Policy Alliance. (2011). *Drug Courts Are Not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach to Drug Use*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Courts%20Are%20Not%20the%20Answer\\_Final2.pdf](http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Courts%20Are%20Not%20the%20Answer_Final2.pdf)

Drug Watch International. (1996). *Against the Legalization or Decriminalization of drugs*. Retrieved September 23, 2011, from <http://www.drugwatch.org/Against%20Legalization%20of%20Drugs.htm>

DuPont, R. & Voth, E. (1995). Drug Legalization, Harm Reduction, and Drug Policy. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 123 (6): 461-465.

European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies. (2011, September 30). *ENCOD Bulletin on Drug Policies in Europe*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://encod.org/info/ENCOD-BULLETTIN-80.html>

European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies. (2007, May 18). *The Hard Way Forward to Another Drug Policy*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://encod.org/info/THE-HARD-WAY-FORWARD-TO-ANOTHER.html>

European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies. (2004). *European NGOs Campaign for Legal Regulation of Drugs*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.akzept.org/pdf/aktuel\\_pdf/ENCOD%20PressRelease19.03.04.pdf](http://www.akzept.org/pdf/aktuel_pdf/ENCOD%20PressRelease19.03.04.pdf)

Géné, J.P. (2011). Cannabis: la France accro à la prohibition. *Le Monde*. Retrieved September 14, 2011, from [http://www.lemonde.fr/week-end/article/2011/09/02/cannabis-la-france-accro-a-la-prohibition\\_1566279\\_1477893.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/week-end/article/2011/09/02/cannabis-la-france-accro-a-la-prohibition_1566279_1477893.html)

Global Commission on Drug Policy. (2011). *Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/Report>

Greenwald, G. (2009). *Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful drug policies*. Washington DC: CATO institute. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10080%2520](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10080%2520)

Holloway, S. (1995). The regulation of the supply of drugs in Britain before 1868. In: Porter and Teich, *Drugs and Narcotics in History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

International Drug Policy Consortium. (2009, January). *Five Policy Principles*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles\\_publications/publications/idpc-policy-principles-20100601](http://www.soros.org/initiatives/drugpolicy/articles_publications/publications/idpc-policy-principles-20100601)

Jelsma, M. (2011, February). *The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the Future*. Transnational Institute Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies Nr. 10. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.tni.org/paper/development-international-drug-control>

Levine, H. & Reinerman, C. (2004). *Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition. Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy*. Amsterdam: CEDRO. Retrieved August 30, 2011, from <http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/levine.alcohol.html>

Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2010). *Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift*. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from [www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao\\_ingles\\_site.pdf](http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf)

Nadelman, E. (1992). Thinking Seriously about Alternatives to Drug Prohibition. *Political Pharmacology: Thinking about Drugs*, Vol. 121 (3). Retrieved October 14, 2011, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027122>

Miron, J. (2005). *The Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Publications*. Retrieved September 22 from <http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/mironreport.html>

PBS (2000). *Thirty Years of America's Drug War, a chronology*. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/>

Sinha, J. (2001). *The History and Development of the Leading International Drug Control Conventions*. Prepared for the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs, Parliament of Canada. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/371/ille/library/history-e.htm>

Transform Drug Policy Foundation. (2010). *A History of Drug Prohibition*, Retrieved September 1, 2011, from [http://www.tdpf.org.uk/Policy\\_Timeline.htm](http://www.tdpf.org.uk/Policy_Timeline.htm)

United Nations. (1995). *The Social Impact of Drug Abuse*. Study prepared by UNDCP as a position paper for the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995. [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical\\_series\\_1995-03-01\\_1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1995-03-01_1.pdf)



United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2009). *World Drug Report 2009*. Retrieved August 29, 2011, from [www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR\\_2009/WDR2009\\_eng\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *World Drug Report 2011*. Retrieved August 29, 2011, from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2011.html>

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. (1994, November). *Illicit Drugs: Social Impacts and Policy Responses*. UNRISD Briefing Paper No. 2, World Summit for Social Development. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/\\$file/bp2.pdf](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/4C3D0BE90FAD550480256B6400419B57/$file/bp2.pdf)

United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances. (1971). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from [www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention\\_1971\\_en.pdf](http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention_1971_en.pdf)

United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. (1961). Retrieved September 2, 2011, from [http://www.incb.org/incb/convention\\_1961.html](http://www.incb.org/incb/convention_1961.html)

United States Department of State. (2001). *Plan Colombia*. Retrieved October 6, 2011, from [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs\\_000328\\_plancolombia.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html)

United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Illicit Substances. (1988). Retrieved September 20, 2011, from [www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1988\\_en.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf)

Yeates, N. (2005). *"Globalization" and Social Policy in a Development Context Regional Responses*. Social Paper No. 18. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from [http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpPublications\)/BC2F4898F6E7B775C1256FF6002EDCC9?OpenDocument](http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpPublications)/BC2F4898F6E7B775C1256FF6002EDCC9?OpenDocument)

## **Rules of Procedure Commission on Narcotic Drugs**

### ***Introduction***

1. These rules shall be the only rules which apply to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) and shall be considered adopted by the Commission prior to its first meeting.
2. For purposes of these rules, the Director, the Assistant Director(s), the Under-Secretaries-General, and the Assistant Secretaries-General, are designates and agents of the Secretary-General and Director-General, and are collectively referred to as the “Secretariat.”
3. Interpretation of the rules shall be reserved exclusively to the Director-General or her or his designate. Such interpretation shall be in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the National Model United Nations and in furtherance of the educational mission of that organization.
4. For the purposes of these rules, “President” shall refer to the chairperson or acting chairperson of the commission.

### **I. SESSIONS**

#### **Rule 1 - *Dates of convening and adjournment***

The commission shall meet every year in regular session, commencing and closing on the dates designated by the Secretary-General.

#### **Rule 2 - *Place of sessions***

The Commission shall meet at a location designated by the Secretary-General.

### **II. AGENDA**

#### **Rule 3 - *Provisional agenda***

The provisional agenda shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the Commission at least sixty days before the opening of the session.

#### **Rule 4 - *Adoption of the agenda***

The agenda provided by the Secretary-General shall be considered adopted as of the beginning of the session. The order of the agenda items shall be determined by a majority vote of those present and voting. Items on the agenda may be amended or deleted by the Commission by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

*The vote described in this rule is a procedural vote and, as such, observers are permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those delegates, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to a vote.*

#### **Rule 5 - *Revision of the agenda***

During a session, the Commission may revise the agenda by adding, deleting, deferring or amending items. Only important and urgent items shall be added to the agenda during a session. Permission to speak on a motion to revise the agenda shall be accorded only to three representatives in favor of, and three opposed to, the revision. Additional items of an important and urgent character, proposed for inclusion in the agenda less than thirty days before the opening of a session, may be placed on the agenda if the Commission so decides by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. No additional item may, unless the Commission decides otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, be considered until a committee has reported on the question concerned.

*For purposes of this rule, the determination of an item of an important and urgent character is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final. If an item is determined to be of such a character, then it requires a two-thirds vote of the Commission to be placed on the agenda. It will, however, not be considered by the Commission until a committee has reported on the question. The votes described in this rule are substantive vote, and, as such, observers are not permitted to cast a vote. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting means members (not including observers) in attendance at the session during which this motion comes to vote.*

#### **Rule 6 - *Explanatory memorandum***

Any item proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents.

### III. SECRETARIAT

#### ***Rule 7 - Duties of the Secretary-General***

1. The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall act in this capacity in all meetings of the Commission.
2. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the Commission and be responsible for all the arrangements that may be necessary for its meetings.

#### ***Rule 8 - Duties of the Secretariat***

The Secretariat shall receive, print, and distribute documents, reports, and resolutions of the Commission, and shall distribute documents of the Commission to the Members, and generally perform all other work which the Commission may require.

#### ***Rule 9 - Statements by the Secretariat***

The Secretary-General, or her/his representative, may make oral as well as written statements to the Commission concerning any question under consideration.

***Rule 10 - Selection of the President*** The Secretary-General or her/his designate shall appoint, from applications received by the Secretariat, a President who shall hold office and, *inter alia*, chair the Commission for the duration of the session, unless otherwise decided by the Secretary-General.

***Rule 11 - Replacement of the President*** If the President is unable to perform her/his functions, a new President shall be appointed for the unexpired term at the discretion of the Secretary-General.

### IV. LANGUAGE

#### ***Rule 12 - Official and working language***

English shall be the official and working language of the Commission.

#### ***Rule 13 - Interpretation (oral) or translation (written)***

Any representative wishing to address any body or submit a document in a language other than English shall provide interpretation or translation into English.

*This rule does not affect the total speaking time allotted to those representatives wishing to address the body in a language other than English. As such, both the speech and the interpretation must be within the set time limit.*

### V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

#### ***Rule 14 – Quorum***

The President may declare a meeting open and permit debate to proceed when representatives of at least one third of the members of the Commission are present. The presence of representatives of a majority of the members of the Commission shall be required for any decision to be taken.

*For purposes of this rule, members of the Commission means the total number of members (not including observers) in attendance at the first night's meeting.*

#### ***Rule 15 - General powers of the President***

In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him or her elsewhere by these rules, the President shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Commission, direct the discussions, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings of the Commission and over the maintenance of order at its meetings. He or she shall rule on points of order. He or she may propose to the Commission the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each member may

Speak on an item, the adjournment or closure of the debate, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting.

*Included in these enumerated powers is the President's power to assign speaking times for all speeches incidental to motions and amendment. Further, the President is to use her/his discretion, upon the advice and at the consent of the Secretariat, to determine whether to entertain a particular motion based on the philosophy and principles of the NMUN. Such discretion should be used on a limited basis and only under circumstances where it is necessary to advance the educational mission of the Conference. For purposes of this rule, the President's power to propose to the Commission entails her/his power to entertain motions, and not to move the body on his or her own motion.*

**Rule 16**

The President, in the exercise of her or his functions, remains under the authority of the Commission.

**Rule 17 - Points of order**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, which shall be decided immediately by the President. Any appeal of the decision of the President shall be immediately put to a vote, and the ruling of the President shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

*Such points of order should not under any circumstances interrupt the speech of a fellow representative. Any questions on order arising during a speech made by a representative should be raised at the conclusion of the speech, or can be addressed by the President, sua sponte, during the speech. For purposes of this rule, the members present and voting mean those members (not including observers) in attendance at the meeting during which this motion comes to vote.*

**Rule 18**

A representative may not, in rising to a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

**Rule 19 - Speeches**

1. No one may address the Commission without having previously obtained the permission of the President. The President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.
2. Debate shall be confined to the question before the Commission, and the President may call a speaker to order if her/his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.
3. The Commission may limit the time allowed to speakers and all representatives may speak on any question. Permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives favoring and two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call her or him to order without delay.

*In line with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN, in furtherance of its educational mission, and for the purpose of facilitating debate, if the President determines that the Commission in large part does not want to deviate from the limits to the speaker's time as it is then set, and that any additional motions will not be well received by the body, the President, in her/his discretion, and on the advice and consent of the Secretariat, may rule as dilatory any additional motions to change the limits of the speaker's time.*

**Rule 20 - Closing of list of speakers**

Members may only be on the list of speakers once but may be added again after having spoken. During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Commission, declare the list closed. When there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure by decision of the Commission.

*The decision to announce the list of speakers is within the discretion of the President and should not be the subject of a motion by the Commission. A motion to close the speakers' list is within the purview of the Commission and the President should not act on her/his own motion.*

**Rule 21 - Right of reply**

If a remark impugns the integrity of a representative's State, the President may permit that representative to exercise her/his right of reply following the conclusion of the controversial speech, and shall determine an appropriate time

limit for the reply. No ruling on this question shall be subject to appeal.

*For purposes of this rule, a remark that impugns the integrity of a representative's State is one directed at the governing authority of that State and/or one that puts into question that State's sovereignty or a portion thereof. All interventions in the exercise of the right of reply shall be addressed in writing to the Secretariat and shall not be raised as a point of order or motion. The reply shall be read to the Commission by the representative only upon approval of the Secretariat, and in no case after voting has concluded on all matters relating to the agenda topic, during the discussion of which, the right arose.*

**Rule 22 - Suspension of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension of the meeting, specifying a time for reconvening. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass.

**Rule 23 - Adjournment of the meeting**

During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the meeting. Such motions shall not be debated but shall be put to the vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. After adjournment, the Commission shall reconvene at its next regularly scheduled meeting time.

*As this motion, if successful, would end the meeting until the Commission's next regularly scheduled session the following year, and in accordance with the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and in furtherance of its educational mission, the President will not entertain such a motion until the end of the last meeting of the Commission.*

**Rule 24 - Adjournment of debate**

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of debate on the topic under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded to two representatives favoring and two opposing adjournment, after which the motion shall be put to a vote immediately, requiring the support of a majority of the members present and voting to pass. If a motion for adjournment passes, the topic is considered dismissed and no action will be taken on it.

**Rule 25 - Closure of debate**

A representative may at any time move the closure of debate on the item under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified her/his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall be put to the vote immediately. Closure of debate shall require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If the Commission favors the closure of debate, the Commission shall immediately move to vote on all proposals introduced under that agenda item.

**Rule 26 - Order of motions** Subject to rule 23, the motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- a) To suspend the meeting;
- b) To adjourn the meeting;
- c) To adjourn the debate on the item under discussion;
- d) To close the debate on the item under discussion.

**Rule 27 - Proposals and amendments**

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, with the names of twenty percent of the members of the Commission would like the Commission to consider the proposal or amendment. The Secretariat may, at its discretion, approve the proposal or amendment for circulation among the delegations. As a general rule, no proposal shall be put to the vote at any meeting of the Commission unless copies of it have been circulated to all delegations. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments or of motions as to procedure, even though such amendments and motions have not been circulated. If the sponsors agree to the adoption of a proposed amendment, the proposal shall be modified accordingly and no vote shall be taken on the proposed amendment. A document modified in this manner shall be considered as the proposal pending before the Commission for all purposes, including subsequent amendments.

*For purposes of this rule, all proposals shall be in the form of working papers prior to their approval by the Secretariat. Working papers will not be copied, or in any other way distributed, to the Commission by the*

*Secretariat. The distribution of such working papers is solely the responsibility of the sponsors of the working papers. Along these lines, and in furtherance of the philosophy and principles of the NMUN and for the purpose of advancing its educational mission, representatives should not directly refer to the substance of a working paper that has not yet been accepted as a draft resolution. After approval of a working paper, the proposal becomes a draft resolution and will be copied by the Secretariat for distribution to the Commission. These draft resolutions are the collective property of the Commission and, as such, the names of the original sponsors will be removed. The copying and distribution of amendments is at the discretion of the Secretariat, but the substance of all such amendments will be made available to all representatives in some form.*

**Rule 28 - Withdrawal of motions**

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before voting has commenced, provided that it has not been amended. A motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

**Rule 29 - Reconsideration of a topic**

When a topic has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Commission, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, so decides. Reconsideration can only be moved by a representative who voted on the prevailing side of the original motion to adjourn. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.

*For purposes of this rule, those present and voting means those representatives, including observers, in attendance at the meeting during which this motion is voted upon by the body.*

VI. VOTING

**Rule 30 - Voting rights**

Each member of the Commission shall have one vote.

*This rule applies to substantive voting on amendments, draft resolutions, and portions of draft resolutions divided out by motion. As such, all references to member(s) do not include observers, who are not permitted to cast votes on substantive matters.*

**Rule 31 - Request for a vote**

A proposal or motion before the Commission for decision shall be voted upon if any member so requests. Where no member requests a vote, the Commission may adopt proposals or motions without a vote.

*For purposes of this rule, proposal means any draft resolution, an amendment thereto, or a portion of a draft resolution divided out by motion. Just prior to a vote on a particular proposal or motion, the President may ask if there are any objections to passing the proposal or motion by acclamation, or a member may move to accept the proposal or motion by acclamation. If there are no objections to the proposal or motion, then it is adopted without a vote.*

**Rule 32 - Majority required**

1. Unless specified otherwise in these rules, decisions of the Assembly shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.
2. For the purpose of tabulation, the phrase "members present and voting" means members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

*All members declaring their representative States as "present and voting" during the attendance roll call for the meeting during which the substantive voting occurs, must cast an affirmative or negative vote, and cannot abstain.*

**Rule 33 - Method of voting**

1. The Commission shall normally vote by a show of placards, except that a representative may request a roll call, which shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the members, beginning with the member whose name is randomly selected by the President. The name of each present member shall be called in any roll call, and one of its representatives shall reply "yes," "no," "abstention," or "pass."

*Only those members who designate themselves as present or present and voting during the attendance roll*

*call, or in some other manner communicate their attendance to the President and/or Secretariat, are permitted to vote and, as such, no others will be called during a roll-call vote. Any representatives replying pass, must, on the second time through, respond with either yes or no. A pass cannot be followed by a second pass for the same proposal or amendment, nor can it be followed by an abstention on that same proposal or amendment.*

2. When the Commission votes by mechanical means, a non-recorded vote shall replace a vote by show of placards and a recorded vote shall replace a roll-call vote. A representative may request a recorded vote. In the case of a recorded vote, the Commission shall dispense with the procedure of calling out the names of the members.
3. The vote of each member participating in a roll call or a recorded vote shall be inserted in the record.

***Rule 34 - Explanations of vote***

Representatives may make brief statements consisting solely of explanation of their votes after the voting has been completed. The representatives of a member sponsoring a proposal or motion shall not speak in explanation of vote thereon, except if it has been amended, and the member has voted against the proposal or motion.

*All explanations of vote must be submitted to the President in writing before debate on the topic is closed, except where the representative is of a member sponsoring the proposal, as described in the second clause, in which case the explanation of vote must be submitted to the President in writing immediately after voting on the topic ends.*

***Rule 35 - Conduct during voting***

After the President has announced the commencement of voting, no representatives shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual process of voting.

***Rule 36 - Division of proposals and amendments***

Immediately before a proposal or amendment comes to a vote, a representative may move that parts of a proposal or of an amendment should be voted on separately. If there are calls for multiple divisions, those shall be voted upon in an order to be set by the President where the most radical division will be voted upon first. If objection is made to the motion for division, the request for division shall be voted upon, requiring the support of a majority of those present and voting to pass. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favor and two speakers against. If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are involved shall then be put to a vote. If all operative parts of the proposal or of the amendment have been rejected, the proposal or the amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.

*For purposes of this rule, most radical division means the division that will remove the greatest substance from the draft resolution, but not necessarily the one that will remove the most words or clauses. The determination of which division is most radical is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

***Rule 37 - Amendments***

An amendment is a proposal that does no more than add to, delete from, or revise part of another proposal.

*An amendment can add, amend, or delete operative clauses, but cannot in any manner add, amend, delete, or otherwise affect perambulatory clauses.*

***Rule 38 - Order of voting on amendments***

When an amendment is moved to a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal shall be voted on first and then the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all the amendments have been put to the vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or more amendments are adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.



*For purposes of this rule, furthest removed in substance means the amendment that will have the most significant impact on the draft resolution. The determination of which amendment is furthest removed in substance is subject to the discretion of the Secretariat, and any such determination is final.*

**Rule 39 - Order of voting on proposals**

If two or more proposals, other than amendments, relate to the same question, they shall, unless the Commission decides otherwise, be voted on in the order in which they were submitted.

**Rule 40 - The President shall not vote**

The President shall not vote but may designate another member of her/his delegation to vote in her/his place.

## VII. CREDENTIALS

**Rule 41 - Credentials**

The credentials of representatives and the names of members of a delegation shall be submitted to the Secretary-General prior to the opening of a session.

**Rule 42**

The Commission shall be bound by the actions of the General Assembly in all credentials matters and shall take no action regarding the credentials of any member.

## VII. PARTICIPATION OF NON-MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

**Rule 43 - Participation of non-Member States**

1. The Commission shall invite any Member of the United Nations that is not a member of the Commission and any other State, to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
2. A committee or sessional body of the Commission shall invite any State that is not one of its own members to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that State.
3. A State thus invited shall not have the right to vote, but may submit proposals which may be put to the vote on request of any member of the body concerned.

*If the Commission considers that the presence of a Member invited according to this rule is no longer necessary, it may withdraw the invitation again. Delegates invited to the Commission according to this rule should also keep in mind their role and obligations in the committee that they were originally assigned to. For educational purposes of the NMUN Conference, the Secretariat may thus ask a delegate to return to his or her committee when his or her presence in the Commission is no longer required.*

**Rule 45 - Participation of national liberation movements**

The Commission may invite any national liberation movement recognized by the General Assembly to participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that movement.

**Rule 46 - Participation of and consultation with specialized agencies**

In accordance with the agreements concluded between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the specialized agencies shall be entitled: a) To be represented at meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary organs; b) To participate, without the right to vote, through their representatives, in deliberations with respect to items of concern to them and to submit proposals regarding such items, which may be put to the vote at the request of any member of the Commission or of the subsidiary organ concerned.

**Rule 47 - Participation of non-governmental organization and intergovernmental organizations**

Representatives of non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations accorded consultative observer status by the General Assembly and other non-governmental organizations/intergovernmental organizations designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Commission on the recommendation of the Bureau, may participate, with the procedural right to vote, but not the substantive right to vote, in the deliberations of the Commission on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations.